Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
8-8-2018 1:00 PM

A Duty to Adopt? On the Ethics and Politics of Adoption
Veromi Arsiradam, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: McLeod, Carolyn, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Philosophy
© Veromi Arsiradam 2018

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Arsiradam, Veromi, "A Duty to Adopt? On the Ethics and Politics of Adoption" (2018). Electronic Thesis
and Dissertation Repository. 5644.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5644

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Around the world, millions of children are in need of parental care. In response
to this global crisis, some philosophers defend a moral duty for prospective
parents to adopt children rather than procreate. Challenges to the duty focus
almost exclusively on parents’ desires to have biological children. However,
reasons deriving primarily from one’s membership in a social group that favour
procreation over adoption or oppose transracial adoptions are largely overlooked.
In this dissertation, I examine whether group-based reasons could justifiably
override a duty to adopt for prospective parents who are members of racially
oppressed groups. I ultimately argue that group-based interests cannot outweigh
the needs of existing children for parental care, and thus provide further support
for the duty to adopt.
My thesis is divided into four chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduce a duty to
adopt and argue that it is resilient against a series of proposed defeating
conditions and foundational challenges. In Chapter 2, I develop three groupbased reasons in favour of procreation that challenge the duty: reparative justice,
racial solidarity, and cultural preservation. In Chapter 3, I argue that these
reasons do not definitively support procreation over adoption and, instead, seem
to favour adopting children either within or outside one’s racial group. I then
identify remaining challenges to the duty that take issue with transracial
adoptions and place a high value on children’s belonging in same-race families or
in their communities of origin. In Chapter 4, I argue that the needs of individual
children to receive timely parental care should not be compromised by groups’
interests and that children’s relationships with their communities of origin can be
maintained in transracial or extra-communal adoptive placements.
Keywords
Duty to Adopt, Adoption, Procreation, Ethics of Adoption, Politics of Adoption,
Children’s Belonging, Family Ethics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy
i

Dedication
For Sephe

ii

Acknowledgments
This doctoral project came together with the support of many people. I extend my
deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Carolyn McLeod, whose philosophical rigor,
thoughtfulness, and care have helped shape this dissertation for the best.
Carolyn’s insightful observations and our inspiring conversations have guided my
thinking, creativity, argumentation, and moral commitments. I have become a
better writer and student of philosophy thanks to her expertise, patience, and
encouragement. I could not have asked for a more dedicated supervisor and
mentor; it has been a privilege to learn from and work with Carolyn.
I would like to thank the members of my supervisory committee, Dennis
Klimchuk and Erica Lawson, whose feedback and guidance were invaluable in
shaping my views. I am honoured to have received thoughtful advice, warmth
and support from my examination committee members, Lorraine Davies,
Richard Vernon, and Tina Rulli, all of whom have inspired my approach to doing
philosophy. I am especially grateful to have had Tina as my external examiner.
Many faculty members at Western have provided mentorship and helpful
feedback on my doctoral work throughout the years: Andrew Botterell, Samantha
Brennan, Louis Charland, Robert DiSalle, Helen Fielding, Tracy Isaacs, Anthony
Skelton, Chris Smeenk, Rob Stainton, and Jackie Sullivan. For their continued
mentorship and friendship over the years, I extend my thanks to professors at
Dalhousie – Greg Scherkoske, Kirstin Borgerson, Chike Jeffers, Letitia Meynell,
and Andrew Fenton.
I am grateful for funding I received from Western’s Department of Philosophy,
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
(SGPS), Rotman Institute of Philosophy; and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC).

iii

I had the pleasure of sharing my years at Western with incredible graduate
students and postdocs (many of whom have graduated). Special thanks to Emma
Ryman, Katy Fulfer, Melissa Jacquart, Alida Liberman, Cameron Fenton, Justin
Bzovy, Marie Gueguen, Stephanie Kapusta, and Rob Kantymir Moir for their
input and support.
Family and friends made this dissertation possible. I am grateful for the strong
support I received from ma and Eric; Aunty Sha; Aunty Kouslai and Uncle
Mathaven; Aunty Patty and Uncle Kreason; Romy and Paresh; and our family
from all over the world. Thanks to my dearest friends Samantha Begelfor, Nicole
Fice, Shannon Jakel, and Lori Kantymir Moir.
I would especially like to thank my parents, Prema and Mark, for their
unconditional love and unwavering support of all my endeavors; and my sister,
Shuvani, for being my cheerleader and constant source of inspiration. Our canine
princess Persephone has given us endless joy since entering our lives, and I am
indebted to her for her intellectual prowess and loving companionship.

iv

Land Acknowledgment
Western University is situated on unceded and unsurrendered traditional
territories of the Anishinaabeg, Haudenosaunee, Lunaapeewak and
Attawandaron peoples. The local First Nation communities of this area include
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, Oneida Nation of the Thames, and
Munsee Delaware Nation. In this region of Turtle Island, there are eleven First
Nation communities and a growing Indigenous urban population.

I honour the animals, land, and waters; and the ancestors who walked before us.
We are all treaty people.

v

Table of Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................... i
Dedication ......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... iii
Land Acknowledgment .................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ vi
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: The Nature of a Duty to Adopt .................................................................. 17
1.

Introduction: Rethinking the Morality of Procreation ................................. 17

2.

Global Orphan Crisis ......................................................................................... 19

3.

A Duty to Adopt .................................................................................................. 23
3.1.

Moral Foundations..................................................................................... 23

3.2.

Children’s Needs for Parental Care ......................................................... 25

3.3.

Preference for Biological Children ........................................................... 29

4.

Possible Defeating Conditions.......................................................................... 33

5.

Foundational Objections to a Duty to Adopt.................................................. 65

6.

5.1.

Undesirable Implications .......................................................................... 65

5.2.

Obligating Intimate Relations .................................................................. 66

5.3.

Duties to Assist as Imperfect .................................................................... 71

5.4.

Misdiagnosed Problems & Inappropriate Solutions ............................. 73

5.5.

Numbers and Collective Duties ................................................................ 74

5.6.

Corruption in Intercountry Adoptions .................................................... 76

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 78

Chapter 2: Group-Based Reasons in Favour of Procreation .................................... 80
1.

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 80

2.

A Taxonomy of Procreative Reasons ............................................................... 81

3.

Group-Based Reasons ....................................................................................... 85
3.1.

Social Groups .............................................................................................. 85

3.2.

Races as Social Groups .............................................................................. 90
vi

4.

5.

Reasons in Favour of Procreation .................................................................... 95
4.1.

Reparative Justice ...................................................................................... 96

4.2.

Racial Solidarity ....................................................................................... 103

4.3.

Cultural Preservation ............................................................................... 106

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 114

Chapter 3: Group-Based Reasons in Favour of Adoption ...................................... 115
1.

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 115

2.

Racial Demographics of Child Welfare ......................................................... 117

3.

Concerns about Race in Adoption ................................................................. 121

4.

5.

3.1.

Indigenous Transracial Adoptions ........................................................ 121

3.2.

Non-Indigenous Transracial Adoptions ............................................... 129

Group-Based Reasons in Favour of Adoption .............................................. 132
4.1.

Reparative Justice .................................................................................... 132

4.2.

Racial Solidarity ....................................................................................... 142

4.3.

Cultural Preservation ............................................................................... 144

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 146

Chapter 4: The Politics of Children’s Belonging ...................................................... 148
1.

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 148

2.

Children, Law, and the Politics of Belonging ............................................... 150

3.

Two Views on Children’s Belonging .............................................................. 155

4.

5.

3.1.

Children as Community Representatives ............................................. 156

3.2.

Children as Liberated Beings.................................................................. 164

Adoptions as Child-Centered and Collaborative ......................................... 167
4.1.

Children’s Voices ...................................................................................... 168

4.2.

Collaborations Between Communities .................................................. 171

4.3.

Implications for a Duty to Adopt ........................................................... 174

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 175

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 176
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 179
Curriculum Vitae .......................................................................................................... 201

vii

1

Introduction
Background
Around the world, millions of children are in need of parental care. In Canada,
about 78,000 children are in child welfare systems, 30,000 of whom are eligible
for adoption. Each year, 2,000 children are adopted either domestically or
internationally by families based in Canada. Globally, intercountry adoptions
account for approximately 45,000 adoptions annually, though that number has
been declining in recent years due to stricter international adoption policies and
the closing of international adoption programs. On a global scale, the numbers of
willing adoptive families as compared to adoptable children are remarkably
discrepant, leaving room for much improvement in our current systems to ensure
that children receive the care they need and deserve.
With an explicit focus on the needs of existing children, some philosophers
defend a duty to adopt children instead of procreating, contextualizing their
arguments as a response to what has been called a ‘global orphan crisis’. On this
view – prominently defended by philosophers Tina Rulli1 and Daniel Friedrich2 –
prospective parents have a strong pro tanto duty to adopt children instead of
procreating, as long as adoption would not pose sufficiently burdensome costs
that would be avoided through procreation. Those who desire parenthood would
pursue adoption and form families with children in need of parents.
In this dissertation, I will defend a duty to adopt from a set of objections
that is overlooked in existing philosophical literature. Specifically, I will respond

Tina Rulli, “Preferring a Genetically-Related Child,” Journal of Moral Philosophy
13, no. 6 (2014a): 669-698; Tina Rulli, “The Duty to Adopt” (PhD diss., Yale University,
2011), 1-210.
2 Daniel Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 1
(2013): 25-39.
1
1
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to three challenges to a duty to adopt – in the form of arguments grounded in
reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation – that seek to justify
procreation for members of racially oppressed groups. Ultimately, I will argue
that group-based interests cannot override the needs of individual children for
parental care.
Outline of Chapters
In Chapter 1, I argue that a duty to adopt is very compelling. I introduce the duty,
as it is presented by Tina Rulli and Daniel Friedrich, as a way of framing the
discussions in the rest of the dissertation. I begin by describing the moral
framework of obligatory rescue that they rely on to articulate the specific duty to
adopt. Then, I review and engage with a series of proposed defeating conditions
that would, if successful, justifiably override one’s duty to adopt. I offer my
evaluations of several proposed defeating conditions that they consider, and I
also respond to several objections that they do not. After dealing with this set of
challenges, I evaluate a set of objections that challenge the foundations of a duty
to adopt. Ultimately, I conclude that a duty to adopt withstands many strong
criticisms.
In Chapter 2, I develop three group-based reasons in favour of procreation
that challenge a duty to adopt. By constructing a taxonomy of different kinds of
reasons in favour of procreation and identifying group-based reasons as a distinct
category, I show how proponents of a duty to adopt overlook the entire category
of group-based reasons (i.e., reasons deriving primarily from one’s membership
in a social group) that challenge a duty to adopt. These reasons respectively
appeal to efforts at achieving reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural
preservation. These reasons rely on one of two metaphysical theories of race: a
political theory or a cultural theory. After briefly explicating each of these two
theories of race, I develop the three group-based reasons and identify their
objections to a duty to adopt. In this chapter, I offer the strongest arguments in
support of members of racially oppressed groups having biological children, and I
reserve criticism for the following two chapters. Importantly, in this chapter I
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show that group-based reasons in favour of procreation present a unique set of
challenges for a duty to adopt, as compared to self-regarding reasons that tend to
be the focus of engagement in existing philosophical literature.
In Chapter 3, I argue that the goals of reparative justice, racial solidarity,
and cultural preservation do not definitively support procreation over adoption
but, rather, provide compelling reasons for members of these groups to adopt
children either within or outside one’s racial group. Thus, I push back against the
arguments in Chapter 2 that seek to provide moral justification for members of
oppressed racial groups to procreate instead of upholding a duty to adopt. I begin
the chapter by contextualizing the state of child welfare systems, with specific
reference to racialized children. I contend that this demographic information
provides a nuanced picture of global and localized child welfare, which will help
us to engage in a productive philosophical examination of a moral duty to adopt.
Next, I draw upon this information to develop three arguments in favour of
members of racially oppressed groups to adopt children rather than procreate. I
end the chapter by identifying remaining group-based challenges to a duty to
adopt.
In Chapter 4, I argue that the needs of individual children to receive timely
parental care should not be compromised by groups’ interests and that children’s
relationships with their communities of origin can be maintained in transracial or
extra-communal adoptive placements. I critique two prominent views concerning
children’s belonging, both of which are supported in adoption legislation. On one
view, children are viewed as being interdependently bound to their birth
communities and, on another view, children are viewed as independent and as
having no birth-inherited rights to their communities and cultures of origin. I
argue that we should think of adoptions as existing within larger networks of
relationships, in which birth and adoptive communities collaborate to provide the
adopted child with meaningful opportunities for connection to their birth
communities. Such collaborations would facilitate children’s access to cultural
and community connections so that they can develop healthy identities, and it
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would also mean giving them a say in maintaining or resisting connections as
they grow.
Crucially, the implication for a duty to adopt is that the interests of social
groups cannot override the needs of individual children for parental care. This
means that children within racially oppressed groups who need parental care
should not be denied timely placement, even if that means being placed outside
of their birth communities or in the care of parents who do not share their race. It
also means that prospective parents who are members of racially oppressed
groups have a moral obligation to provide parental care for children outside their
racial group. This chapter concludes my final defence of a duty to adopt.
Social Pressures to Procreate
In most societies, having children is an anticipated milestone in one’s life.
However, not all means of having children are equally supported, respected, or
valued. Both pronatalist and bionormative ideals create barriers for us to
understand adoption as a viable and valuable means of having children, perhaps
even a preferable means, in light of a global orphan crisis. Responding to this
crisis, I contend, requires challenging pronatalist and bionormative conceptions
of families that make it such that adoptions are oftentimes pursued as a last
resort means of having children.3
Pronatalism, broadly defined, is a pervasive social ideology that places a
high value on bearing children.4 Pronatalism can be grounded in various
philosophical commitments. A utilitarian, for example, could plausibly argue that
one should produce many children as a means of promoting as much good in the
world as possible, so long as the offspring increase the net well-being in the

Nicholas Park and Patricia Wonch Hill, “Is Adoption an Option? the Role of
Importance of Motherhood and Fertility Help-Seeking in Considering Adoption,”
Journal of Family Issues 35, no. 5 (2014): 601-626.
4 Angel Petropanagos, “Pronatalism, Geneticism, and ART,” IJFAB: International
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 10, no. 1 (2017): 17.
3
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world.5 Deontologists might endorse pronatalism for reasons having to do with
religious obligations or civic duties to one’s state. 6 In general, in most societies,
having children is considered a good thing, cause for praise and congratulations. 7
People engage in celebratory rituals for expectant parents (e.g., pregnancy
announcements, baby showers) and for welcoming newborns into the world (e.g.,
naming ceremonies, gender reveals). Moreover, positive attitudes about
procreation tend to run counter to the experiences of adoptive families, who are
often met with skepticism or criticism from family members, friends, and
strangers about their decision to adopt.8
Furthermore, those who choose not to or cannot bear children carry a
burden of justification to defend themselves.9 Women who experience infertility
often blame themselves and are blamed by others for failing to conform to their
social roles – as constructed in a pronatalist society – even though infertility is
generally a result of luck and beyond their control.10 Women who prefer not to
have children – whether due to internalized oppression (i.e., adaptive
preferences) resulting from experiences of infertility – often face stigmas,
disapproval from family and friends, and social exclusion.11 On the flip-side, the

Christine Overall, Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate. (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2012), 71.
6 Overall, Why Have Children? 66.
7 Travis Rieder, “Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation,” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 32, no. 3 (2015): 293.
8 Overall, Why Have Children? 2.
9 Overall, Why Have Children? 3.
10 Carolyn McLeod and Julie Ponesse, “Infertility and Moral Luck: The Politics of
Women Blaming Themselves for Infertility,” IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist
Approaches to Bioethics 1, no. 1 (2008): 126-144.
11 See Beth Turnbull, Melissa L. Graham, and Ann R. Taket, “Pronatalism and
Social Exclusion in Australian Society: Experiences of Women in their Reproductive
Years with no Children,” Gender Issues 34, no. 4 (2017): 333-354.
5

6

expectation for procreators to justify their decisions about having children is
entirely absent.12
Pronatalist ideologies that permeate most societies are rooted in
conservative thinking, especially as it concerns gender norms and expectations.
Christine Overall discusses how pronatalism constructs and polices people’s
social identities along gendered lines:
Pronatalist pressures are still ubiquitous, and the resulting
tendency to define womanliness in terms of procreation
and manliness in terms of begetting has not disappeared. …
Having children thereby becomes a means to conformity, a
way of giving the community the gendered behaviour it
expects.13
Thus, social expectations for women and men to procreate are deeply
entrenched in a pervasive social system: gender. But the effects of pronatalism
extend further than requiring that individuals conform to binary gendered roles,
in that it also places undue burdens on women in culturally or religiously
oppressive societies, encouraging procreation for patriarchal state-based
interests, including labour and intelligence for military, industrial, or economic
purposes.14
Angel

Petropanagos

highlights

the

male-dominating

aspects

of

pronatalism and its emphasis on genetic reproduction, defining her feminist
conception of patriarchal pronatalism as “a coercive social bias, which grounds
women’s identities on their reproductive roles and mandates that women bear
men’s genetic children.”15 Some state-based methods of encouraging or

Christine Overall, “What is the Value of Procreation?” in Family-Making:
Contemporary Ethical Challenges, eds. Francoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 98.
13 Overall, Why Have Children? 64.
14 Overall, Why Have Children? 70.
15 Angel Petropanagos, “Fertility Preservation Technologies for Women: A Feminist
Ethical Analysis” (PhD diss., Western University, 2013), 39.
12
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promoting procreation include offering child subsidies, grants to cover birth
expenses, child tax exemptions; attempting to support families through free or
subsidized childcare; and limiting access to contraceptive and abortion services.
Yet states can also harness and fuel sinister motivations in favour of pronatalism
as a way to promote the growth and expansion of select populations, through
eugenics regimes or nation-building projects.16
Pronatalism can also be rooted in cultural traditions. Kwame Akonor, for
example, provides an illustration of how pronatalist attitudes shape social order
and people’s worth within a culture, citing “a general abhorrence of barrenness
and sterility in African societies. Barrenness carries a heavy social stigma because
it constitutes an incomprehensible upsetting of the social and religious order”.17
As he explains, this is because procreation, “the ability to reproduce and have
children, is a central feature of the African value system.”18 The continuation of
family lines is highly valued and so a “person who bears no children, and
therefore has no descendants, in effect terminates social reproduction and
extinguishes the family line.”19 Infertility, in some societies, has served or still
does serve as legitimate grounds for divorce and, in extreme cases, death. In
some African societies, Akonor notes, regardless of a person’s contributions to
their society, he or she “lose[s] a place among honored ancestors if he or she dies
childless.”20 These are some of the ways in which pronatalist attitudes not only
shape the way people interact and deliberate about family-making, but also
structure the social order and determine the value of women and men based on
their desires or abilities to procreate.

See Erika Dyck, Facing Eugenics: Reproduction, Sterilization, and the Politics of
Choice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
17 Kwame Akonor, “Procreation,” in Encyclopedia of African Religion, eds. Molefi
Kete Asante and Ama Mazama. 2009.
Akonor, 2009, n.p.
18 Akonor, “Procreation”.
19 Akonor, “Procreation”.
20 Akonor, “Procreation”.
16
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Pronatalism is also problematic in privileging certain kinds of families
over others, namely, families who create new children who share genetic or
biological ties, over families formed through adoption. This is because the ideals
of pronatalism are intricately bound up with ideals of bionormativism. Central to
the ideal of bionormativism (or ‘bionormativity’) in families is that those families
formed through biological reproduction, in which parents and children share
genetic ties, are superior to families formed through adoption.21 Some
philosophers argue that it is essential for one’s sense of self to have knowledge of
resemblances between oneself and one’s biological relatives,22 or that
membership in a biological kinship family plays a vital role in how we understand
our social world and people in it.23 Other philosophers have offered critiques of
bionormativity and, in general, have rejected the idea that biological- or geneticrelatedness is essential for familial relationships and one’s sense of self.24
A second and related bionormative idea is that families that are formed
through adoption are not real families. Assumptions that family members should
resemble one another present challenges for adoptive families in which parents
and children do not share the same race, notably in transracial adoptions in
which the parents are non-white and children are white. The assumption that

Charlotte Witt, “A Critique of the Bionormative Concept of the Family,” in
Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, eds. Francoise Baylis and Carolyn
McLeod (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 50. This could apply, more generally,
to families in which parents and children lack a biological or genetic connection. For
example, procreation involving two parents with genetic and biological links to their
children would, on a bionormative view of families, be superior to procreation in which
only one parent shares genetic material with the child and the other parent does not, as
would be the case for some same-sex couples (see Julie Crawford, “On Non-Biological
Maternity, or ‘My Daughter is Going to be a Father!’ in Family-Making: Contemporary
Ethical Challenges, eds. Francoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 168-184.
22 David Velleman, “Family History,” Philosophical Papers 34: 357-378.
23 Robert Wilson (2008); cited in Witt, “A Critique of the Bionormative Concept of
the Family”, 59.
24 Witt, “A Critique of the Bionormative Concept of the Family,” 49-63.
21
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bionormative families are superior to non-kinship adoptive families also reveals
itself in the morally questionable asymmetrical treatment of adoptive and
biological families – for instance, in an absence of parental licensing for
biological parents,25 and through the scrutiny of adoptive parents’ motivations to
adopt.26 Additionally, adoptive families may encounter social stigmas.27 Sources
of stigma for parents may include shame surrounding infertility and not being
able share bloodlines with one’s child. For children, stigmas may include
assumptions about them being unwanted, or emotionally and psychologically
unstable. These unequal standards for treating biological and adoptive families
emphasize the idea that creating a new biological child is preferable to adoption.
Interestingly, as Rulli notes, pronatalist and bionormative ideologies are
so persistent that they even operate implicitly in some arguments in favour of
adoption. For example, when adoption is advocated as a means of having
children, it is often aimed at convincing people who cannot procreate easily that
adoption is valuable, despite their difficulty procreating. In this way, the value of
adoption is not presented as being universal to all prospective parents, just those
who cannot procreate. Thus, yet again, adoption is tacitly regarded as having a
second-best status.28
On a political level, pronatalist and bionormative ideologies are supported
by government funding for research and development of assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) and, in some jurisdictions, subsidized medical treatments for

McLeod, Carolyn and Andrew Botterell, “Parental Licensing and
Discrimination,” in The Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Childhood and
Children, eds. Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere (Abingdon:
Routledge, forthcoming). See also Peg Tittle, ed., Should Parents Be Licensed? Debating
the Issues (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004).
26 Tina Rulli, “The Unique Value of Adoption,” in Family-Making: Contemporary
Ethical Challenges, eds. Francoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 121.
27 Park and Wonch Hill, “Is Adoption an Option?” 607.
28 Rulli, “The Unique Value of Adoption,” 121.
25
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those who experience infertility or difficulty procreating. 29 While government
support for ART can be limited, it still often overshadows support for adoption
and adoptive families. Many adoption agencies around the world tend to be
bureaucratically chaotic, understaffed and underfunded, and lacking in
infrastructure and governmental oversight. Furthermore, as indicated above,
prospective adoptive parents are subject to personal investigations and moral
scrutiny in the process of becoming licensed to adopt. Parental licensing, which
screens adoptive but not biological parents, can be a drawn-out, rigorous and
invasive process, given the personal nature of screening and evaluations that are
needed to approve a family for adoption.30 Thus, even between different methods
of having children that are regulated by the state, families who pursue
procreation enjoy advantages associated with families who share biological or
genetic connections.
In summary, pronatalism and bionormativism are pervasive ideologies
that present as implicit and explicit, attitudinal and structural constraints on
people’s views about the positive value of creating children through procreation.
Pronatalism, the idea that procreation is praiseworthy and ought to be
encouraged, is closely connected to ideals of bionormativism,31 the idea that
family members fundamentally do and should have genetic or biological

“Raising Expectations: Recommendations of the Expert Panel on Infertility and
Adoption,” 2009.
http://www.children.gov.on.ca/htdocs/english/documents/infertility/raisingexpectatio
nsenglish.pdf; Monique Scotti, “Paying to Treat Infertility: Coverage Varies Widely
Across Canada,” Global News, November 15, 2016,
https://globalnews.ca/news/3059988/paying-to-treat-infertility-coverage-varieswidely-across-canada/.
30 See Andrew Botterell and Carolyn McLeod, “Can a Right to Reproduce Justify
the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?” in Permissible Progeny, eds. Richard Vernon,
Samantha Brennan, and Sarah Hannan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 184207; and McLeod and Botterell, “Parental Licensing and Discrimination,” forthcoming.
31 For a more detailed discussion and critique of bionormativism, see Witt, “A
Critique of the Bionormative Concept of the Family,” 49-63. For a feminist critique of
geneticism, see Petropanagos, “Pronatalism, Geneticism, and ART,” 119-147.
29
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connections. These ideologies are so pervasive, tacitly accepted, and socially
enforced, that they create ideological barriers that negatively affect people’s
perceptions and preferences in favour of adoption. When thinking about familymaking, most people do not consider adopting a child and, more often than not,
people who pursue adoption do so only after trying to procreate. Studies have
found that, when women experience infertility, adoption is not considered a
viable option until other options for procreating – including medical treatments
for fertility – are exhausted.32 Pronatalism and bionormativism are barriers to
adoption that impact people’s choices about whether to have children and how to
do so. Unfortunately, these social ideologies negatively impact people’s decisions
to adopt children, even in light of a global orphan crisis.
Forms of Adoption
Adoption, broadly construed, is the conferring of permanent parental
responsibilities in caring for another person. Adoptions can take many forms,
and so it is worth identifying the forms I discuss in this dissertation. One can
characterize adoptions according to the following divisions: domestic and
international; public and private; child and adult; formal and informal; and
kinship and non-kinship. Because some these categories or concepts may vary
from one country to another, I will explain each of them within a Canadian
framework.
Adoptions involving adoptive parents and children within the same
country (i.e., Canada) are domestic adoptions, while those in which the parents
adopt a child from a different country are international adoptions. International
adoption policies (e.g., The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption) refer to
the parents’ country as the ‘receiving’ country and the child’s as the ‘sending’
country. Domestic adoptions can be pursued through either private or public
avenues, whereas international adoptions are always private. Public adoptions
are processed through government agencies, with legal fees and associated costs

32

Park and Wonch Hill, “Is Adoption an Option?” 601-627.
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(e.g., for an adoption licensee, for mandatory parental training classes, etc.)
covered by the government. Private adoptions are not funded by the government,
and the process of adopting a child this way involves finding and paying for
private adoption practitioners. In the case of international adoptions, which are
private, prospective parents work closely with a private agency that is licensed to
process adoptions involving the sending countries. Both the sending and
receiving countries in international adoptions must abide by The Hague
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption (hereby referred to as ‘The Convention’), if they are
signatories to The Convention. This is an intergovernmental policy that regulates
the transferring of children across national borders, in an effort to prevent, for
example, child trafficking or baby-selling.
Thus far, I have characterized formal adoptions, those that involve legal
recognition of adoptive parents’ rights and responsibilities for their child. Before
distinguishing formal from informal adoptions, it is important to note that both
children and adults may be adopted through formal domestic adoption systems.
We tend to think of adoptions as involving young children or minor-aged youths
(i.e., under 18), but adoptions can also involve major-aged youths (i.e., legal
adults) or older adults. In some jurisdictions, legislation currently permits
adoptions of former youths in care by those who have cared for them prior to
them having reached adulthood. Proposed legislation may allow for adult
adoptions in families who make a connection after the prospective adoptee
becomes a legal adult.33
Adoptions can also be informal, as in the case of moral and customary
adoptions. Moral adoptions involve a commitment to provide familial care to
someone who is not eligible to be legally adopted or who does not meet the
requirements for adult adoption. This type of adoption would be applicable in the
following two scenarios. First, a child may not be eligible for adoption due to

“Adult Adoption,” Adoptive Families Association of BC, accessed June 1, 2018,
https://www.bcadoption.com/adult-adoption.
33
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continuing parental ties, but they may form a close bond with someone who
commits to providing them with parental care. This familial bond would not be
recognized in law but constitutes an adoption nonetheless: a moral adoption.
Second, a youth who has ‘aged out’ of foster care may form a bond with a family
who has not cared for them during their minor-age years. In places where
legislation does not permit adoptions of former youth in care by individuals who
have not provided care to them in their past (prior to reaching adulthood), these
individuals would have the option of gaining a forever home through moral
adoption. Again, while the parent-child relationship would not be recognized in
law, it constitutes a moral adoption.
Custom adoptions (also referred to as ‘customary care’ arrangements) are
another main type of informal adoptions in Canada, as defined by “cultural
practices of Aboriginal peoples to raise a child, by a person who is not the child’s
parent, according to the custom of the First Nation and/or the Aboriginal
community of the child.”34 A distinguishing feature of custom adoptions is that
they do not necessarily involve the removal of children from their families and
permanent placement with an adoptive family; rather, custom adoptions tend to
involve extensions of familial ties, and placements may be temporary or
permanent.35 These adoptions typically involve openness with birth families and
sharing of childcare between families, in-keeping with fluid kinship ties within
indigenous communities.36 Customary adoptions of children occur for a wide
range of reasons, including for the benefit of older adoptive parents whose adult
biological children have left home; for the prestige that accompanies parents or

Marilyn Poitras and Norman Zlotkin, prepared for Saskatchewan First Nations
Family and Community Institute Inc., “An Overview of the Recognition of Customary
Adoption in Canada,” 6. (February 15, 2013).
http://www.sfnfci.ca/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Custom%20Adoption%20Final%20Report
%202013(2).pdf).
35 Poitras and Zlotkin, “Customary Adoption in Canada,” 11.
36 Cindy Baldassi, “The Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across
Canada: Comparisons, Contrasts, and Convergences,” University of British Columbia
Law Review 39, no. 1 (2006): 71.
34
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communities who welcome young children to raise; as a means of family
formation for those who cannot conceive biological children; to correct gender
imbalances within families; for building alliances between families; and, of
course, to care for children in need of parental care.37 Both children and adults
may be adopted within indigenous communities, to fulfill any kinship role.38 Not
all custom adoptions are recognized in current Canadian law and so for those that
are not, these familial arrangements are informal. Rather, the state requires that
families go through the full statutory procedure for adopting children for these
familial arrangements to be legally recognized. 39 I will revisit the relevance and
significance of custom adoptions in Chapter 4.
One may wonder where community networks of care fit into this picture.
In some places, children are ‘raised by a village’, so to speak, as members of a
community share responsibilities for childcare and provide goods of parenting to
all children, as needed. I want to separate these forms of childcare from adoption,
even moral or custom adoptions, because adoptions signify intentional
commitments to provide permanent care and support to individuals, which
encompasses all aspects of their lives throughout their lives. The bonds of
adoptive families, I maintain, are intentional and lifelong in a way that other
forms of childcare are not. In fact, what makes community networks of care
distinct from adoptions is that community-based care arrangements are
embedded in social norms about child-rearing practices and our responsibilities
toward children. They lack the intentional element of fully and unconditionally

Cindy Baldassi, “Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across Canada,” 70-74.
For example, see Kisa Macdonald, “Customary Adoption in British Columbia:
Recognizing the Fundamental Differences,” Appeal, Review of Current Law and Law
Reform 14, (2009): 20, on custom adoptions of elders.
39 Cindy Blackstock, “First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada:
Supporting First Nations Adoption,” Submission to the Standing Committee on Human
Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities.
2010: 1-7. https://fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/13.FNCFCS-Supporting-FirstNations-Adoption-Dec2010.pdf; and Baldassi, “Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across
Canada,” 70-74.
37
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committing oneself as a caregiver to another individual. Thus, while I am aware
that there are a multitude of kinds of caring relationships between children and
adults, I consider some of these relationships to be part of a wider set of caring
practices that do not constitute adoption.
In my dissertation, I focus mainly (though not exclusively) on formal
international and domestic adoptions of children because these are paradigmatic
cases of adoption. To the extent that I am motivating a duty to adopt, there are
two problems with focusing exclusively on formal adoptions. First, not all
countries have formal adoption systems or a “cultural environment in which
adoptions are seen as an option,” leaving children in need of adoption without a
chance of formal adoption placement.40 Assuming a child is genuinely in need of
parental care, providing parental care in an informal (i.e., not recognized by law)
capacity would, I grant, fulfill one’s duty to adopt. Importantly, children who
need care and who live in countries without formal adoption systems should not
be overlooked. Second, some adoptions are not recognized by the state but
perhaps ought to be. Take, for example, custom adoptions in indigenous
communities. Many argue – and I agree – that the state ought to support custom
adoption laws in ways that meaningfully support indigenous children and
communities.41 All in all, we must find ways of accommodating children’s
situations and allow prospective parents to fulfill a duty to adopt in ways that are
possible and appropriate within their particular social contexts. These are topics I
raise in Chapter 4.
Ethics and Politics
In this dissertation, I discuss the ethics and politics of adoption. These two
aspects of my philosophical inquiry are distinct and, at the same time,
inextricably connected, in that each informs the other. In general, questions

Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” 34.
Cindy Blackstock, “Supporting First Nations Adoption”
https://fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/13.FNCFCS-Supporting-FirstNations-Adoption-Dec2010.pdf.
40
41
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about ethics (from the Greek ethos, meaning ‘custom’ or ‘habit’) or morality
(from the Latin mōrālis, having to do with ‘mores’ or ‘customs’) pertain to the
permissibility of particular acts. In my dissertation, I ask questions such as, Is
adoption permissible or impermissible? If it is permissible, is it obligatory or an
act of supererogation? Is there a moral duty to adopt? Would a desire to
procreate be strong enough to justifiably override one’s duty? Are adoptions
undesirable in certain cases? How ought individuals to engage in family-making?
While existing literature on a duty to adopt tends to treat a duty to adopt
as a universal prescription of morality and abstracts away from political systems
of child welfare and adoption, politics are central to my project as it pertains to
both issues of justice and social relations of power. I ask: What are the sociopolitical features of adoption systems? Does a duty to adopt apply equally to
individuals who are members of historically privileged and oppressed groups? In
the second sense, I ask: Do goals of racial justice and equality favour some forms
of family-making over others (e.g., procreating vs. adopting)? Are certain
individuals better suited to care for certain children (e.g., same-race vs.
transracial adoptions)? Who gets to decide what is in children’s best interests?
Although ethical and political questions about adoption are distinct, their
answers mutually inform one another. For instance, whether the state ought to
support families who want to adopt children depends on whether adoptions are
permissible and desirable in the first place. In turn, whether there is a universal
moral duty to adopt depends on whether this obligation applies fairly to all
prospective parents, regardless of social identity and particular circumstances.
Moreover, whether adoption systems are just depends, at least in part, on how
the state treats and regulates children and families. Each of these layers – ethics
and politics (and within the latter, political state rule and political justice) – are
critical to answer my central question about whether prospective parents have a
duty to adopt children instead of procreating.
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Chapter 1: The Nature of a Duty to Adopt
1. Introduction: Rethinking the Morality of Procreation
Questions about the ethics of having children have given rise to sustained
philosophical debates, especially over the past few decades. Philosophers have
offered many insights about the morality of procreation, endorsing positions that
range from anti-natalism,42 restricted procreation,43 and qualified pronatalism. 44
Respective motivations for these views stem from concerns about the anticipated
well-being

of

future

children,

scarce

environmental

resources

and

overpopulation, and human extinction or depopulation. Apart from these
reasons, a few philosophers center the morality of procreation around the context
of a global crisis, positioning their arguments in response to a serious problem:
that millions of children around the world are in need of parental care. Most
notably, Tina Rulli (2011, 2016) and Daniel Friedrich (2013) independently argue
that prospective parents have a strong pro tanto duty to adopt children instead of
bringing new children into the world through procreation. They locate the moral
wrong of procreating in the act of doing so rather than adopting a child, absent
‘special burden’ for prospective adoptive parents.

David Benatar defends philanthropic and misanthropic arguments against
procreation. See David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Procreation: Is it
Wrong to Reproduce? (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015); and David
Benatar, Better Never to have been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2006).
43 Corey MacIver motivates the need to limit procreation for environmental reason.
See Corey MacIver, “Procreation or Appropriation?” in Permissible Progeny, eds.
Richard Vernon, Samantha Brennan, and Sarah Hannan (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 107-128.
44 Anca Gheaus supports a collective duty to create enough children to ensure that
future generations will not suffer harms resulting from depopulation. See Anca Gheaus,
“Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?” in Permissible Progeny, eds. Richard
Vernon, Samantha Brennan, and Sarah Hannan (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015), 87-106.
42
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An immediate and common challenge raised against duty to adopt
arguments is their infringement upon a supposed right to procreate. 45 Some
claim that people have a natural right to bear children, rooted in an evolutionary
biological drive to propagate one’s species. Others simply find it unequivocal that
one could permissibly procreate, given how widespread the practice is. Variations
of these beliefs are both implicitly and explicitly supported in societies that
implicitly or explicitly embrace pronatalism, a pervasive social ideology that
places a high value on bearing children.46 In most societies, procreation is
considered laudable, worthy of celebration, and perhaps outside the realm of
moral evaluation,47 and a tacit burden of justification falls upon those who do not
procreate, contra societal expectations.48 However, given certain facts about the
global orphan crisis, it is worth rethinking the morality of procreation and
considering proposals about a duty to adopt.
In this chapter I have two aims. The first is to present an overview of
literature on the duty to adopt, focusing on two prominent accounts developed by
Tina Rulli and Daniel Friedrich, which will serve as the basis of my subsequent
chapters. My second aim is to evaluate two sets of objections to the duty: one that
relies on appeals to defeating conditions; and the other that targets the
foundations of the duty itself.

For philosophical debates about a right to procreate, see Andrew Botterell and
Carolyn McLeod, “Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental
Licensing?” 184-207; Muireann Quigley, “A Right to Reproduce?” Bioethics 24, no. 8
(2010): 403-411; Yvette Pearson, “Storks, Cabbage Patches, and the Right to Procreate,”
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 4, no. 2 (2007): 105-115; Laura Shanner, “The Right to
Procreate: When Rights Claims have Gone Wrong.” McGill Law Journal. Revue De Droit
De McGill 40, no. 4 (1995): 823-874; and John Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom
and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
46 Petropanagos, “Pronatalism, Geneticism, and ART,” 120.
47 Heleana Theixos and Sabrina. B. Jamil, “The Bad Habit of Bearing Children,”
IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 7, no. 1 (2014): 35.
Travis Rieder, “Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation.” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 32, no. 3 (2015): 294.
48 Overall, Why Have Children? 2.
45

19

The idea that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt children
instead of bringing new children into the world by procreating, I will argue, is
very compelling. To demonstrate this, I will first detail Rulli’s and Friedrich’s
framework in favour of a duty to adopt. Then, I will review and bolster their
responses to several proposed defeating conditions that challenge the strength of
the duty. Finally, I will evaluate a set of objections that challenge the foundations
of a duty to adopt, some of which Rulli and Friedrich consider, and some of which
I introduce. Ultimately, I will conclude that a duty to adopt can endure many
strong criticisms.

2. Global Orphan Crisis
Rulli’s and Friedrich’s version of a duty to adopt is distinct from other types of
anti-natal pro-adoption arguments in that it is situated in direct relation to a
global orphan crisis.49 Their arguments are premised on two main points.
First, we face a large-scale problem. Around the world, millions of children
(i.e., people under the age of 18) are in need of parental care, including those in
the following groups: an estimated 100 million children who are ‘on the streets’
or undocumented;50 16 million who have lost both parents (termed ‘double’
orphans by UNICEF); 132 million who have lost one parent (termed ‘single’
orphans by UNICEF);51 and some number who are neither single or double
orphans, nor on the streets or undocumented, but have either been relinquished

In his “Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation,” Travis Rieder
distinguishes their ‘rescue-based’ type of argument from those that appeal to
“[p]opulation and environmental concerns” (p. 295).
50 Rulli, “Preferring,” 672.
51 These numbers only represent sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the
Caribbean, as of 2005: “Orphans,” UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html.
49
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by or apprehended from their birth families.52 While precise numbers are difficult
to track, the fact is that there are millions of children in need of parental care.
Second, the problem is marked by the fact that children in need of
adoption “lack the parental care essential for health development and wellbeing.”53 Based on strong empirical evidence, permanent, stable parental care is
superior to other forms of childcare, including institutionalized care (e.g.,
orphanages) and foster care. Children who lack parental care (and thus are in
need of adoption) fare worse on measures of well-being and optimal
development, making adoption a non-substitutable form of care.54 As Rulli nicely
sums it up, the global orphan crisis is one of “great magnitude – there are
millions upon millions of children in need of parents – and severity – they lack
the parental care essential for healthy development and well-being.”55
Terminologically, it is important to be clear about the groups to which we
are referring. ‘Orphans’ refers to the group of children who have lost one or both
parents, though not all orphaned children are in need of adoption. This is because
some orphans receive adequate parental care from a surviving birth parent; some
receive parental care through informal or formal kinship adoptions (i.e., they are
placed in the permanent care of aunts, uncles, grandparents, or other family
members, or a community). And on the flip-side, not all children in need of
parental care are orphans. Some children in need of parental care do have at least

Controversy surrounds the reported statistics of children in need of adoption.
Some argue that reported estimates are low or conservative, representing only a partial
extent of the global orphan crisis because they fail to capture the fact that many
children’s births are undocumented; that some children are missing or victims of
trafficking; and that some children have not been identified as living with inadequate
parental care – for example, due to abuse, neglect, etc. On the other hand, some argue
that statistics about adoptable children are inflated so as to create an economic demand
and global market for adoption practices. See Michele Goodwin (ed.), Baby Markets:
Money and the New Politics of Creating Families (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
53 Rulli, “Preferring,” 704.
54 For more on children’s needs for parental care, refer to §3.2.
55 Rulli, “Preferring,” 704, emphases original.
52
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one surviving birth parent, but one or both parents are unable to provide parental
care (due to, e.g., poverty, sickness, etc.). In some cases, children may live with
their birth parents (or other parental guardians) but may still be in need of
parental care because they experience abuse or neglect in their current living
situation. That is, even though, descriptively, these children have parents, they
are normatively lacking parents (i.e., they are normatively parentless) in the
sense that they lack adequate parental care. I will use the phrases ‘parentless
children’ and ‘children in need of adoption’ to pick out the group of children
about whom the global orphan crisis is concerned: those who need parental care.
Although the phrase ‘global orphan crisis’ picks out the total number of
children who are in need of parental care, a moral duty to adopt applies to the
extent that there are adoptable children (i.e., children who are legally eligible to
be adopted). The number of adoptable children is smaller than the number of
children in need of adoption, simply because not all children in need of adoption
are adoptable. For instance, usually one of the requirements for a child to be
eligible for adoption is that parental ties to their birth parents are legally severed.
For various reasons, however, parental ties are maintained in some cases, and
children become wards of the state through foster care systems. Some children in
need of parental care are not eligible for adoption because they are either
unidentified, undocumented, or have not been registered with an adoption
agency (e.g., due to limited institutional infrastructure). Some children who do
become eligible for adoption are adopted through formal or informal, kinship or
customary adoptions,56 while others ‘age out’57 of foster care. Global statistics

Customary adoptions are “cultural practices of Aboriginal peoples to raise a
child, by a person who is not the child’s parent, according to the First Nation and/or the
Aboriginal community of the child” (Poitras and Zlotkin, “Customary Adoption in
Canada,” 6). Adoptions based on customs (i.e., indigenous traditions or law) tend to
value the preservation of parental ties while at the same time providing adequate care for
a child (or adult) by a community. For more on customary (or ‘custom’) adoptions, see
Jean Carriere (ed.), Aski Awasis: Children of the Earth: First Peoples Speaking on
Adoption. (Black Point, N.S: Fernwood Pub, 2010); Kisa Macdonald, “Customary
Adoption in British Columbia,” 17-23.
56
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about the number of adoptable children are vague, in large part because there is
no reliable integrated global system for tracking children and their status in
families. However, despite the lack of precision in global estimates, one thing is
clear: there are far more adoptable children, and yet even more children in need
of adoption, than there are willing adoptive families .58
Rulli focuses exclusively on formal adoptions between non-relatives, while
Friedrich takes adoption to include formal and informal, international and intranational (i.e., domestic) adoptions, involving non-relatives or kin.59 I consider
that kinship, customary, and informal adoptions could fulfill one’s duty to adopt
and will address this more carefully in subsequent chapters. The problem with
leaving out informal (or ‘non-formal’) adoptions is that some countries lack the
“cultural environment in which adoptions are seen as an option,” leaving children
in need of adoption without a chance of formal adoption placement. 60 Parentless
children who live in countries without formal adoption procedures should not be
overlooked; rather, we must be able to accommodate children’s different
situations and leave room for a variety of ways for a duty to adopt to be fulfilled.

‘Ageing out of care’ refers to the phenomenon of a child welfare system severing
“its formal role as ‘parent’ [of a crown ward] as soon as a young person reaches the age of
majority.” Rather than this period in a one’s life being a smooth transition, studies report
that “entry into adulthood is more akin to an ‘expulsion’ than a transition” (Deborah
Rutman, Carol Hubberstey, and April Febuniw, “When Youth Age Out of Care-Where to
from There? Final Report: Based on a Three Year Longitudinal Study,” (2007): 3).
58 Richard Carlson, “Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New
International Law of Adoption.” New York Law School Law Review 55, no. 3 (2011):
770.
In Canada, there are about 30,000 children who are eligible for adoption. The
Adoption Council of Canada reported in 2010 that only about 2,000 children are
adopted through the public adoption system per year; a further 500-600 children per
year are adopted privately within Canada; and about 2,100 children per year are adopted
internationally: http://www.adoption.ca/family-bonds.
59 Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” note 2.
60 Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” 34.
57
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3. A Duty to Adopt
Two notable accounts of a duty to adopt have been developed independently by
philosophers Tina Rulli and Daniel Friedrich. In this section, I detail their
arguments.

3.1. Moral Foundations
The moral foundations of a duty to adopt, on Rulli’s and Friedrich’s
accounts, rest on a general utilitarian duty to rescue, according to which we ought
to assist those who risk incurring serious harms, if the cost to us is minimal or
relatively small.61 Rulli asks us to consider a thought experiment involving a
standard rescue case to illuminate our intuitions behind this principle:
Railroad: Your drive to work takes you across the railroad
tracks. Today, as you approach the tracks, you notice that a
small child has gotten her foot caught in them. A train will
be coming by any moment now. If the child is left on the
tracks, at the least, her leg will be severed by the oncoming
train. She needs the assistance of a stronger adult to pull
her leg free.62
In Railroad, most of us would agree that, given the critical harm that would befall
the unsaved child, and the small cost the driver would incur by helping the small
child (assuming this is true), the driver morally ought to release the child’s leg
from the railway tracks.
Applied to the global orphan crisis, Rulli provides us with this concise
formulation of a duty to adopt: “given that there is an orphan crisis, prospective
parents have a moral duty to adopt rather than create children, absent special

This principle is derived by Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229-243.
62 Tina Rulli. “The Duty to Adopt” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011), p. 64.
61
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burden.”63 The “absent special burden” clause pertains to the costs associated
with adopting a child as compared to procreating. In some cases, the costs
associated with adopting a child will be sufficient to override one’s duty to adopt
or exempt one from a duty to adopt. Thus, the duty to adopt applies pro tanto,
meaning that it is defeasible under circumstances that impose special burdens or
sufficient costs upon prospective parents that they would not have if they were to
procreate.64
The basic structure of the argument in favour of a duty to adopt proposed
by Rulli and Friedrich is as follows:
P1: We have a moral duty to assist those in need, if the risk of harm to
them is critical and the cost to us is small.
P2: Parentless children are exposed to critical risk of harms that would be
alleviated through adoption.65

Rulli, “The Duty to Adopt,” 1. Friedrich explains the principle and its specific
application in this way: “If we can protect others from serious harm at little cost to
ourselves we morally ought to do it. Moreover, we can protect parentless children from
serious harm at little cost to ourselves by adopting them” (“A Duty to Adopt?” 25).
Travis Rieder rejects a duty to adopt, claiming that relations of radical intimacy
cannot be subject to moral obligation. For more on Rieder’s objection and my response,
see §5.2.
64 Although the duty to adopt is commonly conceived as an instance of a more
general utilitarian duty to rescue, it may alternatively be grounded in a Kantian
framework. Here, the idea would be that we have a duty of beneficence toward others,
which arguably involves assisting those in dire need. See Onora O’Neill, “Kantian
Approaches to Some Famine Problems,” in Matters of Life and Death, T. Regan (ed.),
(McGraw-Hill Companies, 1980), 546-551. Of course, such a framework for a duty to
adopt would have to account for how the imperfect duty of beneficence to others can
obligate one to adopt instead of procreate. For a solution involving the requirement not
to be indifferent to the needs of others, see Karen Stohr, “Kantian Beneficence and the
Problem of Obligatory Aid,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2011): 45-67.
65 Rulli notes that the situation of parentless children is particularly compelling for
a duty to adopt because children are “uniquely vulnerable in their inability to advocate
for themselves and in their dependence upon others to improve their life prospects”
(“Preferring,” 704).
63
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P3: Many prospective parents could adopt children at little cost to
themselves (i.e., absent ‘special burden’), instead of procreating.
C: Therefore, many prospective parents morally ought to adopt existing
children in need of parental care, instead of bringing new children into the
world through procreation.
Let us review the argumentative support for P2 and P3 in the rest of this section.

3.2. Children’s Needs for Parental Care
A core premise (P2) of Rulli’s and Friedrich’s duty to adopt arguments is that
children who lack parental care face serious risk of harms, and that adoption
would alleviate these risks of harms.66 They substantiate these points by drawing
on empirical research. This aspect of their argument has to do with the needs of
existing children.
First, many parentless children lack certain basic goods for survival,
including food, water, medical care, shelter, warmth, and loving care from a
caregiver; in some cases, babies and young children experience abuse or neglect
and, in extreme cases, die from poor living conditions.67 ‘Street children’ face
risks of “maltreatment, disease, exploitation for sex, labour and child soldiering,
and trafficking for these purposes,”68 and investigations into orphanages around
the world reveal shocking realities.69 Many institutions are overcrowded with

In this section, I focus on Rulli’s and Friedrich’s defense of the claim that
children need parental care, simpliciter. Neither engages with the idea that children need
to be cared for by certain people, in particular (e.g., those who share the child’s race).
However, views about children’s right to a certain identity have been a long-standing
subject of controversial debates in the context of adoption. For my input on this debate,
see Chapter 4.
67 Elizabeth Bartholet, “International Adoption: The Child's Story,” Georgia State
University Law Review 24, no 2 (2007): 333-379.
68 Wardle (2005), pp. 325-331, cited in Bartholet, “International Adoption,” 96.
69 For data on various countries, refer to the 2017 report “Protecting Children
Against Torture in Detention: Global Solutions for a Global Problem”, esp. Eric
66
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children and drastically understaffed.70 In some cases, children lack stimulation
in their confined environments and share momentary physical contact with
orphanage workers. Self-harming behaviours and aggression are treated with
psychiatric drugs or physical bondage.71 In some cases, children are left to starve
with no one to feed them.72 Lack of government oversight leaves room for many
orphanages to be run as profitable businesses, with foreign donations serving as
‘revenue.’ Babies and children can face risks of being subject to “sexual abuse,
organ harvesting, and illegal adoptions,” and children with disabilities or other
medical needs are often left unattended. Food shortages and neglect leave
children malnourished, sometimes on the brink of death.73 For these reasons,
orphanages that are “globally depriving in terms of health, stimulation, and social
and emotional relationships”74 are unsafe places for children.
Second, parental care cannot be substituted for institutional forms of care
(e.g., orphanages) or even foster care.75 Even in well-equipped, regulated, wellrun orphanages, sustained engagement with a caregiver, permanency in a family,

Rosenthal, “A Mandate to End Placement of Children in Institutions and Orphanages,”
Georgetown Law Human Rights Institute 1, no. 3 (2017).
70 Elizabeth Bartholet, “International Adoption: The Human Rights Position,”
Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 91.
71 Georgette Mulheir, “Deinstitutionalization: a human rights priority for children
with disabilities,” Equal Rights Review 9, no. 120 (2012).
72 Laurie Ahern, “Orphanages are No Place for Children,” Washington Post, August
9, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/orphanages-are-no-place-forchildren/2013/08/09/6d502fb0-fadd-11e2-a369d1954abcb7e3_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.244d39f05587.
73 Marina Vorobei, “Children Discovered on Brink of Starvation,” The Guardian,
April 20, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/20/children-discoveredon-brink-of-starvation-in-belarusian-orphanages.
74 Jesús Palacios and David Brodzinsky, “Review: Adoption Research: Trends,
Topics, Outcomes.” Vol. 34. London, England: SAGE Publications, 2010: 274.
75 Rulli, “Preferring,” 705-706.
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and stable, loving parental care are absent. 76 And even though foster care is
better for children’s development than institutional care,77 research suggests that
children still fare better in adoptive care, as compared to long-term foster care.78
Crucially, children who grow up without stable, loving parental care are a high
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risk of experiencing emotional and psychological harm. 79 For example, healthy
attachments between a child and parent facilitate “physical, social, language,
cognitive and psychomotor development.”80 Studies show that children living in
institutions or with histories of institutionalization have compromised
attachment behaviour.81 While foster care can improve the quality of attachment
among young children who have been institutionalized,82 the permanency of
adoptive care is preferable to the impermanency in foster care placements.
Adoption provides children with “psychological stability and a sense of
belonging” that they would not have in modes of temporary care.83 For these
reasons, adoption often provides the best form of familial support for parentless
children, who would otherwise be exposed to risks of critical harms.
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34-49; Johanna Bick and Charles A. Nelson, “Early Experience and Brain Development,”
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 8, no. 1-2 (2017): e1387. Bick and
Nelson (2017) find that severe neglect in children’s early years compromises their
emotional, behavioural and cognitive functioning but that early interventions can reverse
the effects of neglect and, in very early adoptions, can support maximal recovery (1).
80 Georgette Mulheir, “Deinstitutionalization: a human rights priority for children
with disabilities,” Equal Rights Review 9, no. 120 (2012).
81 Francesca Lionetti, Massimiliano Pastore, and Lavinia Barone, “Attachment in
Institutionalized Children: A Review and Meta-Analysis,” Child Abuse & Neglect 42,
(2015): 135-145; Linda van den Dries, Linda, Femmie Juffer, Marinus H. van
IJzendoorn, and Marian J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, “Fostering Security? A MetaAnalysis of Attachment in Adopted Children,” Children and Youth Services Review 31,
no. 3 (2009): 410-421.
82 Anna T. et al., “Placement in Foster Care Enhances Quality of Attachment among
Young Institutionalized Children,” Child Development 81, no. 1 (2010): 212-223.
83 Vivek Sankaran, “Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children: A Critical
Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,”
Family Law Quarterly 40, no. 3 (2006): 435.
Pace and Zavattini (2011) report “significant enhancement of the late-adopted
children’s attachment security” within one year of adoptive placement (p. 82). C. S. Pace,
and G. C. Zavattini, “'Adoption and Attachment Theory' the Attachment Models of
Adoptive Mothers and the Revision of Attachment Patterns of their Late-Adopted
Children,” Child: Care, Health and Development 37, no. 1 (2011): 82.
79

29

3.3. Preference for Biological Children
Another core premise (P3) of Rulli’s and Friedrich’s duty to adopt arguments is
that many prospective parents could adopt children instead of procreating, at
little cost to themselves. This requires a defence of the idea that adopting a child
would come at a minimal or small cost to many prospective parents, as compared
to having a child through procreation.
A prominent set of claims about special burdens are presented in the form
of preferences that people have for biological or genetically-related children. For
a variety of reasons, many people think they would prefer having biological
children as opposed to adopting children, and they might argue that adopting a
child would pose significant costs to them. However, both Rulli and Friedrich
argue that there are very few reasons one could offer in favour of having a
biological child that would defeat the duty.84 They argue that most reasons one
could offer in favour of preferring biological children are not sufficient to
constitute a “special burden” to prospective adoptive parents.
One of the most difficult challenges facing proponents of a duty to adopt is
of determining what constitutes a “special burden” or ‘sufficient costs’ for
prospective adoptive parents that would justifiably defeat the duty and thus
morally permit procreation instead of adoption.85 In defending their arguments
that there are very few good reasons to prefer a biological child, Rulli and
Friedrich attempt to address this challenge by applying two standards.
The first standard they set is that morality must allow agents some leeway
to pursue their interests.86 To mitigate the demandingness of morality, some
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This threshold problem of determining what constitutes a ‘sufficient cost’ for
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philosophers grant that people have moral options that can justify their nonfulfillment of a moral requirement, so long as the option is tied to “important life
projects, plans, and pursuits.”87 More specifically, for “high-stakes” duties to
assist, Rulli stipulates, moral options must be limited to those interests that rise
to the level of “projects”. An interest rises to the level of a project if it meets the
following conditions:
i) its value is of “central significance” in one’s life;88
ii) it has “non-trivial” value;
iii) it has “non-negative” value; and
iv) its value is “independent of an agent’s subjective valuation.”89
A project-level interest that both Rulli and Friedrich accept is the desire to
live a child-free life. For some people, the experience of parenting is undesirable,
and the interest in being child-free is of central significance because it shapes
one’s life goals and has “lasting experiential impact … that colors [the agent’s]
perspective or alters the quality or character of her future experiences.”90 Perhaps
other interests (e.g., working, traveling, having leisure time, caring for nonhuman animals) are far more important than having children. Children are a lot
of work, requiring attention, sacrifices in time, self-development, substantial
financial and emotional investment, and not all people have an interest in or a

Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981. These projects are commitments that give one’s life unique
character, as perceived by the individual, are “closely related to [one’s] existence and
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rejection of moral options, see Shelly Kagan, “Précis of “the Limits of Morality,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, no. 4 (1991): 897; Shelly Kagan, The
Limits of Morality, New York: Clarendon Press, 1989.
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willingness to parent. An interest in being child-free is non-trivial because it
reflects a profound desire that influences one’s life goals, and these goals are not
outweighed by the costs to the person in need of rescue. To illustrate this point,
consider that if someone were subject to a moral demand of adopting children
but was unwilling to be a parent, then they would be responsible for caring for
children they would rather not have, an outcome undesirable for both parent and
child. The interest in being child-free, in this way, is clearly non-trivial, for it
directly impacts the central projects of one’s life and thus can “compete with the
good of rescue.”91 Moreover, one’s interest in being child-free has non-negative
value, for it does not involve an imposition of harm. Contrast this with an interest
in, for instance, torturing people, or playing video games instead of calling 911
upon witnessing a horrible car accident, both actions of which clearly result in
bad consequences.92 Finally, an interest in remaining child-free has value
independent of the agent’s subjective valuation. Many of us could understand
(even if we ultimately do not agree with) an agent’s interest in pursuing desired
ends apart from, and to the exclusion of, parenting children. Recognizing that
some people have project-level interests in being child-free, both Rulli and
Friedrich place upfront limits on the scope of a duty to adopt, shielding unwilling
parents from the duty.
In sum, projects reflect an agent’s “most central concerns”93 and shield the
agent by way of normative protection from overly high demands of morality. In
doing so, agents are thus justified in pursuing their desired ends (i.e., interests),
so far as these interests meet the above conditions. Call this limit on moral
agents’ interests within the context of a duty to adopt the ‘project-level interest’
standard.
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A second standard they apply is meant to temper the project-level interest
standard. In the context of a duty to adopt, Rulli explains, appeals to an agent’s
projects alone cannot justify a preference for a biological child over an adopted
child; rather, appeals to projects must be moderated by a second standard:
parental flexibility.94 According to this standard, parents must be flexible and
accommodating enough to love their child, however they may turn out. In Rulli’s
words,
Becoming a parent is, in part, about raising an
independent, autonomous person who may defy our
expectations and have [their] own interests. We must allow
our children to become and to be their own people. Though
parents play a crucial role in shaping their children’s values
and interests, they must be able to find parental satisfaction
in the variety of ways their children may turn out.95
Call this limit on prospective parents’ projects within the context of a duty to
adopt the ‘parental flexibility’ standard.
To recap, with respect to P3, Rulli and Friedrich establish two standards
by which to evaluate proposed defeating conditions to a duty to adopt. The
‘project-level interest’ standard provides agents with some protection from the
high demands of morality (in this case, a duty to adopt). Appeals to project-level
interests must also meet the standard of parental flexibility, which requires that
prospective parents be open to loving a child, however they may turn out. These
two standards serve as criteria for evaluating supposed ‘special burdens’ that
prospective parents may incur as a result of adopting a child, rather than
procreating.
In addition to these two standards, Rulli and Friedrich stipulate that
successful defeating conditions to a duty to adopt must distinguish biological or
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genetic children from adopted children96 and that preferences for biological
children must be based on informed desires, that is, desires that are not based on
mistaken or false conceptions about adoption or the desired state of affairs (i.e.,
having biological children).97 In all cases, one must be able to show that they
would incur a special burden (i.e., sufficient costs) in adopting a child that they
would otherwise avoid through biological procreation. Both philosophers
dedicate a substantial portion of their arguments to defending them against
various reasons that people may have for preferring a biological child over an
adopted child. Let us review the proposals they consider.

4. Possible Defeating Conditions
In this section, I systematically review Rulli’s and Friedrich’s engagement with
proposed defeating conditions and identify the grounds upon which they reject or
accept each one. I begin with proposals that, in my view, are relatively weak and
progress to those that seem to be promising candidates for defeating a duty to
adopt. Like Rulli and Friedrich, I ultimately reject most of the proposals they
consider but accept a few. I will indicate clearly along the way where my
reasoning resonates with or differs from theirs.
I review their responses carefully for two key reasons. First, a defense of a
duty to adopt requires thoughtful and critical engagement about different
scenarios that seem to present cases about special burdens that adoptive parents
incur that biological parents do not. Although I agree with Rulli’s and Friedrich’s
reasoning with respect to many scenarios, I also disagree at critical points.
Drawing out these differences between their views and mine will provide the
reader with insight about my interpretation and application of their standards
(see S 3.3). Second, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, there are reasons to favour
procreation about which neither Rulli nor Friedrich engage. Reasoning carefully
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through the objections that they do consider will provide a blueprint for
evaluating an uncharted set of proposed defeating conditions in subsequent
chapters.
For Parent-Child Physical Resemblance
Some might appeal to the desire to have a child who shares a physical
resemblance as a reason to have biological rather than adopted children. After all,
it is often treated as a positive thing if one shares resemblances with one’s child.
Genetically-related parents and children who ‘look alike’ are complimented, and
adoptive parents and children can be faced with non-innocent questions about
why they do not look alike.98 Friedrich casts this proposal aside, and Rulli also
dismisses it, citing its failure to rise to the level of a project due to its triviality.
However,

social

meanings

associated

with

parent-child

physical

resemblance may not be as trivial as Rulli and Friedrich presume. Consider that
resemblance with one’s child could be a symbolic marker of “true kinship,” a sign
of an intimate and caring relationship, “an index of a ‘real’ family connection.”99
In the ways that Rulli and Friedrich think about the desire for parent-child
physical resemblance, I regard the desire as trivial and narcissistic. However,
Rulli addresses my point about symbolism in parent-child resemblance in terms
of family resemblance, more generally.
For Family Resemblance
Perhaps what is important for a parent is that their child shares with them
family resemblance: they stand in a ‘looks like’ relationship to members of the
genetic lineage, sharing certain ‘family-typical’ features even if their looks are not
specifically alike to one’s own. For example, one may have a distinctive aquiline
nose that ‘runs in the family’ or long arms that are ‘typical’ of one’s side of the
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family. Beyond physical characteristics, one may share a personality trait
common to members of a family. In this way, desired features in one’s child are
not merely trivial but, rather, are “social” and “relational properties” that “serve
various purposes: bonding family members, explaining behaviour, assigning
blame.”100 Understood this way, the value of family resemblances, Rulli
contends, are not obviously trivial, for they hold symbolic meaning and signify
connection with familial others.101
Even though the desire to experience such resemblances is non-trivial, I
agree with Rulli that it is nonetheless a poor candidate for defeating a duty to
adopt. Nelson Goodman’s work in the philosophy of art sets the stage for
evaluation. In two excerpts, Goodman writes:
Anything is in some way like anything else. … the fact that a
term applies, literally or metaphorically, to certain objects
may itself constitute rather than arise from a particular
similarity among those objects.102
That we know what we see is no truer than we see what we
know. Perception depends heavily on conceptual
schemata.103
In essence, Goodman’s critique of resemblance is that any number of
things (or, in our case, people) can be said to resemble one another in some
relevant respect, as determined by some frame of reference or conceptual
framework. What we see as a relation of resemblance is prejudged by our eye,
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which “selects, rejects, organizes, associates, classifies, analyzes, constructs.”104
When we make a judgement about resemblance, we do so in relation to some preestablished framework. Take this example, adapted from Goodman.105 If I pour
three glasses of liquid, the first two colourless and the third red, an observer
would likely identify the first two glasses as being more like each other than the
third, based on colour. However, as it turns out, I have filled the first and third
glasses with water (one clear and one beet-dyed) and the second with vinegar. If
one were informed about what liquids were in each glass, one would likely
identify this resemblance (i.e., type of liquid) rather than (or perhaps in addition
to) the former. In sum, we identify resemblances between things we know to be
related, as per some pre-existing framework (e.g., colours, types of liquids). So
how could this idea inform our evaluation of the proposed defeating condition?
Sally Haslanger106 and Charlotte Witt107 seem to channel Goodman’s
abstract idea in the context of family resemblance, arguing that we identify family
resemblances amongst those who fit “our own normative conception of family” in
the first place.108 That is, when we identify family resemblance amongst family
members, we do so against a pre-existing conceptual framework of who counts as
family. As Haslanger notices, our notions of family resemblance tend to account
for differences in gender (e.g., a white girl can resemble her white grandfather),
but not race (e.g., a black girl is not easily identified as resembling her white
mum, although they may share physical similarities). Crucially, who we count as
family in the first place is founded on a “genetic bias in the socially constructed
family resemblance schema.”109 We should be critical of appeals about the
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importance of having a biological or genetically-related child for family
resemblance, given that the value of that connection is presupposed by our
normative conception of family.
After all, Rulli reasons, if our understanding of family resemblance is
socially constructed, then adopted children could fit the construct if we broaden
it to capture similarities not just in physical appearances but also “certain traits
that are not exclusively genetically explained, such as mannerisms, body
language, facial expressions, behaviour, speech patterns, accents, interests,
hobbies, and so on.”110 This is a key point, because the burden for prospective
parents who would prefer to procreate rather than adopt, is to show that one
cannot obtain certain goods from adopting a child that one would otherwise have
with a biological or genetically-related child. We have seen that by simply
revising our concept of family, we allow ourselves to notice physical and nonphysical traits that can symbolize our relationship with one another as members
of a family, and that principle includes recognizing adopted children in this way,
too.111 All in all, for its logical invalidity and conceptual unsoundness in
establishing the importance of having a genetic child (as compared to an adopted
child), Rulli and I dismiss this proposal as a viable defeating condition to a duty
to adopt.
For Psychological Similarity
Psychological similarity with one’s child may be desired, for its supposed
likelihood in facilitating a “shared point of view and mutual understanding.”112
Rulli deals with this proposal by highlighting the lack of common sense in this
view. Not only do genes play a largely insignificant role in determining one’s
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psychological makeup113 but also it is possible that similar personalities within a
family (e.g., having strong convictions) make for difficult relationships. Let us
assume, though, that it is possible to significantly increase the likelihood of
having a psychologically-similar child through procreative genetic connection
and that that would be a good thing.
Rulli argues, and I agree, that it is very difficult to imagine how a
prospective parent’s desire for psychological similarity with a genetically-related
child could meet the standard of a project while at the same time satisfying the
standard of parental flexibility. Consider this variant of an example Rulli offers.
Imagine a family in which the parents are both political activists who spend a
great deal of their time rallying for justice in many forms. They eagerly want a
child who shares their passion for activism, and who sees the world the way they
do: with a strong psychological disposition to put others before them. If their
genetic child turns out not to be psychologically inclined in this way (perhaps
they turn out to be selfish and greedy for personal gain), their project-level
interest in having a psychologically-similar child would be unrealized. As parents,
however, their love for their child should not evaporate for reasons of project
non-fulfilment. Recall Rulli’s advice about parental preferences, accommodation,
and flexibility: “Though parents play a crucial role in shaping their children’s
values and interests, they must be able to find parental satisfaction in the variety
of ways their children may turn out.”114 Because the desire for psychological
similarity with one’s child fails to simultaneously meet the ‘project-level interest’
and ‘parental flexibility’ standards, I agree that it fails as a defeating condition to
a duty to adopt.
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As an Expression of Love Between a Couple
Rulli considers that a couple might favour having a biological child as an
expression of love between them. The biological child resulting from them is a
“natural product of their love” and a “symbol of their romantic relationship and
commitment to one another.”115 This proposal is unsuccessful for several reasons.
For one thing, it fails to distinguish between biological and adoptive children. As
Rulli points out, romantic love is grounded in “people’s mutual commitment to
moral values, shared love of pastimes, common memories, compassion, and
commitment to one another,” and adopted children would be fitting beneficiaries
of this strong love in parental form. It is not necessary for a child to be a physical
product of a couple to symbolize or embody their shared commitment to one
another. Thus, this proposed defeating condition fails the burden of
demonstrating the unique value of a biological child rather than an adopted child.
Furthermore, I would add that to desire creating a child as a means to
express love within a relationship is to instrumentalize and trivialize the child’s
worth. Couples can express love to one another in countless ways that do not
involve the creation of a child – for example, by bestowing gifts upon one
another, happily spending time together, etc. Thus, by itself, desiring a biological
child for the sake of expressing love for or with another person cannot justify
creating a new person through procreation, nor can it justify preferring a
biological child over an adopted child. For these reasons, this proposed defeating
condition fails to override a duty to adopt.
To Love ‘One’s Own’ Child
One might desire biological children based on the belief (or perhaps out of
fear) that they would not love an adopted child in the same way that they would
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love a child who shares biological ties.116 However, this belief is largely
unsupported by both testimonies of adoptive parents and empirical data, leading
Friedrich to remain unconvinced of this proposal’s force. 117 Adoptive parents
often express their utmost love and affection for their adopted children, 118 and
evidence of parental favouritism of biological children over adopted children is
unsupported by research.119 However, it is important to recognize that some
adoptive families go through an adjustment period upon placement, during
which time secure attachments may not yet be formed, and the loving bond that
one might expect to have with one’s child may initially be unrealized. To address
this, adoption professionals have developed a range of strategies to help facilitate
loving bonds between parents and children over time. 120 While most people’s
belief that they could not love an adopted child as ‘their own’ is most likely
factually mistaken and could change if they were presented with counterevidence, I am willing to grant an exemption to a duty to adopt for those whose
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belief is so deeply-held that it would most likely materialize and thus negatively
affect the quality of care that an adopted child would receive.121
To Witness Early Childhood ‘Firsts’
One may prefer to have a biological child for the sake of capturing
memories, perhaps especially early childhood ‘firsts’, such as a child’s first time
walking, first word, first birthday, etc. Consider someone for whom sharing in
and documenting early memories with one’s child is a cherished experience that
deeply enriches their parenting experience. My view, which resonates with
Friedrich’s and Rulli’s, is that while memory-sharing is an understandable desire
to have as a parent, it is a mistake to think that it cannot be fulfilled through
adopting a child. Of course, adopting a baby or very young child considerably
dissolves the concern, but the desire can also be fulfilled through adoptions of
older children. There are many memories and milestones that one can experience
with an adopted child because children experience various types of milestones
and ‘firsts’ throughout their childhood (e.g., first day at school, first time reading
a book, first music recital, first vacation) and even into their teenage years (e.g.,
getting a driver’s license, graduating from high school, working at their first job).
Also, being able to experience certain moments together with one’s child for the
first time is special, even if it’s not their first ever experience of an event (e.g.,
celebrating their birthday as a family). These meaningful, memorable experiences
deserve to be treasured just as much as one would treasure other typical early
childhood firsts. Positive memories can be made and documented at any stage of
one’s life, and so the desire to have biological children for the sake of capturing
early childhood memories should be put into perspective. As compared to the
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possibility for personal transformation upon transracial adoption placement (and some
might argue that such a placement would positively enrich the parents’ worldview), some
individuals may harbour such deeply-held beliefs about their ability to care for a certain
child that it might compromise the quality of care that the child would receive.
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benefits that a child would receive from being adopted, the desire to witness early
childhood firsts is trivial and can be fulfilled through memory-sharing in other
ways. For these reasons, I am unpersuaded by this proposal in favour of having
biological children.
For the Value of Creating a Child
Rulli considers that if one has an interest in creating a child, perhaps this
reason is strong enough to justify one’s non-fulfillment of a duty to adopt in
favour of procreating. However, this proposal fails because whatever particular
method of procreation one has an interest in pursuing, the point is that one’s
interest in doing so must be accompanied by an interest in raising the child or
otherwise “ensur[ing] reasonably that the child is responsibly raised by someone
else.”122 This is because one cannot permissibly create a child without any
concern for the child’s life after coming into existence. Crucially, given that the
interest in creating a child must be linked to raising a child, this proposal fails to
distinguish between the value of a biological child and an adopted child. The
value of creating a child is valuable insofar as it creates an opportunity to parent
the child (or have someone else care for the child), and adopted children provide
these parenting opportunities. As Rulli explains, this proposal is thus not
successful in challenging one’s duty to adopt.
For Genetic Connection
Perhaps genetic connection, for its own sake, is strong enough to justify
procreation over adoption. Drawing on Niko Kolodny’s account of partiality,123
Rulli considers whether his explanation of special connection with one’s genetic
offspring could validate this proposal. The relevant feature of Kolodny’s view is
that the special valuing of one’s genetic offspring could be explained by genetic

Rulli, “Preferring,” 693.
Niko Kolodny, “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? the Case of Parents and
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partiality: because one values one’s own “genetic, biologically-based identity,” it
can be inferred that one has reason to value one’s genetic child in virtue of them
being “similarly connected” to oneself.124 Kolodny’s account seems to match our
intuitions in a Baby Swap case, where two families go home with each other’s
genetic children due to an accidental swap at the hospital. Many would think
that, in such a case, each set of families has been given the wrong child, even if
each of them would be excellent parents to either child. This thought experiment
seems to support the idea that desiring a genetic connection with one’s child
would, in itself, be strong enough to justify a desire for a genetically-related child
over an adopted child.
Nevertheless, Rulli identifies a critical problem with Kolodny’s account of
genetic partiality, namely, that it cannot explain the lack of genetic partiality that
parents of both adopted and genetically-related children experience. In these
‘mixed’ families, genetic partiality towards one’s genetic children over one’s
adopted children would likely seem implausible, unintuitive, or even
reprehensible. Even if we agree that there is value to genetic partiality in the case
of Baby Swap, Rulli argues, the case of mixed families shows that the preference
for a genetic child does not persist past the point of having children. I interpret
Rulli as saying that, for its failure to show the continuing value of genetic
connection once one has children – biological or adopted – genetic partiality falls
short of providing us with a sufficient reason to prefer having a geneticallyrelated child over an adopted child. She rightly concludes that one’s interest in
having a child for the sake of sharing a genetic connection (even if we grant that it
is non-trivial), fails to meet the standard of a project and, for this reason, cannot
defeat a duty to adopt.
To Pass on One’s Good Genes
The desire to pass on one’s genes in order to rule out certain negative
health risks for the child is a reason to prefer a biological child that Friedrich
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carefully evaluates. Adoptions, some may think, are risky because one cannot be
sure of a child’s genetic makeup or history, whereas investments of known
genetic material from procreators is a safer bet for positive health outcomes in
the child. There are two parts to this proposal that Friedrich addresses: one, by
having a biological child, one can safeguard against having a child with a genetic
disorder; and two, one increases the likelihood of passing on good traits to their
children if they procreate rather than adopt.
Regarding the idea that genetic conditions can be prevented, Friedrich
points out the distinction between medical conditions that have a genetic
component (i.e., having to do with genes) and those that are hereditary (i.e.,
having the property of being passed down from one generation of geneticallyrelated individuals to another). Genetic conditions can result from gene
mutations without heredity,125 they can be passed on from a previous generation,
or they can manifest from epigenetic factors that trigger phenotypic expression.
For example, Down Syndrome results from a gene mutation but only a small
fraction of cases involve hereditary factors. Some cases of breast cancers are
hereditary, whereas others are non-inherited (i.e., sporadic) but involve a gene
mutation. Some diseases arise from a combination of genetic predisposition and
environmental factors (e.g., stress, exposure to infection, etc.). In these latter
sorts of cases, one may have the gene for x medical condition but, absent
epigenetic contributors, the condition might not even manifest itself. Thus, the
business of trying to prevent certain genetic disorders through gene selection is
much more complex than it may seem.
With respect to wanting to pass on ‘good genes’, Friedrich warns of the
dangers of overconfidence about one’s own positive traits. Inflated optimism
about the passage of one’s positive traits can overshadow one’s perception of the
possibility of the passage of one’s negative traits. Consider a couple who keenly

Note that the initial mutation may not be passed on from a previous generation
but may be hereditary in the sense that it can be passed on thereafter.
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envisages having a child with A’s looks and B’s intelligence, all the while failing to
contemplate a perhaps less-than-desirable outcome: passing on B’s looks and A’s
intelligence.126 Psychologically, people tend to have “optimistic bias – the
tendency to overestimate one’s chances of good fortune and to underestimate
one’s risk for misfortune,” a phenomenon that contributes to a “better-thanaverage” opinion of oneself.127 This psychological disposition can distort one’s
perception about the traits one’s biological child will possess.
Furthermore, Friedrich argues, consider that many of us have inadequate
information about the genetic disorders of our relatives and ancestors, either
because those disorders went unnoticed or undiagnosed, or because the medical
community’s understanding of such disorders were unknown at the time. 128 For
this reason, it is often a misconception that one can accurately predict ‘genetic
success’ of one’s biological children. What is often not considered is that parents
have a better chance of selecting particular phenotypic traits when they adopt
because they can evaluate a child after they are born and screen them for certain
disorders, disabilities, and so on. Therefore, the preference for a biological child
for these reasons is misguided.
There is, however, a significant difference between biological and adopted
children that Friedrich overlooks. Adoptive parents often do not have access to
“base knowledge” about the child’s biological parents or their medical history that
could help with “prevention, treatment and management” of their child’s existing
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health concerns.129 Without access to a child’s medical history and genetic profile
prior to adoption, the argument goes, adoptive parents have less medical
information about their child than do biological parents and, thus, incur a greater
risk in adopting rather than procreating. If a duty to adopt depends on a cost
analysis (i.e., one is obligated to adopt if the cost to oneself is small and does not
carry a special burden), then more needs to be said about access to medical “base
knowledge” that many adoptive parents do, in fact, lack.
However, although parents may lack genetic information about their
adopted children, there are other ways to evaluate a child’s current health, for
example,

through

medical

examinations,

bloodwork,

and

psychological

evaluations. They may also pursue genetic testing post-adoption. Some critics of
genetic testing in adoption argue that a cultural background of geneticization –
characterized by a fascination (by medical professionals and the general public)
with finding underlying genetic causes of illness and disease – creates an
unnecessary anxiety for adoptive parents to have genetic information about the
child.130 As Lebner argues, the concerns of adoptive parents about their child’s
health surpass practical inquiry and, instead, enter the realm of the “medical
abstract, comprised of unknown futures and unknown health risks.”131 Shifting
the focus away from the importance of genetics, Kimberly Leighton argues in
favour of “a unified policy on information and adoption” that allows prospective
adoptive parents to be “responsibly informed” of their child’s life background,

For instance, study participants reported that having genetic information about
their adopted child could have helped explain their child’s existing medical problems
(e.g., hearing loss), prevent certain adverse reactions (e.g., morphine administered in
hospital), and mitigate certain conditions (e.g., depression) (Julia Crouch, Joon-Ho Yu,
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including the circumstances of the child’s relinquishment and their living
conditions since then. Whereas genetic testing is a narrow measure of health and
cannot detect the most common health conditions that adoptive children have,132
Leighton maintains that educating parents about the limited value of genetic
testing and about how to “research the background conditions of children
available for adoption” is a better method of ascertaining the actual or potential
health conditions of an adoptive child. While I agree with Friedrich that the
desire to pass on one’s good genes is a poor reason to prefer biological children
over adopted children, perhaps Leighton’s suggestion would help to bridge the
existing gap between biological and adoptive parents’ knowledge about their
children’s health.
For Familial Harmony
A preference for biological children might reflect one’s desire for familial
harmony, in line with the belief that adopting a child will likely bring familial
strife, conflict and discord. But while it is true that some adoptive families
experience hardships, so too do biological families.133 There are many potential
sources of hardship and conflict for any family, regardless of whether children are
adopted or biological. For example, families of any kind can experience the loss of
loved ones, difficulties due to medical issues, and stresses related to work, school,
personal relationships, and other aspects of life. Friedrich addresses the worry
that adoptive families have an added level of disharmony by emphasizing that
significant differences between adoptive and biological families on measures of
parental well-being and family interactions are empirically unsupported.134 In a

Leighton cites as the most common health problems that adoptive child have
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critical meta-analysis of 22 studies of adoptive families, and 16 comparative
studies of adoptive and biological families, researchers found that, contrary to
common belief, adoptive families were not more troubled than biological
families. Instead, across the numerous studies, adoptive families tended to report
“positive outcomes with regard to satisfaction with the adoption, familial
functioning, and parent-child communication.”135 Furthermore, research shows
that stresses that accompany having an adopted child are shared with biological
parenthood, as well. In general, the addition of a child places stress on the
parents, as they adjust to and manage their roles and relationships as parents and
partners. A comparative, longitudinal study by León et al. (2015)136 found no
significant difference on measures of parental stress between adoptive and
biological parents, a finding supported by Ceballo et al., (2004)137 and others.
Overall, current research suggests that adopting a child does not impose a greater
burden on families than does having a biological child. Because the preference for
biological children on grounds of familial harmony is empirically unsupported, I

inherently pathological. The division of adoptive versus biological families seems to have
primed results in favour of positive outcomes for the latter (p. 237). However, in their
independent study of adoptive parents, Borders et al. found no significant differences on
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compared to biological parents (p. 240). These results have been replicated in more
recent, methodologically sound, studies. Borders, L. DiAnne, Lynda K. Black, and B. Kay
Pasley. “Are Adopted Children and their Parents at Greater Risk for Negative
Outcomes?” Family Relations 47, no. 3 (1998): 237-241.
135 Karen M. O'Brien and Kathy P. Zamostny, “Understanding Adoptive Families:
An Integrative Review of Empirical Research and Future Directions for Counseling
Psychology,” The Counseling Psychologist 31, no. 6 (2003): 690.
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“Gaining a Child: Comparing the Experiences of Biological Parents, Adoptive Parents,
and Stepparents,” Family Relations 53, no. 1 (2004): 38-48.
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agree with Friedrich that it cannot be a successful defeating condition to a duty to
adopt.
To Have Well-Adjusted Children
A related belief that might inform one’s desire to have biological children
is that adopted children are more likely than biological children to be
behaviourally maladjusted and unhappy.138 Friedrich’s response to this proposal
is that empirical evidence does not support this belief and thus, that it is an
unsuccessful challenge to the duty. Research shows that adoptees are, on the
whole, well-adjusted in psychological, socioemotional and cognitive domains,
both independently and as compared to non-adopted peers.139
I would also argue that it is presumptuous to think that having a biological
child will guarantee optimal adjustment and happiness. As Lamb (2012) reports,
biological-relatedness to one’s child is of “little or no predictive importance”
when it comes to a child’s psychological adjustment. Many biological children
behave poorly, rebel, and exhibit the very signs of maladjustment that
prospective parents might fear would result from having an adopted child. Many
factors determine a person’s level of adjustment – socially, psychologically,
cognitively, etc. – and so the generalized belief that adopted children will likely be
maladjusted and unhappy is, in my view, problematic. Interestingly, current
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research on adoption is focusing on the underlying factors that mediate adoptees’
adjustment.140 For example, socioeconomic statuses of adoptive parents seem to
correlate with patterns of maladjustment in adoptees 141 while age at the time of
adoptive placement does not.142 In general, across adoptive and non-adoptive
families, adolescents raised in families that emphasized open communication and
conversation amongst members of the family were at a lower risk for adjustment
problems.143
Altogether, for its lack of empirical foundation and for failing to
distinguish biological from adopted children I am also unpersuaded that the
desire for a well-adjusted child could successfully defeat one’s duty to adopt in
favour of having a biological child.
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For Immortality
Rulli acknowledges that the desire for immortality by having children
whose lives continue forward into future generations, surpassing finite individual
lives, may be offered as a reason to procreate rather than adopt children. Those
who “see children as extensions of themselves, as a way of transcending their own
finite lives”144 may be interpreted as saying at least one of two things: that one
can live on through the passage of one’s genes from one generation to another,
and so on; or that one can transcend one’s finite existence by helping to pass on
cultural artifacts to successive generations, of “projects, values, commitments,
traditions, and customs.”145 The former interpretation is problematic if only
because only a fraction of one’s original genetic material will be passed on from
one generation to the next, reaching “exponentially smaller” portions as
generations generate.
However, the latter interpretation is intriguing. The idea here is it that we
may desire immortality through passing down “familial and cultural legacies
[that] endure via knowledge, values, and customs.”146 Rulli’s response is to this
more charitable interpretation is that it fails to distinguish a biological child from
an adopted child. After all, she explains, adopted children can “assume, celebrate,
and carry on their families’ customs, speak their families’ language, and endorse
their families’ beliefs,”147 as a genetic child would. Because this proposal fails to
identify the value of a genetic over an adopted child, Rulli regards it as an
unsuccessful challenge to the duty.
I agree with Rulli’s rejection of the genetic interpretation of immortality,
but unlike her (at least for now), I suspend my judgment about the cultural
interpretation of immortality. Perhaps she is ultimately correct that the proposal
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fails in precisely the way she identifies (i.e., by failing to distinguish between the
value of a genetic and adopted child), but I think it is deserving of more thorough
exploration first. When tied to the idea that cultures are bound up with ancestral
lineages, the idea that we may have “a duty, not just a permission, to carry on our
lineage”148 invites further investigation. I will revisit this idea in more detail in
Chapter 2.
Desiring the Experience of Pregnancy
For Rulli, the only reason she unreservedly accepts (in some cases) as a
successful defeating condition to one’s duty to adopt is a woman’s strong desire to
experience pregnancy. Perhaps the very “experience of carrying and nurturing
nascent human life inside one’s body” can ground a successful defeating
condition.149 Rulli accepts that, even taking into consideration the potential risks
of pregnancy and the advantages of adoption over pregnancy, even then there are
women who will have project-level interests in desiring “to know what
[pregnancy] feels like, and to experience quickening and the process of giving
birth.”150 Thus, in her view, to deny someone the experience of pregnancy “may
be to deny (what she takes to be) a foundational experience of being a woman.” 151
In addition to the desire rising to the level of a project, for some, the experience
of pregnancy is “not easily substitutable.”152 The experience is unique; nothing
else can quite mimic or replicate it. Moreover, it is clear that adoption cannot
provide the goods of pregnancy, and those who desire the experience can point to
a clear difference between having a biological child versus an adopted child. I
would point out, too, that the value of pregnancy goes beyond one’s subjective
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valuation, which could possibly be contested by those who would regard
pregnancy as having negative value for them. That is, even if we agree that
pregnancy is more or less desirable for different people, we can still understand
its objective value in providing a unique bodily experience. Rulli grants that a
desire to experience pregnancy can defeat one’s duty to adopt, but only once per
person; once someone has had the experience of pregnancy, they cannot rely on
this reason again.153
I disagree with Rulli’s reasoning. For one thing, in arguing that the desire
to experience pregnancy can provide a “moral exemption”154 but only once, Rulli
incorrectly assumes that all experiences of pregnancy and birth are the same, as
evidenced by her repeated reference to “the pregnancy experience.”155 However,
experiences of pregnancy can vary significantly. For example, some pregnancies
are uneventful and overall pleasant, while others are accompanied by various
ailments, cravings, discomfort, etc.; some pregnancies terminate prematurely,
while others are carried out past a typical full-term duration; some involve one
fetus, while others involve multiple; some women experience pregnancy with the
support and help from others, while others experience it with very little support;
and so on. Moreover, there are many ways to experience childbirth (e.g., with or
without an epidural, home or hospital birth, Caesarean section or vaginal, etc.). It
is plausible that someone might want to experience a phenomenologically
different pregnancy and childbirth after going through the process a first time,
and so it seems that the desire to experience pregnancy and even childbirth can
be used as a defeating condition more than once (if at all), and perhaps as many
times as is desired, as long as the expected experience would be predictably
different from previous ones. For these reasons, the argument that one can
appeal to a desire to experience pregnancy and childbirth, but only once, is not
defensible.
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Apart from the implausibility of Rulli’s limit of one pregnancy experience
per woman, it is questionable in my view that the desire to experience pregnancy
can successfully defeat a duty to adopt, at all. This is because desiring the
experience of pregnancy to the extent of having a “moral exemption” to a duty to
adopt is selfish when compared to the extreme consequences of not providing
“critical benefits” to a child in need of adoption. For all the reasons pregnancy
could be incredibly valuable for one person (or even a few people, counting those
close to the pregnant person), the relatively short time one experiences
pregnancy cannot compare to the benefits that a child could receive if they were
to be adopted. Given that there are adoptable children who need parental care, it
seems problematic to place such a high value on experiencing pregnancy,156 for
every experiential benefit that one could appeal to can easily be eclipsed by the
benefits of parental care that a child would receive through adoption. In my view,
the desire for pregnancy is relatively trivial as compared to the life of a child.
Third, the idea that denying a woman the experience of pregnancy is
tantamount to denying her the experience of womanhood is troubling in that it
willingly accepts and reinforces a gender-essentialist view about womanhood:
that women are women in virtue of their ability to bear children. Even if we do
not endorse such a conception of ‘woman-ness,’ as Rulli clarifies, granting moral
permission for certain women whose gendered identity is bound up with this selfconception nonetheless tacitly endorses it. This, to me, is problematic. Many
women experience infertility, yet that has no bearing on whether or not they are,
in fact, women. To concede to a desire to experience pregnancy on these grounds

Not to mention, the high value placed on pregnancy often overshadows the
potential dangers of pregnancy and childbirth, including preeclampsia, gestational
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is to submit to the sexist idea that ‘womanliness’ is contingent upon one’s ability
to produce children, even if one has internalized this as a deep desire. For all
these reasons, I reject appeals to one’s desire to experience pregnancy as a
justified defeating condition to a duty to adopt.
Social Costs of Not Procreating
What if women’s desires to become pregnant and bear children were not
merely (or perhaps at all) related to a desire to experience pregnancy, per se, or
their “self-conception as women” but, rather, were influenced by social norms in
their respective societies about the value of women as child-bearers? More
specifically, what if women’s desire to have biological children reflected their
interest in avoiding social costs associated with non-compliance of gendered
expectations, namely, bearing children? This proposal goes beyond what Rulli or
Friedrich consider.
As McLeod and Ponesse highlight, in some pronatalist societies,
“childbearing is a woman’s social role and if a woman does not bear children,
then she does not ‘count’ (i.e., have value) in society, or she counts less than other
women.” 157 Not all societies share the same degree of pronatalist pressures, but
women do face a range of social costs across different places if they were to have
the “moral bad luck” of infertility or even if they just preferred not to bear
children at all. Motherhood through procreation, in many parts of the world,
represent “cornerstones of adult femininity” and are “often viewed as the
quintessential component of womanhood.”158 Social costs of choosing not to
procreate or being unable to procreate could range from being subject to
invasions of privacy and familial pressures to bear children, 159 to much more
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severe consequences, like devaluation of one’s worth in a society, divorce and
death rites.160
Reflecting on the work of Anne Donchin, Carolyn McLeod161 suggests that
a woman’s interest in having biological children is strengthened by her interest in
being free from potential harms, such as being ostracized, stigmatized, or
experiencing “domestic violence, abandonment, divorce, and infidelity.”162 One’s
situation within a community or communities provides a context within which
one’s interest in procreation is formed and negotiated. While some women may
face relatively mild consequences of infertility, others may have their lives
threatened as a result. Accordingly, we must consider that women who face a
“gendered cycle of vulnerability” may have a “socially constructed” desire to have
biological children, one that is informed by their intimate knowledge of cultural
expectations and social expectations within their communities.163
In my view, women who face overwhelming social pressures to bear
children should be morally permitted to favour procreation over adoption, for
personal safety and self-protection. At the same time, though, efforts should be
made to challenge and reform the social landscape so that women do not face
these social pressures in the first place and so that parentless children are not
deprived of the opportunity for a family.
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Costs Associated with Adoption
Another set of proposed defeating conditions to a duty to adopt appeal to
the costs associated with adoptions. Adoptions can be financially costly, 164 timeconsuming, stressful, logistically difficult, and emotionally taxing, prompting
Rulli to speculate that the complexity of adoption practices “may constitute the
most promising challenges to a duty to adopt”165 It may be argued that adoption
imposes special burdens en route to parenthood that procreation (at least, for
cases that are relatively simple) does not. Rulli’s view on these various kinds of
costs is that they are “oftentimes overstated,”166 “socially-continent” barriers to
adoption,167 while Friedrich considers each kind of cost separately. I suggest that
we can differentiate these various kinds of costs by placing them on a spectrum of
negligibly to sufficiently burdensome. Recall that the duty to adopt requires
prospective parents to adopt rather than procreate so long as they do not incur
“special burdens” that meet a threshold of sufficient costs: i.e., costs sufficient for
an exemption. Let us systematically evaluate each set of cost-based appeals to
favour procreation over adoption. While it is difficult to set definitive answers,
reasoning through each set of adoption-related costs may provide some guidance
as to how we should weigh them in our moral analyses.
Logistical Costs
Some costs associated with adoption are logistical. For example, adoptive
parents are subject to parental licensing, a rigorous process that involves
paperwork, home studies, parental training sessions, and meetings with social

It is worth noting that the idea that adoptions are necessarily more financially
costly than procreation is false. For more on this, see Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” 32.
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barriers to adoption as a justified defeating condition (p. 43).
165 Rulli, “Preferring,” 698.
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workers, none of which biological parents are required to complete.168 These are
logistical costs to parenthood that biological parents do not have to incur, lending
support to appeals that adoptive parenthood imposes special burdens that could
override one’s duty to adopt. Many scholars have written about the incongruous
treatment that adoptive and non-adoptive parents face, arguing that licensing
one group and not the other is unjustified. Despite almost unanimous agreement
in favour of system reform, there is substantial disagreement about the means of
reform and it is difficult to predict when such changes would be implemented.
For now, willing adoptive parents must face logistical hurdles to adoption.
But how significant are logistical costs? It is difficult to provide a definitive
answer because each case will vary, but I follow Friedrich in thinking that these
are relatively minor (i.e., insufficiently weighty) costs.169 Preparing paperwork
and obtaining certain documentation may be tedious and time-consuming,
attending parental training courses may be mind-numbing, and completing home
studies may feel invasive, but these are relatively minor costs to incur in the
process of having (i.e., adopting) a child. Granted, these costs are not trivial or
negligible, but they do not pose a particularly compelling challenge to a duty to
adopt. If anything, the demandingness of logistics in adoptions reflects a need for
parental licensing reform, but it is unlikely that one’s appeal to logistical costs,
alone, is sufficient to override a duty to adopt. Perhaps if accompanied by some of
the following kinds of adoption-related costs, the case against fulfilling one’s duty
to adopt would be stronger.
Financial Costs
On the spectrum of costs, financial costs associated with adoptions can be
more burdensome than procreation, but the idea that adoptions are necessarily

See Carolyn McLeod and Andrew Botterell. (forthcoming), “Parental Licensing
and Discrimination” In The Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Childhood and
Children, edited by Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere (Abingdon:
Routledge).
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financially costlier than procreation is misguided for a few reasons.170 First, some
adoptions (e.g., domestic public adoptions) are financially non-burdensome.171
Second, some couples experience infertility for which associated treatments or
alternative methods of procreation require substantial investments. Financial
costs of procreation with the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) can
be much more than adopting a child. Third, adoptions of older children can
reduce the costs that a family would incur had the child been adopted when they
are newborns, infants, or toddlers. For all these reasons, it is false to think that
adoptions are necessarily more expensive than procreating.
While Friedrich concedes that one who lacks the financial means
(including, e.g., access to loans or other “lending instruments”), to pursue
adoption is justified in non-fulfilment of their duty, I want to offer two alternative
suggestions to this problem. First, for those who cannot secure the financial
means to pursue adoption, perhaps delaying the process until one is in a more
financially secure position would be advantageous for the child, morally
speaking. After all, all children – biological or adopted – are expensive. Second,
the problem of financial costs brings out an important distinction between
necessary and unnecessary costs. Some costs in adopting a child, Rulli argues, are
“based on socially contingent and eliminable factors”172 that can be alleviated
through a restructuring of our adoption systems. For example, one way to make
adoptions more accessible is to provide financial support to adoptive families
who would benefit from it. In sum, for those who would be overly burdened by
the costs of adopting a child (even with respect to adoptions that are least
expensive), it may be wise to delay adoption until one has accrued enough
financial security; it would be a mistake to think that procreation would solve this

Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” 32.
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problem. At the same time, we should work towards making adoptions, in
general, less financially burdensome.
Emotional Costs
The process of adopting a child can also be emotionally costly, Rulli
recognizes.173 Some couples’ diligent efforts to adopt a child span many years, 174
without foreseeable placement. Other families’ efforts to adopt a child
internationally are frustrated by fast-changing international policies. Those who
pursue transracial adoptions may do so against negative familial pressures. In
cases like these, people make significant emotional investments and experience
stress in the process of adopting a child. Once again, as with the case of financial
costs, it is important to remember that, while it is true that the process of
adopting may be stressful and emotionally onerous, this cost is not unique when
compared to the emotional costs that some prospective parents experience while
pursuing assisted reproduction for procreation. Second, for all the emotional
obstacles one must deal with when adopting, we need not accept these as fixed
hurdles that prospective adoptive parents must overcome. Rather, as Rulli
explains, features of adoption systems that are unnecessarily burdensome can be
subject to revision to make adoptions more accessible.175 I agree with Rulli that
adoption systems should be amended for this reason, but also, in my view, for
those who are confronted with current systems, it is important to balance the
emotional costs of the prospective adoptive family with the emotional costs
endured by parentless children. In doing so, one is reminded that the relative
scale of burdens will most likely favour the child.
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Social Costs
Some families who pursue adoption are faced with significant social costs
prior to pursuing adoption, during the adoption process, or post-adoption.176
These social costs range from scrutiny about the legitimacy of their familial
bonds, parents’ motivations to adopt, or shame surrounding infertility (or
presumptions thereof). Ideals about bionormativism – the idea that families
formed through biological reproduction, in which parents and children share
genetic ties, are superior to families formed through adoption – may operate in
the background.177 Assumptions that family members should resemble one
another present challenges for adoptive families, perhaps especially in transracial
adoptions. To avoid social stigmas associated with adoption for both adoptive
parents and adopted children, one might prefer to have biological children
through procreation rather than adopt a child.
Understandably, social pressures to have biological children can be
discouraging for prospective parents, and the thought of avoiding certain
encounters with people who question the legitimacy of one’s adoptive family is
tempting. However, in my view, these costs are manageable and can be
overcome. Through experience, adoptive parents become equipped to fend off
scrutiny about their family, and children can be educated about the unsoundness
of bionormative ideals. Furthermore, if anything, adopting a child provides
opportunities for personal and social transformation. Rulli explains the point
nicely:
The possibility for transpersonal transformation is yet
another benefit of adoption and testament to the unique
moral value of adoption; it allows us to transcend the
constraints of our own accepted identities and integrate
into them what was once outside or foreign to ourselves. In
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a way, adoption makes us bigger than our original selves; it
expands us beyond our original kin and community.178
In sum, there are opportunities for personal transformation that can result
only from adopting a child, and opportunities for personal transformation extend
to those beyond the adoptive family. Extended family members, neighbors,
school educators, the child’s friends, and members of one’s community at large
are in a position to confront and reformulate their beliefs about families and
adoption, kinship, and perhaps also racial hierarchies, cultural difference and
appreciation, and so on. Where possible, rather than viewing social costs in an
entirely negative light, we should embrace the opportunities that adoption brings
to change our society for the better. However, we could imagine that some
communities would be so hostile to adoptive families that adopting a child would
compromise the child’s well-being. These sorts of cases, I think, would meet the
threshold of sufficient costs, though many would not.
Systematic Barriers
Another set of costs to adoption take the form of systematic barriers. For
instance, prospective adoptive parents with disabilities can face suspicion,
scrutiny, and discrimination by social workers, family court judges, other
adoption professionals, friends and family, resulting in misjudged parental
‘fitness’ to care for children.179 According to the National Council on Disability,
disabled individuals face discrimination at various stages of the adoption process,
most notably during home studies.180 Many disabled people experience difficulty
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completing the screening process or, ultimately, are placed with adoptive
children at much lower rates as compared to non-disabled individuals.181 Samesex couples face discrimination in the process of adoption, as well. In some
places, adoptions by same-sex couples are illegal.182 Lesbian and gay couples also
experience discrimination and face suspicions about whether they can produce
the same positive outcomes for children in their care as heterosexual couples. 183
Moreover, although same-sex couples in some jurisdictions are approved for
adoption in equal proportion to heterosexual couples, they are being matched at
lower rates with children awaiting placement.184 Therefore, some prospective
adoptive parents incur differential burdens in adoption in the form of
discrimination.
Rulli very briefly touches on this issue but deals with it quickly, treating
discrimination in adoption systems as a product of unfair parental licensing.

encounter bias and speculation concerning their parenting abilities” (2012, p. 188),
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Ultimately, she remains uncompromising, writing that “it does not generate
sufficient reason to avoid adoption”185 My own view differs. While I agree with
Rulli that adoption systems and government policies could (and should) change
over time to make adoption more accessible for the sake of children in need, and
that many of these barriers to adoption are “nonessential,”186 another feature of
morality is relevant.
Moral duties require that agents be able to fulfill their duty. Recall the case
of Railroad. If a bystander is physically incapable of dislodging the child’s leg
from the track, s/he would not fail a moral duty to save the child from critical
harm. Failure to attempt any aid strategy at all would be morally wrong (e.g., one
could attempt to flag third-party help), but if despite one’s best efforts one is
unable to save the child’s leg, one would not fail in one’s duty to rescue. Likewise,
people who find themselves in overly taxing (i.e., sufficiently burdensome)
positions when trying to adopt a child – despite their willingness and genuine
efforts to do so – are justified in their non-fulfillment of their duty. However,
because there may be ways to overcome such barriers and practical constraints,
one should make an attempt to fulfill their duty to adopt first. When a threshold
of sufficient costs is demonstrably met despite one’s efforts, one is exempted
from moral obligation. Furthermore, in cases where one is unable to fulfil their
duty, Rulli argues that a duty to adopt creates secondary obligations for collective
action.187 These collective action efforts could include advocating for adoption
reform to reduce placement wait times, providing better support services to
birthmothers and infants, and enforcing policies that serve to protect children in
the adoption process.188 Thus, when individuals cannot fulfil duties to adopt,
there are many other ways to fulfil a more general duty to assist children in need.
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In this section, I have evaluated numerous proposed defeating conditions,
making the case that a duty to adopt is very compelling and, but for a few
exceptions, withstands strong criticism. However, some critics of a duty to adopt
may offer a more foundational set of objections that may present an even
stronger threat to a duty to adopt. That is, they may question the very
foundations of the duty itself. Let us now turn our attention to this next set of
objections.

5. Foundational Objections to a Duty to Adopt
In this section, I engage with objections to a duty to adopt that challenge its very
foundations. This set of objections differs from the set of defeating conditions we
reviewed in §4 in that, instead of identifying instances of ‘special burden’ that
could defeat a duty to adopt in specific cases, it targets the idea that there could
be such a thing as a duty to adopt. I have chosen to include my discussion of these
objections toward the end of the chapter because they have the potential to
undercut any variation of a duty to adopt argument. Even if one is persuaded at
this point by the force of a duty to adopt, this set of objections could altogether
overturn its moral foundations. Let us attend to each foundational objection in
turn.

5.1. Undesirable Implications
One may object to a duty to adopt because it seems to allow for certain
undesirable implications. For instance, a duty to adopt may seem to entail other
duties, like a duty to abort a fetus189 or a duty to prevent procreation through
forced sterilization of women or men. It is thus worth clarifying what a duty to
adopt does not entail. Let me address these concerns in turn.
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First of all, the duty to adopt applies to people’s choices about having
children prior to conception. Once a pregnancy or fertilization process has begun,
moral considerations about gestation become complicated by additional facts.
Once a woman becomes pregnant and has “[a]n interest in nurturing a life
already underway”190 considerations about bodily autonomy become part of the
moral picture. The moral wrong of procreation is located in the act of procreating
rather than adopting a child when one can adopt without incurring sufficient
costs to oneself, but that calculus does not entail honouring the duty to the
exclusion of post-conception considerations. While the duty to adopt does not
itself entail a duty to abort a pregnancy, one who is persuaded by arguments in
favour of a duty to adopt might desire to terminate a pregnancy in favour of
adopting a child.
Second, the duty to adopt does not entail a duty to forcibly sterilize people
or carry out forced abortions. Such actions would be defeated by a right to bodily
autonomy. A similar concern comes up in parental licensing debates. Some
opponents of parental licensing express the fear that requiring moral licenses for
parents will authorize the state to enforce licensing through physical force.
However, on the moral basis of parental licensing arguments alone, the state
would not be justified in, for example, sterilizing all unfit parents or forcing
women to have abortions should they be poor candidates for obtaining a
parenting license. The same applies for a duty to adopt.

5.2. Obligating Intimate Relations
Another objection against a duty to adopt is that certain spheres of life, including
intimate relationships, cannot be subject to moral obligation for they “simply fall
beyond the scope” of duty.191 Travis Rieder (2015) argues that, while there are
many good reasons to adopt children, morality cannot require that we adopt
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children rather than procreate. Relying on Margaret Little’s work, Rieder argues
that relationships of radical intimacy cannot be subject to strict moral obligation.
He draws an analogy between cases of gestation, sex, marriage, and adoption to
make the case that, just as we cannot morally obligate a person to marry or have
sex with another person, we cannot subject people to a duty to adopt. Thus, the
objection goes, while it may be good to adopt children instead of procreating,
people would not be acting contrary to moral duty if they were to do otherwise.
Because Rieder’s view relies heavily on Margaret Little’s argument about the
permissibility of abortion, let us briefly review it.
In an effort to re-characterize the abortion debate in the United States,
Little focuses our attention on the “gestational connection” involved in pregnancy
that places a woman and fetus in “a particularly intimate physical relationship
with one another.”192 Little vividly describes the unique “fetal ‘geography’” of
bodily occupation, enmeshment, habitation, intertwinement, and intrusion. 193
Regardless of the nature of the particular pregnancy (e.g., positive, medically
burdensome, etc.), the fact is that the fetus “shifts and alters the very physical
boundaries” of a woman’s body.194 To obligate a woman to carry a fetus to term
without her consent (i.e., to force gestation) is to impose a liberty harm on the
woman.195 Importantly, Little’s point is that gestation involves an “intimacy of
the first order,” and so women should have the moral option to determine
whether or not they have the “space – material, psychic, emotional” to carry the
pregnancy to term.196
Although Rieder does not provide an interpretation of ‘relationships of
intimacy,’ we can gather that he imagines gestation, marriage, sex, and adoption
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to involve intimate connections with another person such that morality cannot
impose strict obligations to enter into these relationships. Crucially, Rieder’s
central claim – that people cannot be subject to a duty to adopt – relies on an
analogy between gestation, marriage,197 sex, and adoption. As he explains, even if
it would be a good thing’ in many respects198 to gestate a fetus, marry someone,
or have sex with someone, one cannot be obligated by morality to do these
things. Likewise, because adoption is also a relationship of radical intimacy,
prospective parents cannot be subject to a duty to adopt.199
The fault in Rieder’s argument is that it fails to establish a secure analogy
between the types of relationships he compares with adoption and thus
misapplies the standard of morality uniformly across all cases. Let me point out
relevant dis-analogies in each case. First, consider gestation and adoption. The
intimacy of gestation is different from the intimacy that one can expect right
away from an adopted child. Whereas pregnancy involves an immediate physical
bond, many adopted children experience an adjustment period, during which
time they gradually develop a physical bond with their adoptive parents. In some
cases, adopted children never express physical intimacy. The idea that gestation
and adoption both necessarily involve physical intimacy – and a comparable kind
of physical enmeshment – does not capture the experiences unique to each kind
of relationship. Little’s point that forced gestation imposes a liberty harm to the
woman does not align with the case of adoption, where the child and prospective
parent do not exist in an intertwined, embodied relation at the point of moral
obligation. Rather, adoptive parents are bound by a moral duty to fulfil their
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parenting desires by caring for an existing child rather than bringing a new child
into existence. In sum, because gestation involves an intricately embodied
relationship with another being – one that threatens the spatial and social
landscape of the woman’s life – morality cannot impose an obligation for a
woman to remain pregnant. A duty to adopt is different in character in that it
involves prospective parents with no prior physical attachments entering into
parent-child relationships, in which physical intimacy with one’s child may
develop gradually over time.
Next, compare sex with adoption, a much easier case. Simply put,
relationships with a sexual partner are different in kind from parent-child
relationships. Intimacy associated with the former should absolutely be absent
from the latter. Whereas one cannot be forced to engage in sexual intimacy with
another, morality can certainly prescribe us with an obligation to care for another
through adoption. This is because children are uniquely vulnerable and cannot
provide for themselves optimally without parental care. We have duties to care
for others in need of care, and parentless children are in need of care. For those
who wish to be parents, morality demands that we care for those who already
exist and with whom we can have a parent-child relationship.
Finally, compare marriage with adoption. Marriage is paradigmatically
different from adoption in that it involves entering into a relationship with an
equal, for the sake of roughly equivalent benefits for each party. One chooses a
partner to marry based on their fully-formed (not to be confused with
unchanging) values, beliefs, and personality, along with the perceived
compatibility between oneself and the other. Intimacy in marriage oftentimes
(though not always) includes a physical connection. One cannot be morally
obligated to marry someone, for the decision to enter into this kind of
relationship is based primarily on individuals’ willingness to be recognized in a
particular way (i.e., as a married couple). In the case of adoption, however, a
prospective parent enters into a relationship not as an equal but, rather, as a
caregiver to a child in need of care. The child is a developing being, with a yet-tobe-formed personality and set of values, beliefs, and preferences. Given this fact
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about the nature of children, two things are true in a parent-child relationship: 1)
a parent can shape their child in various ways, but 2) a parent must be open to
the kind of being that the child turns out to be. While intimacy is a part of both
parent-child and marital relationships, the key difference is that a parent, as
caregiver, occupies an unequal position in relation to their child. Whereas
morality cannot obligate one to enter into a marital relationship, it seems
reasonable that morality could prescribe us with a duty to provide parental care
to those in need of it.
Overall, I find that Rieder’s claim that general principles of obligation do
not apply in certain cases (e.g., adopting children) lacks argumentative support.
More specifically, the cases of marriage, sex, gestation upon which Rieder
grounds his core claim are disanalogous with adoption in crucial respects. As I
have shown, there is good reason to treat adoptions differently than marriage,
sex, and gestation, especially given the unique nature of parent-child
relationships in which the parent stands in a caregiving relationship to the child.
Andrew Botterell200 also remains unconvinced that one cannot be
obligated to adopt children rather than procreate, and he provides a persuasive
account to challenge Rieder’s conclusion. As Botterell nicely puts it, “one cannot
infer from the fact that gestation and adoption are both forms of intimate
relationships that concepts of duty and obligation apply to them in the same
way.” He provides a compelling comparison between the morality of foster care
and adoption to show that our intuitions about forming intimate relationships do
not clearly “block the application of obligation or duty,” as Rieder contends.201
Botterell recalls the evacuation of British children during WWII, in 1939, in an
effort to protect them from the threats of war in urban centres. As part of
‘Operation Pied Piper,’ over one million children were evacuated over the course
of three days from their urban homes and placed in foster care throughout the
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United Kingdom. Under the dire circumstances that presented themselves at the
time, Botterell argues, it is compelling to think that morality imposed a strict
obligation upon able individuals to foster these children. As he demonstrates, the
parallels between foster care and adoption provide a much clearer comparison
between two kinds of relationships of intimacy, in which morality does seem to
prescribe us with a duty to care. The key to understanding this comparison, I
suggest, is to view the global orphan crisis of millions of children around the
world as an up-scaled analogue to Operation Pied Piper. In sum, Rieder’s
argument that adoption – in virtue of being a relationship of radical intimacy –
cannot be subject to moral obligation is unsound and thus does not pose a threat
to a duty to adopt.

5.3. Duties to Assist as Imperfect
It may be argued that the duty to assist is not strong enough to generate an
obligation for one to adopt children.202 Duties to assist are imperfect in nature,
meaning that they allow for latitude and discretion on the part of the agent. In
other words, agents can fulfill imperfect duties in a variety of ways. Granted that
we have a duty to assist, the objection goes, we can exercise a range of options to
fulfill this moral demand. Adoption is one means of fulfilling the duty but there
are many other ways to do so, such as volunteering at an old age home, rescuing
animals, teaching people how to read, offering transportation services to disabled
people, and so on. In this way, the duty to assist is so wide in its prescription that
it cannot ground a duty to adopt, specifically.
An alternative version of this objection is that one is under an obligation to
assist children in need of parental care, but not at the expense of (i.e., instead of)
procreating. Rather, the duty to rescue may allow for people to procreate, as long
as they also contribute to efforts that support children who lack adequate
parental care. Perhaps one can donate substantial sums of money to orphanages
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or devote time to being involved in associations that lobby the government for
increased child welfare services. As the argument goes, these commitments
toward the betterment of children’s lives could fulfill one’s duty to assist to such
an extent that it would offset any duty to adopt. Let me address each objection in
turn.
While duties to assist are imperfect in nature, the moral prescriptions that
follow from them are sometimes context-specific. For instance, my obligation to
assist others in a multitude of ways I deem fitting (as per my discretion as an
agent) would not fulfil my duty to rescue a drowning person, should I encounter
such a situation. Likewise, prospective parents are presented with a contextspecific moral problem: satisfy one’s parenting desires by bringing a new child
into the world, or do so at a comparably insignificant cost to oneself by adopting a
child. Individuals can fulfil duties to assist in many ways, but within the specific
context of having children, the duty to assist requires that one forgo procreating
and, instead, satisfy one’s parenting desires by adopting an existing child in need.
As for the suggestion that one can permissibly procreate so long as one
offsets one’s duty to assist children in need of care, I regard this as misguided
reasoning. Adoptive children require rescue in the form of parental care,
specifically, and creating a new child instead of adopting a child merely generates
the need for an additional bundle of parental resources: “dedicated time,
guardianship, care, emotional commitment, financial support and attention to
basic needs.”203 The creation of a child diverts potential parental resources away
from existing children, toward newly created children. Absent special burden, the
act of procreating, even if supplemented with voluntary contributions to child
welfare, fails to attend to the needs of existing children in place of one’s biological
offspring. Friedrich nicely brings out the problem through an analogy: “it is not
permissible to ignore the plight of one person just because one has already helped
others; ‘I could have easily prevented her suffering but I already donated $100 to

203

Rulli, “The Duty to Adopt,” 8.

73

UNICEF’ is not an acceptable justification.”204 Thus, the moral wrong of
procreating lies in one’s ability to provide care for an existing child in need in
favour of creating a new child with the same kinds of needs, thereby depriving an
existing child of parental resources. Challenges to a duty to adopt that rely on the
claim that the duty to aid is imperfect are, therefore, unsuccessful.

5.4. Misdiagnosed Problems & Inappropriate
Solutions
Perhaps one may challenge the foundations of a duty to adopt on the grounds
that it misdiagnoses the underlying problems that many parentless children face
and thus issues in an inappropriate moral response to their situation: adoption.
Children become normatively parentless for a wide variety of reasons, and
sometimes the underlying causes of their situation are preventable. For example,
some birth parents are in positions of extreme financial vulnerability and do not
have the means to care for their biological children. In some places, women
cannot easily access abortions or are discouraged by strong social disapprobation
to seek it. In recent history, Romania enforced strict fertility policies mandating
procreation that ultimately left hundreds of thousands of children orphaned. The
list of circumstances under which children become parentless is extensive, and
many are, arguably, preventable. Given the “large-scale” nature of the global
orphan crisis and core underlying causes of children’s welfare status, one might
argue, a more appropriate response to the global orphan crisis would require
“institutional solutions and not remediation through individuals’ duty to
rescue.”205 Thus, the objection goes, prescribing individuals with a duty to adopt
incorrectly diagnoses the problem of children in need of adoption and overlooks
the massive efforts that are needed to overhaul institutional failures at the root of
children’s predicaments. Perhaps the duty even seems to tacitly endorse or
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encourage the diversion of efforts to improve social conditions for people around
the world so that children are not placed in positions in which they lack adequate
parental care.
While it is true that many of the circumstances that lead to children’s
status as parentless are preventable, the timeframe required to establish many of
the necessary conditions of change far exceed the immediacy of the children’s
need for parental care. Even if we identity them as underlying causes of children’s
status, we cannot overhaul political systems, restructure economic systems,
remedy international relations, reform problematic social norms, and so on, in a
timely manner. We could make efforts towards doing all these things but, still, we
would not beat the clock. Time is of critical importance for the children. Rulli also
stresses this, illustrating the point through Railroad, in which the child’s leg
being caught in the track is determined to be a result of institutional failure
(perhaps inadequate public safety protocols). Despite this fact, a bystander would
not be justified in failing to save the child. Rulli’s example nicely emphasizes the
time factor, and it also reinforces a point made earlier: while institutional
responses to the global orphan crisis (as duties to assist) do not stand in
opposition to individual duties to adopt, they are also no substitute for individual
duties – in this case, providing needy children with parental care. In sum, this
objection incorrectly assumes that institutional action can provide the immediate
parental care that children need.

5.5. Numbers and Collective Duties
Another objection to a duty to adopt is that not every prospective parent could
be morally obligated to adopt children, for that would require enough adoptable
children for every prospective parent: the numbers simply do not add up. The
numbers of adoptable children and prospective adoptive parents, within any
particular context, fluctuate: currently, there are far fewer willing adoptive
parents than there are children in need of adoption worldwide (hence, the global
orphan crisis), though historically, there have been domestic shortages (in the

75

United States, for example) of adoptable children for willing adoptive parents.206
As the objection goes, the problem for those who advocate in favour of a duty to
adopt as an individual duty is that they overlook practical implications having to
do with numbers and distribution. Thus, it may be argued that assigning
collective duties to assist might be preferable, for this avoids the problem of
assigning a duty to adopt to all prospective parents, not all of whom could fulfil
the duty.
I have three responses. First, the numbers problem, at least for now, is not
a pressing issue. In our current situation, “the number of children who could
benefit from adoption far surpasses the number of actual adoptions in a year.”207
Second, while duties to aid could be collective (e.g., a medical team performing
surgery, a group of people engineering running water systems, etc.), children’s
needs for parental care can only be satisfied by individuals. Third, if we do, in
time, approach a genuine numbers problem (one that reflects global numbers of
adoptees and prospective adopters), there are a variety of ways we could deal
with distribution issues. One suggestion is to be more open to multiple family
adoptions, whereby a child is placed in the joint care of individuals from different
family units, each and all of whom would provide the child with parental care. 208
Another suggestion for dealing with an uneven ratio is to devise a matching
scheme to pair best-suited families with available adoptable children. 209
Whatever the practical policy solution is, I agree with Friedrich that some
creative solution can be developed to take into account the needs of both
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parties.210 Perhaps not every prospective parent will get to adopt a child, but that
outcome would be better than an ongoing global orphan crisis.
This brings me to my last point. The duty to adopt is a context-dependent
duty: it relies on the existence of adoptable children. While it would be ideal if
there were no children in need of adoption worldwide, we live in a non-ideal
world, in which the problem of parentless children not only exists but exists on a
scale of global crisis. Rather than being a critical objection to the duty to adopt,
advocates of a duty to adopt embrace the possibility, as an ideal, that some
parents would not be able to fulfill their duty to adopt due to a lack of adoptable
children. After all, the argument is premised on children’s welfare. Herein lies the
paradox of adoption: while it is “an impressive intervention” for parentless
children, the conditions that give rise to the need for adoptions “should be
prevented as much as possible.”211

5.6. Corruption in Intercountry Adoptions
Some might issue a challenge to the very idea of a duty to adopt children by citing
corrupt systems of adoption that perpetuate harms against children by treating
them as products of global economic exchange. The charge here is that many
nations are drastically ill-equipped to properly regulate the care of children and,
instead, leave them exposed to harmful outcomes, such as trafficking, for-profit
schemes, and instrumentalist treatment for the benefit of global elite adoptive
families.212 Intercountry adoption-related corruption has been uncovered in a
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number of countries.213 Charges include recruiting and paying for babies from
poor families; kidnapping, trafficking, and selling children (many of whom are
not in need of adoption) for organ harvesting; and forging documents for illicit
adoptions. The demand for intercountry adoptions has, some argue, created a
market demand for babies and children. As the challenge goes, we should not be
advocating adoption (especially international adoption), let alone a moral duty to
adopt, because systems of child welfare in many parts of the world are far too
corrupt.
These concerns need to be taken very seriously, given the potential harms
against children. However, we should be careful to not generalize from a
sampling of cases – which, to be sure, are atrocities – to all adoptions. Rather, we
should aim to glean lessons from these cases and focus on developing and
enforcing effective regulatory measures. This sort of response echoes Elizabeth
Bartholet, who considers such cases of corruption to be “occasional” rather than
“systemic.” She writes:
The harms caused by any adoption abuses that exist are far
outweighed by the harms caused when international
adoption is shut down and children are denied by the tens
of thousands the nurturing homes they need. The obvious
solution is to do better at enforcing the laws prohibiting
these abuses and penalize the perpetrators rather than the
children.214
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However, we may criticize Bartholet on this point, for perhaps the
perception of these incidents as isolated is only so because only the most
egregious cases are known. It could be that the very hiddenness of the problem of
child trafficking, for instance, masks its rate of occurrence.215 Either way,
enforceable guidelines are needed as a means of regulating intercountry
adoptions, and The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption is promising. 216
As an inter-governmental agreement designed to ensure the best interests of the
child in intercountry adoption, and to “prevent the abduction, sale, and
trafficking of children”, it includes requirements by which each signatory country
must comply and guidelines for cooperation between contracting states.217 Thus,
criticisms about corruption in adoption systems call for acute awareness about
the conditions surrounding intercountry adoptions but do not undermine the
duty to adopt.

6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that a pro tanto duty to adopt children instead of
procreating is very compelling and defensible against many strong criticisms. I
began by highlighting features of the global orphan crisis, in which millions of
children around the world are in need of parental care. Applying the framework
of a duty to assist, I reviewed Rulli’s and Friedrich’s arguments in favour of a duty
to adopt children instead of bringing new children into the world through
procreation. I reviewed their reasoning about several proposed defeating
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conditions to a duty to adopt and offered my own assessments along the way.
Furthermore, I engaged with a set of objections that challenged the foundations
of a duty to adopt. Ultimately, I have demonstrated the strength of a duty to
adopt. In the next chapter, I consider three group-based proposals in favour of
procreation.
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Chapter 2: Group-Based Reasons in Favour of
Procreation
1. Introduction
In Chapter 1, I strengthened Tina Rulli’s and Daniel Friedrich’s defense of a duty
to adopt against two sets of objections: one premised on the idea that willing
prospective parents have a justified preference for biological children and the
other having to do with foundational challenges to a duty to adopt. At the end of
the chapter, I mentioned that there could be a different set of objections against
the duty, namely, group-based reasons to favour procreation over adoption.
My central aim in this chapter is to develop three group-based reasons in
favour of procreation that challenge a duty to adopt. I will begin by constructing a
taxonomic characterization of different kinds of reasons in favour of procreation.
In doing so, I will identify a category that has been left largely unaccounted for by
proponents of a duty to adopt, namely, group-based reasons. After articulating
the distinct nature of social groups and the nature of races as social groups, I will
include a brief commentary on the metaphysics of race, focusing on two social
constructionist theories of race. These two ways of thinking about race will
provide the basis for my development of three group-based reasons in favour of
procreation: for reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation.
While in-depth critical engagement with the arguments against a duty to adopt
that follow from these reasons will be the focus of subsequent chapters, in this
chapter I will offer the strongest arguments in support of members of racially
oppressed groups to have biological children, against a duty to adopt.

81

2. A Taxonomy of Procreative Reasons
According to what Mianna Lotz calls the “reasons-relevance thesis,” the reasons
“why we procreate matters for the morality of our procreative conduct”.218 Many
of us intuitively regard some reasons in favour of procreation as, at best, morally
suspect and, at worst, morally reprehensible. For example, wanting a child to
save one’s marriage and wanting to have a child through whom to live vicariously
are morally dubious and commonly frowned-upon reasons to procreate;219 and
most of us would agree that wanting to have a child in order to profit from the
child’s labour is one such unacceptable reason to procreate. However, as we
encountered in Chapter 1, some reasons offered in favour of procreation seem
initially convincing and thus require thoughtful reflection to gauge their strength
against a duty to adopt. In this section, I develop a taxonomy of reasons in favour
of procreation and, in so doing, uncover a largely under-examined type of reason
to procreate: for the sake of one’s social group. I will suggest that a successful
defense of a duty to adopt must respond to challenges posed by what I refer to as
‘group-based’ reasons in favour of procreation.
As part of her project to clarify how we might think about the rightness
and wrongness of procreative conduct, Lotz categorizes different reasons offered
in favour of procreation. While her project differs markedly from my own, I take
inspiration from her identification of a taxonomy of reasons. Mapping out and
distinguishing different kinds of reasons that people have for preferring
biological children over adopted children, I contend, will help us to assess their
unique challenges against a duty to adopt.
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The first main category of reasons to favour procreation is what I will refer
to as self-regarding reasons. These are reasons in favour of having biological
children that are derived from the interests of the prospective parents. Reasons of
this type include wanting to have a child who shares one’s physical appearances,
desiring the experience of pregnancy and, as Lotz mentions, giving one’s life
purpose and meaning, gaining social acceptance, and wanting to experience
parenthood.220 Interestingly, Tina Rulli and Daniel Friedrich focus heavily on
self-regarding reasons to procreate (see Chapter 1). That is, when evaluating
claims about one’s desire to procreate instead of adopt children, both Rulli and
Friedrich tend to consider reasons that are based upon the self-interests of the
prospective parents. Rulli reveals her emphasis on self-regarding reasons when
she says, “arguments in favour or defence of procreation tend to emphasize the
importance of the biological child’s connection to oneself through genes or body.
The value of procreation is located in the value of oneself.”221 I have provided a
detailed analysis in Chapter 1 of why I think many (in fact, in my view, most)
procreative reasons in this category fail to justify procreation over one’s duty to
adopt. There are, however, other types of reasons that might motivate one’s
desire to procreate, and it is worth exploring whether they might pose more
compelling challenges to the duty.
The second main category is what I will refer to as child-centered reasons.
These are reasons in favour of procreating that appeal to the goods or welfare
that would befall the future child, such as wanting to give the anticipated child
the gift of life, or desiring procreation for the sake of the projected well-being of
the possible future child. As several philosophers have pointed out,222 however,
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child-regarding reasons fall prey to non-identity or value-attribution problems,
which makes them questionable grounds upon which to justify bringing a child
into existence. To simplify, the issue at stake here is whether we can benefit
someone by bringing them into existence: if they do not yet exist, then how can
they stand to benefit?223 The problem is, by appealing to the anticipated goods
that a future child would receive or its anticipated well-being upon being born,
we incoherently attribute value to a life that does not yet exist.
Lotz offers a charitable interpretation of child-centered reasons in favour
of procreation. As she explains, although the anticipated good of the possible
future child cannot justify bringing a child into existence, a possible child’s
predicted welfare should be taken into account when contemplating whether or
not to procreate.224 She explains by way of example that being able to benefit
one’s future child by passing on one’s family inheritance may factor into one’s
decision to procreate, but it cannot count as a reason for bringing a child into
existence.225
I reject child-centered reasons in favour of procreation because the very
idea of benefitting someone who does not yet exist by bringing them into
existence is incoherent. Moreover, barring goods such as the ‘gift of life,’ the
goods that one may desire to give a biological child can be given to an adopted
child. For instance, one could pass on one’s family inheritance to an adopted
child; one could nurture an adopted child and provide them with a life full of
valuable goods. In this way, adopting a child unambiguously avoids the valueattribution problem that having a child through procreation inescapably faces. In
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sum, because child-centered reasons to favour procreation face insurmountable
value-attribution problems and also fail to show the unique value of a biological
child, they cannot justify procreation over a duty to adopt.
The third category of reasons in favour of procreation I will call otherregarding reasons. These are, as Lotz describes, reasons to procreate that are
“based upon, derived from, or characterized … by reference to the good, interests
or needs of someone other than the being brought into existence.”226 I suggest
that this category includes several sub-divisions: those reasons respectively
derived primarily from the interests of individuals other than the prospective
parents and children, collectives or associations, and social groups. Examples of
reasons to procreate for another individual’s sake include to create a ‘saviour
sibling’ for one’s existing child, to have a child for an infertile family member via
altruistic surrogacy, to express commitment to one’s spouse, and to honour one’s
parents with a grandchild. Reasons to procreate that are based on the interests of
collectives or associations, as Christine Overall recognizes, may derive from the
interests of one’s nation state. For instance, one might desire to have children as
a way of expressing loyalty to one’s nation, or perhaps to help build a larger
national citizenry for purposes of strengthening one’s state’s military, economic,
industrial, or intelligence agendas.227
Some procreative reasons share features of more than one category and
are thus mixed in nature. For example, wanting to procreate to save one’s
marriage involves both an appeal to one’s self-interest in preserving one’s
marriage and concern for one’s partner, with whom one values sharing an
interpersonal bond. Likewise, we can interpret Lotz’s example of desiring to have
a child who would inherit the family business228 as mixed because, in addition to
expressing one’s self-interest in continuing the family business, one may also
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hold a child-centered view that the inheritance of the family business would be of
benefit to the anticipated child.229
Also within the category of other-regarding reasons, I propose, are groupbased reasons to procreate, reasons that are derived primarily from the interests
of a social group to which one is a member. Here, the primary source of
motivation for one to procreate depends on reasons related to one’s assented-to
identity as a member of the social group. As I will argue, group-based reasons
present a pressing challenge to a duty to adopt and, thus, a robust defense of a
duty to adopt must address them. Existing literature on a duty to adopt
altogether ignores group-based challenges. Before moving into an analysis of
specific group-based reasons, it is worth thinking about the nature of social
identities, and why group-based reasons to procreate are distinct from other
types of other-regarding reasons.

3. Group-Based Reasons
Group-based reasons in favour of procreation are characteristically distinct from
other sorts of other-regarding reasons in that they capture procreative interests
that are founded upon appeals to one’s assented-to membership in a social
group. In this section, I differentiate group-based reasons as a unique subset of
other-regarding reasons by distinguishing social groups from other types of
collectivities.

3.1. Social Groups
Social groups are a unique type of collectivity of people, distinguishable from
other types of collectivities. Drawing upon the works of Iris Marion Young,
Katherine Richie and Linda Martín Alcoff, I contrast aggregates and associations
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from social groups and present what I take to be the latter’s key distinguishing
features.
Let us first compare aggregates and associations. Aggregates, Young
describes, are classifications of people based on any set of shared attributes – for
example, eye colour, the brand of computer people use, the number of languages
people speak, and so on.230 Contrast this type of collectivity with that of an
association, a “formally organized institution, such as a club, corporation,
political party, church, college, or union.”231 Whereas one’s membership in an
aggregate is involuntary and ascribed, one’s membership in an association is
intentional and assented to.232 For example, a member of a soccer team (a type of
association) actively seeks belonging in the group by attending practices and
games, and so on, and assents to being a member of the sports team. On the other
hand, someone who wears jeans would be ascribed membership in an aggregate
that picks out ‘those who wear jeans’ without having to intentionally seek
membership or assent to being classified as a member of such a collectivity.
What makes social groups – e.g., of genders, racial groups, ethnicities,
classes, dis/abilities, etc. – distinctive from aggregates or associations? I suggest
that social groups have at least three key distinguishing features. First, social
groups are socially constructed: they exist and are contextually defined within a
society, and they are subject to society-wide ascriptions of meaning and value.
For example, racial categories shift from one society to the next, and ascriptions
of value (e.g., relative power and privilege) to different racial groups have a real,
causal impact on people’s life chances.233 Whereas one may be identified as
‘coloured’ in South Africa, in other parts of the world, one may be identified as
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‘black’. Michael Root describes this phenomenon of racial category fluidity in
terms of race being localized to socio-historical sites and not necessarily traveling
from one place to the next.234 Although social groups are socially constructed,
they are nonetheless real because they impact people’s lives. To illustrate this
point, consider that the life chances of an indigenous woman in Canada are
grossly compromised as compared to the life chances of a white male in the same
society. Crucially, social groups comprise individuals whose identities are
fundamentally bound up with the social groups to which they are a part. “They
are a specific type of collectivity,” Young explains, “with specific consequences for
how people understand one another and themselves.”235
A second distinguishing feature is that one’s membership in a social group
is either ascribed, assented to, or a combination of both. Although members of a
social group can embrace, sculpt, or resist their group-based identities,
membership in social groups may also be ascribed or perceived by others without
one’s assent. An example of ascription without self-identification would be a
person from South Africa who identifies as racially ‘coloured’ but is labelled as
‘black’ in Canada, perhaps despite resisting or rejecting that label. Another
possibility is self-identification without ascription, as in the case of a person who
identifies as gender non-conforming but is misidentified by others as being of a
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specific binary gender. Finally, self-identification and ascription may align, as in
the case of someone who identifies as indigenous and is also identified as such by
others.
Finally, unlike associations, social groups lack structural-functional
organization, and members lack shared intentionality.236 Take a ballet company,
for instance, which is an association. Members of a ballet company each play a
role in its operation. Administrators market the shows, technicians manage
audio-visual aspects of production, artists create costumes and stage scenery,
directors and choreographers orchestrate the production, and dancers perform. A
ballet company is organized in the sense that each of its members plays a role in
the structure and functioning of the collectivity. Without this organization, the
company (i.e., the association) would crumble. Moreover, members of the ballet
company have shared intentionality, all working toward the goal of producing a
polished piece of performance art to showcase to an audience.
On the other hand, social groups are unorganized, as members of a social
group do not all have the same goals, plans, actions, and beliefs, and they do not
have specific roles to fulfil in order for the group to exist. In addition to being
different from associations, social groups are also different from collectives of
people who band together in striving to achieve an outcome, as in a group of
bystanders on land who coordinate their efforts to save someone who is drowning
in a river, or a movement of vegans who work together to liberate animals. Alcoff
captures this unorganized feature of social groups by pointing out that the
identities of members within any social group are dynamic and contested. 237
Individuals may accept, transcend, or reject their group-based identities, giving
social groups themselves the feature of being dynamic, ever-changing and
evolving. Social groups contain within them microcosmic representations of
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difference and heterogeneity present in the wider society.238 One’s identification
in a social group can shape one’s identities and lived experiences in both positive
and negative ways and, as a result, individuals in social groups may choose to
take pride in or challenge their group-based identities, to varying degrees. In at
least these three ways, social groups are distinctive types of collectivities.
Aggregate- or association-based reasons in favour of procreation would
likely present unconvincing challenges to one’s duty to adopt, but reasons
deriving from one’s membership in a social group have the potential to present
critical challenges. Recall that group-based reasons are those derived primarily
from one’s interest in a social group to which one belongs, and for which one’s
primary source of motivation depends on reasons related to one’s group-based
identity. Rather than basing one’s motivation to procreate upon one’s
coincidental belonging in a random aggregate (e.g., people who live in tiny
houses) or one’s affirmed belonging in an association (e.g., university professors),
the rich socio-political identity-conferring features of social group membership
provides a more plausible starting point for thinking about the moral justification
of procreation. Of course, the degree to which one values one’s membership in a
social group will influence whether and to what extent one appeals to groupbased reasons in favour of procreation. I take it to be essential that, in appealing
to a group-based reason to procreate, one would necessarily identify as a member
of the relevant group and be motivated to act in its interests.239
Group-based reasons could appeal to the interests of any number of social
groups, including ethnic, gender-based, dis/ability groups, but I focus on those
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pertaining to racial groups for two reasons. First, I focus on race because of the
prominence of race-talk and race-related considerations in child welfare and
adoption systems. Race is a key factor that determines children’s connection to
child welfare, and issues related to race play a central role in adoption systems
and individuals’ decisions about family-making. Second, I focus on race so as to
carefully attend to issues related to these kinds of social groups. As Alcoff nicely
puts it, “Social identities operate in very specific ways, utilizing and invoking
different features of social realities, practices, and discourses, and therefore they
require analyses that will not lose sight of these particularities.”240 While there
are many more social groups that could potentially claim for its members a
limited right to procreate, I limit my discussion to racial groups in order to attend
to the specificities of such social identities, and to avoid casting unthoughtful
claims onto others. My hope is that critical analysis of racial group-based reasons
to procreate can illuminate some of the insightful or problematic ways that other
social identities are used to justify procreative decisions.

3.2. Races as Social Groups
The nature of race is widely contested amongst philosophers. Some philosophers
argue that race is fundamentally biological in nature, while others locate the
fundamental nature of race in its social significations. An overview of competing
theories of race,241 or a defense of any particular conception, would require
substantial argumentation and is thus beyond the scope of my project. However,
the group-based arguments I develop in this chapter rely on certain general
theories of race, both of which take race to be socially constructed. In this section,
I briefly outline core commitments of political and cultural theories of race. The
group-based reasons in favour of procreation I consider in §4 – reparative justice,

Alcoff, Visible Identities, 10.
For a thorough overview of philosophical accounts of race, see Jorge J. E.
Gracia, Race Or Ethnicity?: On Black and Latino Identity. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2007; and Sally Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, Quayshawn Spencer, and Joshua
Glasgow. Four Views on Race (Forthcoming).
240
241

91

racial solidarity, and cultural preservation – invoke these two general theories of
race.
It is widely held that races are socially constructed, meaning that they exist
“as a matter of social reality that we produce and maintain through widespread
patterns of thought and behaviour.”242 Within the framework of social
constructivism about race, there are two distinct theories of race: political and
cultural. According to political theories, races are distinct groups of people with
shared political histories who are positioned in hierarchical relationships to one
another. Many philosophers articulate a view of races along these lines. Sally
Haslanger includes in her definition of racialized groups that they are “socially
positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic,
political, legal, social, etc.)” in relation to one another.243 Paul C. Taylor defines
races as “probabilistically defined populations” whose members are “similarly
situated with regard to certain social conditions, including the mechanisms and
measures of social stratification.”244 Linda Alcoff affirms the fundamental
political significance of the origin of racial groups, emphasizing that systems of
oppression and discrimination create the conditions for racial groupings. 245
Charles Mills references a racial order in many parts of the world that imparts
significance to race, identifying “vertical racial systems,” characterized by
hierarchical political and economic orders that serve to privilege some and
subordinate others into superior and inferior races, based on perceived physical,

Jeffers, forthcoming, in Four Views on Race. Contrast social constructivism
about race with biological accounts of race, according to which races are delineated
fundamentally by individuals’ biological features and geographical origins. For nonessentialist biological accounts of race, see Quayshawn Spencer, “A Radical Solution to
the Race Problem.” Philosophy of Science 81, no. 5 (2014): 1025-1038; and Robin O.
Andreasen, “Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?” Philosophy of Science 67, no.
3 (2000): S653-S666.
243 Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race” 44, emphasis added.
244 Paul C. Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge, UK;Malden,
MA;: Polity, 2004. 117, emphasis added.
245 Alcoff, Visible Identities, 165, 278.
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intellectual, and moral-characteristic features.246 Theorizing about a political
philosophy of race, Falguni Sheth argues that race is a long-standing, continual
phenomenon by which “power relationships between sovereign authorities and
subject populations” create and reproduce groups of people who are politically
divided against one another.247 Similarly, David Theo Goldberg argues that race
is used as a tool of governance in modern states and that “racial identification is
elaborated through formalized classification schemes establishing population
hierarchies.”248 Finally, Omi and Winant conceive of race as mediated through
social and historical processes that “signif[y] and symboliz[e] social conflicts and
interests by referring to different types of human bodies.”249 While the details of
these accounts of races vary, they all hold at minimum that races are groups of
people connected to political systems of hierarchy, in which some groups of
people are dominant and others subordinate. I take this to be the defining
characteristic of political theories of race.
Cultural theories of race, which hold less prominence in the philosophical
literature, foreground culture in defining races. In “The Conservation of Races,”
W. E. B. Du Bois writes that a race is a
a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood
and language, always of common history, traditions and
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily
striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or
less vividly conceived ideals of life.”250

Charles W. Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. (Ithaca,
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998), 44.
247 Falguni A. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race (Albany: SUNY Press,
2009), 172, emphasis added.
248 David Theo Goldberg, Are We all Postracial Yet? Cambridge; Polity, 2015.
249 Michael Omi and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States.
(Third ed. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 110, emphasis
original.
250 Cited in Alcoff and Mendieta’s Identities, 2003, 44, emphasis added. Notice that
Du Bois accepts as part of his view of race that people are divided “into distinct races”
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Similarly, for Lucius Outlaw, races
are associated with conceptions, beliefs, values, and
practices and are used to make important distinctions
among groups of peoples, and among persons, on the basis
of physical features and cultural factors which are thought
to be shared by persons in the group and which constitute
the group as a distinct race and/or ethnie.251
Outlaw goes on to identify a race as a distinct group whose biological
features, geographical ties, and cultural processes “combine to constitute a ‘race’”
whose members “know [themselves] as a distinct group” and comprise a “selfreproducing, encultured population.”252 Finally, Chike Jeffers endorses a
cultural theory of race, according to which members of a particular race share (in
addition to political histories) certain ways of life (i.e., a common culture), with
respect

to

any

combination

of

traditions,

expressions,

linguistic

and

extralinguistic communication, and other markers of social existence. 253 Though
varied between different philosophers’ accounts, cultural theories of race
minimally hold that races comprise people who fundamentally share common
ways of life.
One notable normative implication of political and cultural theories of race
is their answer to the question about whether races are worth preserving.
Cultural theorists tend to answer the question in the affirmative, holding that the
positive value of races lies in the cultural goods that members create and share.

whose relationship is characterized by separation into “dominant and subordinate
groups” (cited in Jeffers, 2013, 409, emphasis added). However, Jeffers (2013;
forthcoming) interprets Du Bois as ultimately endorsing a cultural theory of race.
251 Lucius Outlaw, “Against the Grain of Modernity: The Politics of Difference and
the Conservation of ‘Race’,” Man and World 25, no. 3 (1992): 445, emphasis added.
252 Outlaw, “Against the Grain of Modernity,” p. 445, emphases added.
253 Chike Jeffers, “The Cultural Theory of Race: Yet another Look at Du Bois's ‘The
Conservation of Races,’” Ethics 123, no. 3 (2013): 422.
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Although racial divisions have structured hierarchies in our world, cultural
theorists of race hold that there is positive value to race, hierarchies aside. These
cultural goods, it is argued, are valuable in themselves, even in a future world
where classificatory systems founded on racial domination and subordination are
outdated. As Jeffers believes, “the preservation of distinctive cultural traditions is
desirable and admirable” and may ground obligations to preserve one’s culture in
oppressive contexts.254

255

Cultural preservationists would maintain that, if it

were possible to eradicate race-based discrimination, we ought to hold on to
races in their cultural forms and celebrate racial (i.e., cultural) diversity. With an
emphasis on the positive value of race, the existence of races on cultural theories
is not inherently negative; in fact, it is positive because the cultural aspects of
race can be (and perhaps ought to be) celebrated, remembered, shared. On the
other hand, political theorists of race tend to reject ideals of race preservation.
Recall that race, according to political theories, is defined in terms of hierarchical
divisions between groups of people. Hence, in a future world without racism and
vertical racial orders, there simply would be no races. The significance of these
two different theories of race – political and cultural – will become clearer in S4,
in which I develop from these two general concepts three group-based reasons in
favour of procreation.
As I have defined social groups and races, any individual could appeal to
racial group-based reasons to procreate, including those who are members of
dominant racial groups. However, to extend a point that Charles Mills makes in
the context of same-race marriage, I contend that when it comes to having
children, examining the value of racial endogamy or self-segregation for
members of a dominant racial group would yield “philosophically uninteresting
racist reasons” to procreate.256 As I will touch on in the next section, notions of

Chike Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” The Journal of
Value Inquiry 49, no. 1 (2015): 205-220. 215.
255 Jeffers, forthcoming in Four Views on Race.
256 Charles W. Mills, “Do Black Men have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women?”
Journal of Social Philosophy 25, no. s1 (1994): 131.
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racial superiority are used to promote the creation of individuals within
privileged social groups, but I reject these reasons in favour of procreation
because they rely on perpetuating systems of oppression.
Rather, my interpretation of group-based reasons to procreate takes the
foundational motivation of its advocates to be an ethic of resistance to historical
injustice or ongoing racism. This will become evident in §4, where I explicate
racial group-based reasons in favour of procreation. Following Mills, I begin with
the view that these reasons are worthy of philosophical attention and scrutiny
although, upon inspection, we may find that some (or all) of them rest on
misguided motivations, or are factually or empirically ill-founded.257 Although
those who espouse a ‘one human race’ ideal might quickly reject any appeal to
group-based reasons in favour of procreation (or group-based reasons in favour
of adoption, the topic of Chapter 3), the reality is that concerns about race in the
realm of family-making have prompted complex philosophical and political
debates. For this reason, it is important to engage carefully with group-based
reasons having to do with race that might challenge a duty to adopt. In the rest of
this chapter, I consider whether members of oppressed racial groups could be
exempted from a duty to adopt for reasons having primarily to do with the
interests of the racial group to which they belong.

4. Reasons in Favour of Procreation
A few philosophers have gestured toward the possibility of group-based reasons
in favour of procreation. Andrew Botterell and Carolyn McLeod very briefly
suggest that groups of people (e.g., minority ethnic or racial groups, disabled
people) who have been targeted by eugenics programs may have a right to
reproduce as an act of political resistance. They emphasize that this right to
reproduce would apply only to groups that have experienced oppression in the
form of state-restricted reproduction (i.e. eugenics); Botterell and McLeod do not
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endorse a general right to reproduce (i.e., one that applies to everyone).258
Similarly, Maureen Sander-Staudt suggests that “the moral right to become a
biological parent may be fundamental for those who have descended perilously
from slavery, were sterilized because of their ethnic heritage and/or perceived
incompetence, or are/were the targets of genocide.”259 In this way, appeals to
one’s membership in a social group could provide a firm basis for claiming not
merely a desire to procreate but, more strongly, a right (i.e., an entitlement) to
procreate. These are fascinating proposals in favour of procreation, and I think
they carry serious potential to override a pro tanto duty to adopt, at least for
some individuals. Both Botterell and McLeod, and Sander-Staudt seem to have in
mind reasons to procreate based specifically on reparative justice.
Let us consider reasons in favour of procreation grounded in reparative
justice first, and then two others: racial solidarity; and cultural preservation. In
the rest of this chapter, I aim to accomplish three things: first, to develop and
provide support for each of these reasons; second, to identify how each of them
locate the value of procreation; and third, to interpret each of their challenges
against a duty to adopt rather than procreate. Reserved for sustained engagement
over the two chapters following this one is my evaluation of whether these
reasons can successfully override one’s duty to adopt.

4.1. Reparative Justice
Reparative justice seems to present a compelling reason in favour of procreation.
Consider this proposal: as a remedy for anti-natalist oppression or sexual and
reproductive injustices against certain racial groups, direct victims or
descendants of victims have a moral right to procreate. Where the reproductive

Andrew Botterell and Carolyn McLeod. “Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the
Status Quo on Parental Licensing?” in Permissible Progeny, eds. Richard Vernon,
Samantha Brennan, and Sarah Hannan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 196.
259 Maureen Sander‐Staudt, “Frontiers in Parenthood: Queer Mothering, Maternal
Ambivalence, Adoption, and Reproductive Technology,” Hypatia 31, no. 2 (2016): 465.
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liberties of individuals in these groups have been eliminated (perhaps through
the elimination of the individuals themselves) or compromised (e.g., through
anti-natalist regimes), claims to reparative justice in the form of a limited right to
procreate would allow for individuals to reclaim control over their reproductive
choices by procreating.
Fundamental to the idea of reparations – in contexts of interpersonal,
socio-political, and intergenerational injustices – is remedying wrongs.260
Reparative justice offers a framework for redressing wrongs against direct victims
and descendants of victims,261 which may involve restitution, truth and
reconciliation, redistribution, apologies, guarantees of non-repetition, honouring
of treaties, and so on. Margaret Urban Walker contends that appropriate
reparations for injustice are fitting, interactive, useful, and effective.262 A
reparative measure is fitting just in case it applies appropriately (e.g., in kind, in
proportion) to the wrong at stake. For instance, appropriate reparative responses
to suppression of truth may be truth-finding and public memorializing; remedies
for physical violence may require medical care and personal protection for
victims; to redress civil war conflicts, truth-telling and peace initiatives may be
critical; and so on. Reparative measures are interactive if they allow for open
dialogue with victims and take direction from their input, desires, and
expectations of the process, rather than foreclosing communication and
unilaterally imposing the terms of remediation. Relatedly, the usefulness of

Margaret Urban Walker, What is Reparative Justice? Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press. (2010). 49, 9.
261 There is considerable debate about whether or not descendants of direct victims
of historical injustices can claim for reparations in virtue of being linked through
ancestral lineage. See Vernon, Richard. Historical Redress: Must we Pay for the Past?
New York: Continuum, 2012; Vernon, Richard. Justice Back and Forth: Duties to the
Past and Future. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016. I follow Janna Thompson
(2001) in her view that descendants of victims have a claim to reparations: Janna
Thompson, “Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendants,”
Ethics 112, no. 1 (2001): 114-135.
262 Walker, What is Reparative Justice? 21.
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reparative measures corresponds to whether they are suitable in helping victims
come to terms with the losses and harms they have suffered, and whether they
can empower victims and facilitate their building of positive relationships with
others. Finally, we can judge the effectiveness of reparative measures by whether
they are attentive to victims’ needs and abilities to access and utilize the
reparations offered. Reparative measures that ultimately do not effect change
within the context of an injustice fail the standard of effectiveness.
Throughout the world, cases of state-sanctioned

restrictions on

procreation or sexual and reproductive injustices against members of racialized
groups have affected certain individuals’ abilities to exercise their procreative
liberties. Consider the following sorts of injustices. Genocides and massacres,
sometimes euphemistically referred to as ‘ethnic cleansings,’ have been used as
methods of eliminating groups of people based on their race. By wiping out
groups of people entirely – perhaps through biological warfare or armed sabotage
– dominant racial groups have asserted absolute control over the reproduction of
future generations of certain peoples. This means of anti-natalism is abhorrently
direct, for it leaves no option for procreation to occur but for those who escape
death.
Some anti-natalist regimes target women’s ability to procreate by way of
coerced or forced sterilization. Sterilization practices around the world have
historically affected women who are racialized, treating them as fundamentally
unworthy or undeserving of the ability to bear children.263 Racialized women
have been prime targets of sterilization programs, with state-sanctioned
administration of long-term contraceptives occurring without consent, and often
with no or inadequate medical supervision.264 The contraceptive Norplant has

Priti Patel, “Forced Sterilization of Women as Discrimination,” Public Health
Reviews 38, no. 1 (2017).
264 In Canada, one of the many harms resulting from colonization was the forced
sterilization of Aboriginal women (Boyer, Yvonne, University of Saskatchewan. Native
Law Centre, and National Aboriginal Health Organization. First Nations, Métis, and
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been used as a method of international population control, designed to suppress
birth rates of certain populations in third-world countries, including Indonesia,
Bangladesh, and Peru.265 Mass sterilizations of indigenous women in North
America without their consent were aimed at eliminating whole populations,
leading many to recognize the practice as “literally genocidal.”266 Sterilization has
been and continues to be267 a method of state-sanctioned population control that
targets members (especially women) of oppressed racial groups.
Furthermore, eugenics programs and nation-building268 projects seek to
propagate the best, most ‘pure’ groups of citizens and eradicate those groups that

Inuit Women's Health. Vol. no. 4. Ottawa: National Aboriginal Health Organization,
2006). A thorough history of sterilization methods in the United States and
internationally can be found in Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race,
Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty, (1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).
Also see Jennifer Nelson, Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement
(2003), esp. “An Instrument of Genocide: The Black Nationalist Campaign Against Birth
Control,” 85-111 for a history of resistance movements in the United States to end
population control, including sterilization abuse, against women of colour.
265 Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 139.
266 Jane Lawrence, “The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native
American Women,” American Indian Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2000): 400-419; Roberts,
Killing the Black Body, 95.
267 For contemporary examples of sterilization abuses against black women, see
Erica Lawson, “Black Women’s Mothering in a Historical and Contemporary
Perspective,” Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering, 2(2), (2000): 2130. At the time of writing this dissertation, indigenous women in Saskatchewan, Canada
have filed a class-action lawsuit for having been subjected to coerced sterilization from at
least the 1930s through to the early 2000s. See Alex Soloducha’s CBC report (2017):
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/sask-indigenous-women-file-lawsuitclaiming-coerced-sterilization-1.4348848.
268 I understand nation-building in terms of state-based efforts to cultivate a
unified citizenry with a sense of national unity. While the concept of nation-building
seems inviting, it is often accompanied by insidious intentions and discriminatory
effects. In sculpting desirable nations, states impose policies and differential treatment
upon “non-core groups” – aggregates of individuals who are treated as ‘other’ by those in
power within and outside the state – in ways that determine which of those non-core
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are deemed impure or less pure. An example of nation-building that has aided in
the killing of racialized bodies are the extremely high rates of indigenous youth
suicides in Canada, borne out of poor social conditions and legacies of
colonialism, which have only recently signaled a national crisis for intervention
and supports. Systemic racial oppression sends a clear message, with material
and social implications, that some groups of people are lesser and do not have
absolute value. Constructing a nation comprised of the purest citizens entails
employing means to eliminate – through direct and sometimes subtle means –
certain groups of people who do not meet dominant racial groups’ standards.
An example of contemporary eugenics involves separating people through
means of incarceration, thereby preventing procreation by restricting contact
between potential progenitors. James Oleson269 makes the case that race-based
segregation via mass incarceration has the effect of significantly depressing
reproductive rates amongst racialized minorities, who are disproportionately
represented in prison systems. Consider that rates of incarceration amongst
racialized men and women in the United States and Canada (among other
countries) are disproportionately high,270 and that procreation for prisoners is
hindered by prison restrictions on conjugal visits and access to assisted
reproductive technologies, if needed.271 Committing racialized men and women
in vast numbers to prison has serious consequences for the possibilities of certain
racialized populations to have biological children and pass on their lineage.

groups are “assimilated, accommodated, or annihilated by their host states” (Harris
Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and
Minorities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)).
269 James Oleson, “The New Eugenics: Black Hyper-Incarceration and Human
Abatement,” Social Sciences 5, no. 4 (2016): 66.
270 Oleson, “The New Eugenics”; Samantha Jeffries and Philip C. Stenning.
“Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: Law, Policy, and Practice in Three Countries,”
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 56, no. 4 (2014): 447-494.
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Systems of colonization, slavery, and racial domination have also denied
procreative liberties to people by means of rape or coerced impregnation.
Adrienne Davis explains how black women’s bodies were exploited for political
and economic gain during slavery in the United States. Black women were forced
to reproduce “the slave workforce through giving birth and serving as forced
sexual labor to countless men of all races.”272 Likewise, Dorothy Roberts affirms
that “For slave women, procreation had little to do with liberty. To the contrary,
Black women’s childbearing in bondage was largely a product of oppression
rather than an expression of self-determination or personhood.”273 Thus,
included in the list of atrocities committed against people who were enslaved was
the sexual and reproductive labour of women that denied them autonomy and
governance over their own bodies. Although this form of injustice is not antinatalist per se (in fact, these acts have an odd connection with pronatalism), such
methods of controlling women constrain their choices about procreation
(whether to procreate at all, with whom, and when, etc.), contra sexual and
reproductive justice. These are just a few of the ways in which individuals (qua
members of targeted racial groups) have been subjected to wrongs that hindered
their ability to exercise control over their bodies and reproductive choices. 274
In the context of family-making, reparations for procreative injustices
would, on Walker’s account, take the form of granting moral permission for
wronged individuals (or descendants of those wronged) to procreate. In political
terms, reparative justice may require state-based initiatives to actively support
procreation (e.g., through state funding for reproductive services) amongst those

Adrienne Davis, “Don’t Let Nobody Bother Yo’ Principle: The Sexual Economy
of American Slavery.” In Sister Circle: Black Women and Work, ed. Sharon Harley,.
(New Jersey: Rutgers. 2002): 105.
273 Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 23.
274 I limit my sample of injustices here for the sake of concision but welcome a
broader interpretation of reproductive injustices, whereby limited access to healthcare
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autonomy.
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who have been deprived of their procreative liberties. Arguably, the remedy of
supporting procreation for members of groups who have suffered injustices that
compromised their reproductive liberties meets Walker’s criterion of fittingness,
given the clear connection between wrong and remedy. We could also determine
with relative accuracy – through political history, ancestral lineage, and
intergenerational memory – the affected victims and descendants of victims, so
that the reparations are awarded to the appropriate individuals. Whether
reparations through procreation are interactive depends on whether there are
supporters of something akin to a moral right to procreate for certain individuals,
amongst those who count as victims. Likewise, for judging its usefulness and
effectiveness. I suggest that we keep these criteria in mind and revisit them in
more detail in Chapter 3.
Importantly, claims to reparation through procreation challenge a duty to
adopt by providing moral license for some individuals to have biological children.
From a reparative justice perspective, the value of procreation cannot be
substituted for adopting a child. This is because procreation serves as a symbolic
act of resistance to oppression, namely, by asserting or reclaiming one’s
reproductive liberties. Whereas anti-natalist oppression and reproductive
injustices have deprived individuals (qua members of targeted social groups) of
their abilities to bear children, procreation motivated by reparative justice allows
for those individuals to embrace pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare as positive
experiences, with autonomy and self-governance over one’s body, and (to a
significant degree) free from similar conditions of oppression. In sum,
procreation motivated by reparative justice provides a compelling case for
granting a limited right to procreate to some individuals. Whether it can
ultimately overturn one’s duty to adopt is something we will discuss in the next
chapter. For now, let us turn to the next proposed reason in favour of
procreation.
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4.2. Racial Solidarity
A second group-based reason in favour of procreation is premised on the idea
that members of oppressed racial groups have a moral right to procreate as a way
to express social or political solidarity with one’s group. This argument is also
founded on an ethic of resistance to historical and contemporary injustices
against certain groups of people, and so the same considerations about antinatalism, and sexual and reproductive injustices, carry over. However, instead of
the idea being that members of certain groups have a limited right to procreate in
virtue of having a claim to reparations, on this view, they would have a right to
procreate as a way of honouring their group through bonds of solidarity and also
at achieving social change.
Solidarity comes in many different forms. At times, it operates as a
unifying force of humanity, bringing together all peoples despite their
differences, where the recognition of human-ness takes precedence in
interactions with and treatment of one another. As Sally Scholz explains, this
“human solidarity” differs from “political solidarity” and “social solidarity.”275
Political solidarity involves the unification of people based on their common
interest in resisting oppression and striving for social change. 276 Unlike with
social solidarity, those who band together in political solidarity need not (though
they may) mutually recognize one another as members of an already existing
group. Importantly, it is the shared commitment to “a struggle for liberation” that
forms the basis of political solidarity, not necessarily shared social identities or
lived experiences.277 For example, vegans are unified in their commitment to
abolish animal use, suffering and exploitation, though vegans have vastly

Sally J. Scholz, “Political Solidarity and Violent Resistance,” Journal of Social
Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2007): 39.
276 Katie Stockdale (2017) calls this moral-political solidarity, “solidarity based in a
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different lived experiences and identities, coming from all parts of the world and
representing vastly different ages, religions, genders, races, etc. Unified by their
dedication to alleviate the oppression of non-human animals, vegans form a
group in political solidarity aimed at bringing about social change.
Social solidarity, Scholz explains, is the basis of unification amongst
people – a family, a social group, an organization, a geographical nation, etc. –
who mutually identify with one another, perhaps due to having a shared “history,
consciousness, identity, location, or experience.”278 Crucially, social solidarity
requires that individuals self-identify and have an affinity with their group, and
that there is “mutual recognition among members of an already existing
community.”279 For instance, one might feel social solidarity with other Buddhist
philosophers in virtue of having been trained in a similar way to think critically
and to pursue a life aimed at the elimination of dukkha (suffering). Members of
an LGBTQ+ community may also be unified in social solidarity in virtue of having
a shared consciousness about, among other things, gender identity and
expression. The key to social solidarity is the mutual recognition that members
within a community have for one another.280

Scholz, “Political Solidarity and Violent Resistance,” 39.
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Social solidarity and political solidarity may operate independently, but it
is when they operate together – when people unify in solidarity in virtue of
having shared identities as well as common interests and goals in achieving social
change – that group-based reasons in favour of procreation start to become
apparent. From the point of view of racial solidarity, the value of procreation lies
in its symbolic assertion that “dispossessed and disempowered groups share the
means to be self-determining and valued members of society.”281 At the heart of
this reason to procreate is an attempt to reclaim or assert the dignity of one’s
group, in a world in which that message may run counter to social realities. Recall
the many ways in which certain groups of people were (and perhaps still are)
subject to anti-natalist oppression, and sexual and reproductive injustices, on the
basis of their race. Crucially, systems of race-based oppression devalue certain
bodies and undermine the worth of certain groups of people.
For members of racially oppressed groups, procreation may be seen as a
means of liberation from injustice. The act of having children is an act of political
resistance, an expression of self-worth and an affirmation of the value of one’s
racial group. By having biological children, one expresses social solidarity with
members of one’s group by desiring to contribute another member to the group.
But the contribution of a biological child also serves a political function: namely,
it symbolizes liberation from the burdens of reproductive suppression and
resistance to the endemic undervaluing of one’s social group.
This reasoning may seem to run together with the appeal to reparative
justice, so let me clarify the difference. Those motivated to have biological
children for reparative justice reasons position their actions as a response to

be shared with those who are themselves not privy to them. Tommie Shelby, We Who
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injustices that concern their procreative liberties. However, those motivated to
have biological children for reasons of racial solidarity are expressing a sense of
solidarity toward the group in which they identify, whether in response to
historical wrongs or contemporary injustices. Bonds of solidarity (rather than
claims to reparations) are the mechanisms of political resistance, liberation from
injustice, and social change. Procreation, then, cannot be substituted by adoption
because having biological children allows for the expression of bonds between
those whose identities as members of certain social groups are challenged within
an existing social order.
Thus, racial solidarity provides a second group-based reason to perhaps
favour procreation over adoption. Let us now explore a third reason.

4.3. Cultural Preservation
Recall Tina Rulli’s suggestion that one may desire to procreate for the sake of
cultural immortality. She considers the idea that, by having biological children,
one can transcend one’s finite existence by helping to pass on cultural artifacts –
“projects, values, commitments, traditions, and customs” – to successive
generations.”282 Procreation, on this view, allows for the passing down of
“familial and cultural legacies [that] endure via knowledge, values, and
customs.”283 Rulli dismisses this reason to favour procreation over adoption for
failing to establish the unique value of biological children over adopted children
for, as she argues, adopted children can inherit cultural artifacts just as biological
children can. However, I would like to offer another attempt at developing the
proposal: from a cultural preservationist perspective, a strong case can be made
that members of racial groups are entitled to procreate in order to honour their
cultural traditions; to resist socio-political pressures to assimilate; or to prevent
cultural extinction by producing more members in one’s cultural group.
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To begin, let us draw the connections between culture, race, and biological
kinship. This will help us identify the value of procreation from a cultural
preservationist point of view. Recall that cultural theories of race minimally hold
that races comprise people who fundamentally share common ways of life (i.e., a
common culture). Jeffers (forthcoming) clarifies that the idea is not that all
members of a race share common ways of life. Rather, the cultural distinctness
and distinctiveness of races is a result of being socialized into different ways of
life as a result of being treated differently as members of different races, based on
perceived physical features and ancestry. What substantiates the ‘common
culture’ nature of race is that many (i.e., not necessarily all) members of a race
identify with and are invested in practices that they regard as distinctive to the
racial group. This, Jeffers explains, is compatible with heterogeneity amongst
members’ levels of investment and engagement with their race’s cultural ways of
life. Nonetheless, the access connection that one has as a member of a race with a
particular culture means that members of a race are bearers and keepers of that
race’s culture, whereas non-members of a race can only appreciate and learn
from the culture of a race from which they are not a part. For instance, as much
as I appreciate and value many cultural contributions of Maori peoples, I can
never lay claim to Maori culture as a non-Maori person.
The connection between race, culture, and ancestral lineage (including
biological kinship) is also strong. Elizabeth Anderson explains that some views of
culture – including, I contend, those that fall within cultural theories of race –
tend to associate ancestral lineages with distinct cultures, where “each ancestral
group’s culture is the expression of its unique identity.”284 Those born into a
cultural community automatically have claim to “their own” (birth) culture, and
the cultural community also claims the offspring as ‘their own.’ These phrases
signify cultural belonging and possession, respectively. Race is conceptually tied
to culture in that races are distinguished from one another by different ways of

Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 2010): 77.
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life, and access to a race’s culture are shared by those who share bloodlines and
ancestral lineages. Now that we have established a connection between race,
culture, and ancestry, we can think about how a cultural theory of race can
provide group-based reasons for procreating.
Chike Jeffers conceptualizes cultural preservation as “efforts by
individuals or groups to maintain the distinctness and distinctiveness of a
cultural

group to

which

they

belong.”285 Jeffers, like other cultural

preservationists, answers the question about whether races are worth conserving
in the affirmative, suggesting that the value of racial groups lies in the cultural
goods that members share. These cultural goods are valuable in themselves, it is
argued, even where hierarchical division of racial groups are absent, as in a future
world where classificatory systems founded on racial domination and
subordination are outdated.286 Jeffers defends the idea that cultural preservation
may not just be morally permissible but, more strongly, morally obligatory. He
considers the case of an Ojibway Winnipegger who “feels no particular need to
remain connected with her cultural heritage” and would, furthermore, “feel no
sense of injury if Canada were to revive its older commitment to cultural
assimilation as a policy regarding indigenous peoples.”287 Her lack of cultural
affiliation, apathy, and cultural investment, Jeffers comments, is reflective of not
just internalized oppression but also active assent to colonialism and, thus, seems
to constitute a moral deficiency. Jeffers argues that “it is reasonable to think that
the issue of cultural preservation attains a special level of importance and an
urgency it may not have elsewhere in the context of the history of racism and

Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 206. For Jeffers,
cultural preservation is valuable for members of all races, for the value in one’s culture
persists beyond a world with racial hierarchies, but in the context of a group-based claim
to procreation, I would argue that, on the basis of race, members of minority racial
groups have a far more plausible claim to procreative rights than do members of
dominant racial groups.
286 Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 215.
287 Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 214.
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colonialism.”288 For Jeffers, efforts to preserve one’s culture, especially in
contexts of colonialism and racism, constitute “hugely significant cases of
resistance to oppression.”289 Cultural preservation can thus be means of political
resistance and, according to Jeffers, it may obligate action on the part of
individuals.
While Jeffers does not consider or advocate for procreation as a way to
pursue cultural preservation, Saul Smilansky offers a version of this idea. He
raises the idea that for some people, having children might be morally obligatory
in order to continue a “cultural form of life.”290 As he explains, one may have an
ethical obligation to ensure the continuation of a group’s future, especially if the
population is at risk of extinction. If one belongs to such a group, he asserts,
“Even if [one] does not identify with [one’s] group,” membership alone and “the
value of the form of life” morally requires that a person do her part to ensure the
group’s future.291 Identification and affinity with one’s social group is deemed
irrelevant and the continuation of the group’s future takes the spotlight.
Smilansky’s proposal is troubling for several reasons, not least because it
places seemingly non-negotiable burdens on women to bear children. As Amin
and Hossain warn, “women’s fundamental rights to reproductive freedom,
security, and health” are restricted and violated by religious and cultural
fundamentalists who, under the guise of cultural preservation, impose on women
patriarchal standards of reproductive labour.292 They point to the existence and
enforcement of population-control programs that treat women as mere means to
achieving demographic targets, as determined by dominant members (i.e., men)

Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 216.
Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 215.
290 Saul Smilansky, “Is there a Moral Obligation to Have Children?” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 47, emphasis original.
291 Smilansky, “Is there a Moral Obligation to have Children?” 47.
292 Sajeda Amin and Sara Hossain. “Women's Reproductive Rights and the Politics
of Fundamentalism: A View from Bangladesh,” American University Law Review 44,
no. 4 (1995): 1320.
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in that community.293 An obligation to preserve one’s racial group (for the sake
of cultural preservation or otherwise) places unjustifiable procreative burdens on
women. Thus, I reject the idea that one could have a moral obligation to bear
children. Those individuals who choose not to procreate and are simply not
persuaded to do so would not be failing a moral obligation to procreate.
In the realm of family-making, I contend that there are three ways in
which one might appeal to cultural preservation as a reason to procreate. The
first way appeals to a desire to honour one’s cultural traditions, specifically, the
high value of procreation in one’s culture. Consider this example from Mulela
Munalula:
Many African people see in reproduction an opportunity to
prove their masculinity or femininity and assure their
posterity. Large numbers of children also represent a new
resource base which may, through the principle of
reciprocity, enable the entire extended family to survive.
Thus, although many people no longer live the way they did
prior to the widespread urbanization that now typifies
much of Africa, social reproduction of the conditions that
sustain the traditional social system continues.294
Munalula’s report reflects the ways in which procreation, as a cultural
good, is valued by some for its regulation and maintenance of a traditional social
order. In this particular case, procreation adheres to and helps to maintain a
certain way of life. Traditions, beliefs, and values about gender roles and
identities (e.g., masculinity and femininity) are represented in the act of having
biological children. Men and women perform their gendered identities to others
in the cultural community by subscribing to social expectations about begetting

Amin and Hossain, “Women's Reproductive Rights,” 1324. The focus of their
research is on Islamic culture and laws, but they indicate the generalizability of their
analyses to other political and cultural contexts.
294 Mulela Margaret Munalula, “Rethinking the Right to Procreate: An African
Imperative,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 13, no. 1 (2012): 306.
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and bearing children.295 Procreation is also valued as a cultural practice because
it generates a familial population in which members contribute materially to the
survival of the family. Here again, it is an imperative of one’s traditional culture
to have many biological children through procreation. Procreation, itself, as a
cultural practice has special value. As Munalula explains, procreation serves as a
means of conserving culture, despite changing times, through the reproduction of
biological offspring. In sum, this first cultural preservationist reason in favour of
procreation locates the value of procreation in its being an expression of one’s
traditional culture, which values procreation: in structuring a social order; in
maintaining kinship structures; and in conserving culture through the
continuation of ancestral lineages.
The second way in which one could appeal to cultural preservation as a
reason to procreate is that by having a biological child (presumably, to make the
argument stronger, with someone of the same race), one protects against
pressures to assimilate by passing on one’s culture through progeny. Notice that
one is not appealing to the value of procreation as located within one’s culture
but rather, to the value of procreation as an expression of one’s commitment to
one’s racial group, with its encompassing cultural values that can be passed on
through one’s lineage. Recall that, on a cultural theory of race, people’s lived
experiences are shaped by culture in deeply meaningful ways that are distinct and
distinctive from one racial group to the next. Individuals are connected in
significant ways to others in the same group by way of shared language,
traditions, values, and so on.296 Crucially, for some, ancestral lineage is a vital

Similarly, in some South Asian cultures, “rituals centring [sic] around fertility,
pregnancy, and childbirth were essentially rites of procreation and the continuity of the
lineage (Marion den Uyl, “Kinship and Gender Identity: Some Notes on
Marumakkathayam in Kerala,” In Culture, Creation and Procreation: Concepts of
Kinship in South Asian Practice, ed. Monika Böck and Aparna Rao (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2001): 190. Kinship founded on procreative relations were (and perhaps, for
some, still are) most valued.
296 Noreen Mokuau documents the importance of biological children to Hawaiians
and Samoans, writing that, “In both cultures, the wish for descendants and large families
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part of one’s cultural history and a key way of understanding oneself in relation to
one’s racial group. In sum, according to this second cultural preservationist
reason, procreation serves as a means of resistance against pressures to
assimilate into dominant culture, and as a means of preserving the cultural
distinctness and distinctiveness of one’s race, by way of passing on culture
through ancestral lineage.
Finally, one may appeal to cultural preservation as a reason to procreate
for the sake of cultural continuation through ancestral lineage, particularly when
cultural extinction is foreseeable. Suppose that a racial group’s population
numbers are low or there is an imminent threat of extinction (due to, e.g., low
birth rates and high mortality rates). In this case, cultural preservation might
require procreation for the purpose of repopulating one’s group.297 Notice that
pressures to assimilate into dominant culture need not be present, as they are in
the second case; rather, one need only be motivated to procreate as a way to
prevent the extinction of one’s race and its distinctive culture.
Anca Gheaus argues that there may be a duty to procreate in a world in
which global human extinction is imminent.298 She grounds the argument in the
interests of the last generations of persons, who would likely experience
psychological distress and face a lack of material infrastructure as they witness
drastic depopulation around them and imminent extinction. In the case of
cultural preservation, this sort of idea is localized to distinct cultural groups, and
the same concerns about psychological distress apply. For some groups,

was derived from a spiritual concern for cultural revitalization” (Noreen Mokuau,
“Human Sexuality of Native Hawaiians and Samoans,” in Sexuality, Ethnoculture, and
Social Work, ed. by Larry Lister. 1986: 69).
297 Smilansky makes the point that people could respond to attempts at cultural
oppression through “a historical ethical fight, by having children” (“Is there a Moral
Obligation to have Children?” 49).
298 Gheaus, “Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?”
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foreseeable extinction is a stark reality. Those experiencing drastic depopulation
or those faced with imminent extinction may seek to implement various methods
of

cultural

revitalization

(e.g.,

intergenerational

language

education;

technological documentation of language, culture, and stories) to ensure that
culture is not lost with the people, should the group go extinct.299 In addition,
efforts to repopulate one’s cultural community through biological reproduction
may reach a level of urgency. In losing one’s cultural community, one risks losing
a sense of self and community, and the world loses a cultural group, with its
distinctive traditions, values, beliefs, music, language, and so on.
In sum, this third cultural preservationist reason in favour of procreation
locates the value of procreation in its continuation of a culture threatened by
extinction. One preserves culture by reproducing progeny who, by default of
birth, become members of and sustain the cultural group. Common to all three
variations of these cultural preservationist motivations to procreate is that
procreation cannot be substituted by adoption because the value of having
children lies primarily in the act of physically producing them through biological
reproduction. Consequently, this presents a challenge to a duty to adopt, for
procreation seems to have highly significant and non-substitutable value.
Procreation motivated by cultural preservation provides a compelling case for
granting moral license for some individuals to procreate, and it carries the
potential to override a duty to adopt. This concludes my development of three
group-based reasons in favour of procreation.

In recent years, states have encouraged procreation to boost their nation’s
populations. Denmark implemented a “Do It for Denmark” campaign, and Spain has
appointed a government commissioner tasked with boosting the nation’s birth rates.
While these programs are implemented by the state and mainly concerned with growing
the nations’ populations for economic reasons, individuals motivated to procreate for
cultural preservation would be doing so for reasons of honouring one’s culture or
resisting cultural pressures to assimilate.
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented three group-based reasons in favour of procreation. I
first presented a distinction between different kinds of reasons to procreate,
distinguishing social groups as a particularly compelling basis upon which to
construct reasons in favour of procreation. Focusing on race-based social groups,
I briefly outlined two theories of race and then explained how they grounded
three possible group-based reasons in favour of procreation: for reparative
justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation. While duty to adopt
arguments tend to be resistant against self-regarding reasons in favour of
procreation, I showed that group-based reasons in favour of procreation – which
are largely overlooked in philosophical literature – present a special set of
challenges. Sustained critical engagement with these proposals against a duty to
adopt will be presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Chapter 3: Group-Based Reasons in Favour of
Adoption
1. Introduction
In Chapter 2, I developed three group-based reasons in favour of procreation,
founded on respective claims to reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural
preservation. I argued that these reasons support procreation and challenge a
duty to adopt by demonstrating a unique value to having biological children that
cannot be substituted by adopting a child, and by distinguishing biological
children from adopted children. From a reparative justice perspective, I
considered the idea that direct victims or descendants of victims of reproductive
injustices have a moral right to procreate, in response to historical state-imposed
restrictions on procreation. With respect to racial solidarity, I recognized the
persuasive proposal that members of oppressed racial groups have a moral right
to procreate as a way of honouring, expressing solidarity with and asserting the
value of one’s group. Finally, based on resources within cultural preservationism,
I engaged with the idea that members of racial groups have a right to procreate as
a way of honouring one’s cultural traditions, resisting pressures to assimilate, or
preventing cultural extinction.
In this chapter, I will argue that reparative justice, racial solidarity, and
cultural preservation each do not definitively support procreation over adoption.
Rather, as I will show, these group-based reasons also support adopting children
either within or outside one’s racial group, instead of procreating and therefore
are in line with a duty to adopt. First, I will provide demographic information
about racialized children in child welfare systems, contending that this
information provides necessary contextualization for a productive philosophical
examination of a moral duty to adopt. Next, I will explain how reparative justice,
racial solidarity, and cultural preservation support adoption rather than
procreation. Toward the end of the chapter, I will identify any remaining groupbased challenges to a duty to adopt but will withhold conclusive judgment about
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their ultimate success, leaving a final layer of analysis for Chapter 4, in which I
discuss the politics of children’s belonging.
In preparation for the critical analysis that follows, let us review from
Chapter 1 the logical structure of a duty to adopt:
P1: We have a moral duty to assist those in need, if the risk of harm to
them is critical and the cost to us is small.
P2: Parentless children are exposed to critical risk of harms that would be
alleviated through adoption.
P3: Many prospective parents could adopt children at little cost to
themselves (i.e., absent ‘special burden’), instead of procreating.
C: Therefore, many prospective parents morally ought to adopt existing
children in need of parental care, instead of bringing new children into the
world through procreation.
Moreover, recall the ways in which a challenge to Premise 3 (i.e., a
proposed defeating condition to a duty to adopt) would be unsuccessful:
a) it fails the ‘project-level interest’ standard
b) it fails the ‘parental flexibility’ standard
c) it fails to distinguish biological or genetic children from adopted
children
d) it fails to establish that prospective parents would incur a special
burden (i.e., sufficient costs) in adopting a child that they would otherwise
avoid through biological procreation.
That is, if a proposed defeating condition fails any one of these criteria, it
would ultimately be unsuccessful in justifiably overriding one’s duty to adopt.
Conversely, a successful defeating condition to a duty to adopt must demonstrate
that adopting a child would impose sufficient costs on prospective parents that
would be avoided through procreation. Such a challenge may appeal to the
unique value of biological children that cannot be substituted by adopting a child,
or to any other calculation of special burden. The group-based reasons in Chapter
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2 attempt this argumentative move; I suggest that a more nuanced understanding
of child welfare demographics will help inform our assessment of them.

2. Racial Demographics of Child Welfare
The majority of children in need of adoption – including those who are on the
streets or undocumented, have lost one or both birth parents, or those have either
been relinquished by or apprehended from their birth families – are children of
colour. UNICEF reports an estimated 140 million orphans (children under 18
who have lost one or both parents) worldwide as of 2015, with over 90% of these
children being from Asia, Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean, and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia.300 Not all orphaned children are in need of adoption,
and not all children in need of adoption are orphans, but some of the factors that
place children at a higher risk of being in need of parental care include abuse,
neglect, and abandonment from current caregivers; personal sickness and
disease;301 parental poverty and low parental education levels;302 disability of the
child or parents; government policies that limit the number of children per
family; familial or civic conflict;303 and effects of natural disasters.
Many children who have lost their parents or who lack adequate parental
care face severe risks to their well-being. Social researcher Susan Mapp reports
that, globally, there are an estimated “158 million child laborers, including
250,000 child soldiers and 1.2 million children who have been trafficked. As a

UNICEF (2017). “Orphans”.
https://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html.
301 In sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated 12.3 million children have lost one or both
parents to AIDS, and an estimated 80% of the world’s AIDS orphans are from this part of
the world (Roby and Shaw, 2006). Lee et al., (2014) report that 16.6 million children
have lost one or both parents to HIV and that 90% of HIV orphans are from sub-Saharan
Africa.
302 UNICEF (2017). “Orphans”.
303 Susan C. Mapp, Global Child Welfare and Well-being (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011): 126; 27.
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result of armed conflict, 20 million children have fled their homes and millions
more have died or been permanently disabled.”304 The link is undeniable
between children who lack parental care and those who experience conditions of
poor welfare that threaten their health, safety, security, and overall quality and
length of life.
Reliable global statistics on the number of children in need of adoption do
not exist, but we do have some statistical data about adoptable children in
intercountry adoptions. The leading ‘sending’ countries between 2003 and 2010
were China, Russia, Guatemala, Ethiopia, and South Korea; and the leading
intercountry adoption ‘receiving’ countries during the period of 1998 to 2010
were the United States, Spain, France, Italy, and Canada. 305 Together, the top
five sending countries for intercountry adoptions sent over 14,000 children in
2010. Together, the top five receiving countries took in over 24,000 children in
2010; peak intake was in 2004, at close to 38,000 children. Notably,
international adoptions typically involve relatively privileged white people from
developed countries adopting children who are born into less affluent families of
less privileged racial or ethnic groups in developing countries.306
In addition to children of colour being disproportionately in need of
adoption on a global scale, racialized children are highly represented within
particular child welfare systems. Canada and the United States are just two

Mapp, Global Child Welfare and Well-being, vii.
See data from Peter Selman, “The Global Decline of Intercountry Adoption:
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International adoptions: The quiet migration, International Migration Review 18 (2):
276–293).
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Families, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 94.
304
305

119

exemplars of this phenomenon.307 In Canada, indigenous and black children are
proportionally overrepresented in adoption and foster care systems. For instance,
the Ontario Association for Children’s Aid Societies (OACAS) reports that
African-Canadian children and youth in the Toronto Children’s Aid Society
represent 41% of those in the care of the state in that region, despite AfricanCanadians representing only 8% of the general population in Toronto.308
Furthermore, across all provinces and territories in Canada for which publicly
accessible data

exists,

Aboriginal

children

in

care

are

proportionally

overrepresented as compared to their non-Aboriginal peers. The provinces with
the three highest rates of proportional disparity, from highest to lowest, are
Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia. In Manitoba, Aboriginal children
represent 23% of the childhood population of the province but 85% of children in
child welfare; in Alberta, the proportions are 9% vs. 59%; and, in British
Columbia, 8% vs. 52%. Non-Aboriginal children are, across the board,
represented at lower rates in child welfare systems per province as compared to
populations of Aboriginal children.309

Disproportionate representation of racialized children in child welfare systems
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Nations. Kiskisik Awasisak: Remember the Children : Understanding the
Overrepresentation of First Nations Children in the Child Welfare System. (Ottawa:
307

120

Likewise, in the United States, racialized children are overwhelmingly
overrepresented in foster care and adoption systems. Despite black children
representing 17 percent of youth in the United States, they represent 42 percent
of children in foster care.310 Indigenous children and Hispanic children are also
represented at higher rates in child welfare than their respective childhood
populations. The disparity in 2004 was reflected in American Indian children
representing less than 1 percent of the total child population in the United States
but 2 percent of children in foster care. While the numbers of Hispanic/Latino
children in foster care (17 percent) were lower than their respective total child
population, they still outnumbered the comparison group of their white peers.311
In both Canada and the United States, racialized children and families
experience markedly different child welfare surveillance and interventions as
compared to that of non-racialized children and families. In terms of entry into
foster care, children of colour are more likely than white children to be removed
from their homes and placed in foster care; they tend to remain longer in care,
receive fewer services, have less contact with child welfare caseworkers while in
care; and they are less likely to be placed in adoptive care or returned to their
original homes. In terms of exiting the foster care system, white children most
often exit by means of reunification with their families, whereas non-white
children most frequently age out of care and face issues such as educational

Assembly of First Nations, 2011). Understanding the Overrepresentation of First Nations
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discontinuation, homelessness and unemployment, and criminality.312 This is a
brief summary of racial demographics of child welfare and adoption systems.
Crucially, racial disparities in child welfare and adoption systems are a
result of historical and ongoing racial injustices against certain groups of people.
For this reason, formal domestic and intercountry adoptions of children of colour
typically involve parents who are racially privileged, and transracial adoptions
involving racialized children and dominant-race parents are a subject of intense
controversy and debate. Let us now review a bit of history surrounding child
welfare and the main concerns raised by critics of transracial adoptions.

3. Concerns about Race in Adoption
Many researchers and interest groups have expressed concerns about the
implications of a racially disparate child welfare system, especially as it relates to
transracial adoptions. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the main
concerns surrounding transracial adoptions of indigenous children and
transracial adoptions of non-indigenous children, in both domestic and
intercountry contexts. It is important for us to have a sense of these issues
because they provide a background for Section 4, in which I detail group-based
reasons in favour of members of oppressed racial groups adopting children.

3.1. Indigenous Transracial Adoptions
In settler-colonialist countries, indigenous peoples have faced discrimination and
prejudice that has had intergenerational effects. As it concerns child welfare and
adoption, colonialist policies have had drastic effects on indigenous families,
communities, parents, and children. In this section, I reflect on Canada’s
government policies that oppress indigenous peoples by way of disintegrating
indigenous families through removing children from their homes and placing
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them into institutionalized, foster, and adoptive care arrangements outside
children’s communities of origin. The following narrative is not unique to
Canada, but I focus on this case study in order to adequately detail the structural
oppression in this and similar child welfare systems that has contributed to the
overrepresentation of indigenous children in child welfare, and to identify the
associated harms of transracial adoptions to indigenous children, parents,
families, communities.
In Canada, a critical series of historical and ongoing injustices against
indigenous families include residential schooling, the 60s Scoop, and the
Millennium Scoop. During the 1800s and 1900s, the Canadian government
designed elaborate regimes to assimilate indigenous peoples into Euro-Canadian
ways of life or to eradicate their existence completely. The literal and cultural
genocide of indigenous peoples relied upon the forced disintegration of
indigenous families. Complete assimilation of indigenous peoples, through
‘education’ and ‘civilization’ of indigenous children and families became the
Canadian state’s mission. From 1939 to 1998, more than 150,000 First Nations,
Inuit, and Métis children – seven generations of children – were forcibly
removed from their families and placed in Christian institutions – residential
schools – far from their homes.
Residential schools inflicted countless wrongs on indigenous children and
parents. An estimated 3,200 child deaths occurred in residential schools, and for
many of these deaths, the details (e.g., age, gender, cause of death) were not
recorded by the schools or the government. Many parents whose children passed
away (due to fires, disease outbreaks, poor nutrition, or other unidentified
causes) were either completely uninformed of their deaths or were given vague
information, leaving them haunted with unanswered questions. 313 Thousands of
indigenous children were buried in unmarked graves throughout the country.
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These deaths of indigenous children left many indigenous families and
communities irrevocably harmed.
Upon entering residential schools, children were forced to cut their hair
and exchange their traditional clothing for European-style outfits. They were
forced to speak English and were banned from and punished for speaking their
own languages. Sacred ceremonies and traditional practices were forbidden;
instead, children were forced to observe Christianity. Children who survived
residential schooling suffered physical, sexual, emotional, mental, psychological,
and spiritual abuse.314 In these institutions, away from their families and without
parental care, indigenous children endured injuries and traumas, and every child
placed in these schools was denied dignity, pride, and respect.315 316
While attending these schools, indigenous children were actively
prevented from bonding with their parents. Visits by parents were discouraged or
drastically limited because indigenous parents’ influence on their children was
said to hamper their education.317 Girls and boys were segregated, so brothers
and sisters did not have adequate opportunities to stay connected with one
another. When children returned home to their families for short periods of time
during breaks in the school year, it was difficult for them to relate to their
parents: they were separated by language, different cultural upbringings, and
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long periods of time spent apart.318 Throughout the entire residential schooling
regime, parents protested individually and collectively against the system. Many
parents refused to enroll their children in the schools; some prevented them from
returning after holidays; and others refused to return children to school who had
run away.319

320

The traumas of residential schooling caused a host of social

problems in indigenous communities, including “alcoholism, neglect, abuse,
abject poverty, as well as poor conditions in terms of health, housing and
nutrition”.321
Instead of honouring customary care or kinship adoptions within
indigenous communities, another form of familial injustice took place, this time
in the realm of foster care and adoption. Between the 1960s and 1990s in Canada,
during an era known as the ‘Sixties Scoop’, thousands of indigenous children
were removed from their families and placed into formal child welfare systems or
in the care of white families.322 Social workers ‘scooped up’ more than 11,000
indigenous children, especially infants, from their families, often without
notifying or obtaining permission from the child’s parents.323 In British
Columbia the numbers of indigenous children who entered child welfare systems
rose from less than one percent to 34 percent from 1955 to 1964.324 Many
indigenous children were sent to the United States, where the demand for
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adoptive children amongst middle-class families was, at the time, relatively high
in the country’s history.325
Legal mechanisms for redressing these injustices against indigenous
families were largely inaccessible and structurally imbalanced to disadvantage
affected families. As Natasha Stirrett explains, “institutional barriers and colonial
mechanisms embedded within the settler colonial court system disallowed
indigenous families from equitably participating in active contestation of the
removal of their children”.326 State-sanctioned policies of removing indigenous
children from their communities of origin, away from their parents, and into
white families contributes to familial harms to indigenous parents and
communities.
The legacy of the 60s Scoop carries on today, and the new age of familial
injustices against indigenous families and communities is known as the
‘Millennium Scoop’. According to Statistics Canada, in 2016, indigenous children
accounted for more than half of the children under 14 years of age in foster
care.327 This is an approximately threefold number of children in child welfare
systems today as compared the period of the 60s Scoop.328 Tracing the legacies of
residential schooling to present day, Reina Foster, indigenous former youth in
care comments that “[t]he child welfare system today is a form of cultural
genocide for Indigenous children. Just like the residential school system, as well
as the Sixties Scoop, today's child welfare system is known as the Millennial
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Scoop. And it's the same legacy as to what the goals of residential schools
were.”329 These are a few key structural elements of Canadian child welfare and
adoption systems that explain the disproportionate representation of indigenous
children.
Given the colonialist underpinnings of child welfare systems in many
countries, including Canada, several harms are cited in relation to transracial
adoptions of indigenous children, a few of which I mention here. First, critics of
transracial adoptions argue, indigenous parents are harmed because they are
deemed incapable caregivers to their own children. Negative stereotypes about
indigenous parents contribute to the belief that children would fare better out of
their care and in the care of non-indigenous parents and communities. In 1883,
then-Prime Minister John A. Macdonald remarked on the necessity of separating
indigenous children from their parents:
When the school is on the reserve the child lives with its
parents, who are savages; he is surrounded by savages, and
though he may learn to read and write his habits, and
training and mode of thought are Indian. … Indian children
should be withdrawn as much as possible from the parental
influence, and the only way to do that would be to put them
in central training industrial schools where they will
acquire the habits and modes of thought of white men. 330
To the colonizers, indigenous parents were fundamentally flawed and
incapable caregivers to their children because they were not white. Their ways of
living and being in the world were inherently detrimental to their children’s wellbeing, and so the state decided that parents needed to be removed from their
roles as primary caregivers.
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Second, indigenous families are harmed through transracial adoption
policies that systematically sever relationships between children, their parents,
and communities, continuing the legacy of residential schooling and child welfare
policies. Historically, assimilationist policies designed to “overcome the lingering
traces of native custom and tradition”331 stifled the transfer of cultural knowledge
and traditions from parents to children. Justice Murray Sinclair, Chair of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, tells of the “cultural genocide”
of Canada’s residential schooling:
The residential school system established for Canada’s
Indigenous population in the nineteenth century is one of
the darkest, most troubling chapters in our nation’s history.
While some people regard the schools established under
that system as centres of education, they were, in reality,
centres of cultural indoctrination. The most alarming
aspect of the system was that its target and its victims were
the most vulnerable of society: little children. Removed
from their families and home communities, seven
generations of Aboriginal children were denied their
identity through a systematic and concerted effort to
extinguish their culture, language, and spirit. The schools
were part of a larger effort by Canadian authorities to force
Indigenous peoples to assimilate by the outlawing of sacred
ceremonies and important traditions. It is clear that
residential schools were a key component of a Canadian
government policy of cultural genocide.
That any Indigenous person survived the culturally
crushing experience of the schools is a testament to their
resilience, and to the determination of those members of
their families and communities who struggled to maintain
and pass on to them what remained of their diminishing
languages and traditions. As each generation passed
through the doorways of the schools, the ability to pass on
those languages and traditions was systematically
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undermined. The schools and Canada’s overall treatment of
its Indigenous peoples have seriously affected Indigenous
pride and self-respect, and have caused individuals and
communities to lose their capacity to cope with the daily
tasks of living. The evidence of that is seen in the serious
social conditions that Canada’s Indigenous people face.332
The Canadian government made concerted attempts at erasing indigenous
culture through assimilation of indigenous children. Former indigenous youth in
care jaye simpson333 articulates that the foster care system “is working the way
it's designed: as a machine to destroy Indigeneity.”334
Third, and relatedly, through paternalistic child welfare interventions in
indigenous families, indigenous communities are denied autonomy and
sovereignty in the governance of its members. As Grace Atkinson writes, adding
to the many layers of harms that colonization inflicted on indigenous peoples –
“loss of culture, poverty, dysfunction, and extreme surveillance by police and
child welfare authorities” – was the denial of indigenous communities’
sovereignty over the care of their children.335 A “longstanding history of custom
adoption in many of the First Nation cultures and communities across Canada”
went unrecognized and un-honoured by the Canadian state.336 Governance of
indigenous groups became subject to the settler state, and their selfdetermination was not recognized.
Fourth, indigenous children are vulnerable to crises of identity when
adopted into non-indigenous families. As Jeanine Carriere explains, “For First
Nations adoptees, a causal relationship exists between connection to birth family
and to community and ancestral knowledge, as well as to health”.337 For many

Justice Sinclair, in TRC Canada, 2015, vii.
Note: this person does not capitalize their first and last names.
334 CBC Radio, “The Millennium Scoop.”
335 Grace Atkinson, in Carriere, Aski Awasis, 37.
336 Atkinson, in Carriere, Aski Awasis, 37.
337 Carriere, Aski Awasis, 21.
332
333

129

indigenous peoples, in Canada and elsewhere, identity formation is a process of
discovery that involves close connections with geography and ecological
processes, ancestors and family members.338 In comparison to Western
conceptions of identity, which are relatively atomistic and individualistic,
indigenous identities are cultivated and realized through one’s immersion in a
familial community. To have a sense of self is to interact with one’s community
and thereby learn about what it is to be indigenous.339 Personal identities, for
many indigenous peoples, are derived from an understanding of one’s “collective
self”, in which kinship is foundational to social life. 340 Elders, for instance, play a
critical role in indigenous children’s identity formation. They impart knowledge
and guidance about how to be community members and relatives to others,
including the land and ancestors. Through residential schooling and child welfare
interventions in indigenous families, many indigenous children lost connections
with their birth communities, resulting in losses of identity. Many indigenous
adoptees experience feelings of loss and yearning for community connection. As
adults, they desire to know about their birth communities, their parents, and
traditions and cultures they did not have the opportunity to learn about.341
These are some of the main observed harms that indigenous parents,
mothers, families and communities endure as a result of transracial adoption
placements. The case of transracial adoptions of non-indigenous children is
similar, though characteristically distinct.

3.2. Non-Indigenous Transracial Adoptions
As is the case with transracial adoptions of indigenous children, transracial
adoptions involving racially disadvantaged non-indigenous children are
controversial because they take place within contexts of historical and
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contemporary unjust race relations. Typically, both domestic and intercountry
transracial adoptions involve the placement of racialized children with dominantrace (usually white) parents and, because of this, racialized communities and its
members (including children) are vulnerable to various harms.342
In some countries, including Canada and the United States, resistance to
transracial adoptions occurs against a backdrop of legacies of slavery and racial
discrimination.343 For instance, Dorothy Roberts, one of the most vocal critics in
the United States of child welfare systems, maintains that racial disparities in the
American child welfare system are tied to group-based civil rights violation
against black families. She argues that systematic discrimination outside child
welfare systems, and racial biases against black people (especially black women)
are key factors that influence the over-representation of black children in foster
care. Consequently, she proposes that we take seriously the racial harms to black
families and communities that result from removing large numbers of black
children from their homes and placing them in foster care.
Roberts identifies three distinct harms when black children are adopted by
non-black (typically white) families. First, black families are harmed through
state-interventions that dissolve familial relationships. The dissolution of
families, in turn, impairs groups’ abilities to form healthy bonds and connections
amongst its members. Second, black communities experience diminished
collective agency as a result of weakened community bonds. The effects of
“disproportionate state intervention in black families,” she argues, “reinforces the
continued political subordination of blacks as a group”.344 Third, as we have seen
argued in the case of indigenous children, the argument from critics of transracial
adoption of black children (e.g., Roberts) is that these children’s sense of self and
community identity is hindered.
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Earlier resonances of these ideas came in 1972, when the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) in the United States issued a
controversial position statement firmly denouncing transracial adoptions of black
children. As they strongly put it,
Black children should be placed only with Black families
whether in foster care or adoption. Black children belong
physically, psychologically and culturally in Black families
in order that they receive the total sense of themselves and
develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings
are products of their environment and develop their sense
of values, attitudes, and self-conception within their own
family structure. Black children in white homes are cut off
from the healthy development of themselves as Black
people.345
This position, which has since softened to reflect a supportive stance on samerace adoptions instead of firm opposition to transracial adoptions, has had a
significant impact on adoption theory and policies and captures a number of
ideas expressed by critics of transracial adoption. For all these reasons,
transracial adoptions with dominant-race parents and racialized children are
seen by critics of transracial adoptions as harmful to children, parents, families,
and communities of colour.
In Chapter 2, we focused on prospective parents’ interests in wanting to
procreate. In this chapter, I maintain that it is imperative to incorporate into our
analysis of a duty to adopt children’s interests in having parents and, more
specifically, parents who share the child’s race. In light of a global orphan crisis,
and now that we have a sense of racial demographics in child welfare and
adoption systems, we can explore in detail how the group-based reasons in favour
of procreation we considered in Chapter 2 – reparative justice, racial solidarity,
and cultural preservation – provide strong reasons for members of oppressed
racial groups to adopt children.
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In the rest of this chapter, mirroring the structure of the previous chapter,
I reflect on group-based reasons in favour of adoption.

4. Group-Based Reasons in Favour of Adoption
In this section, my aim is to develop group-based reasons in favour of adoption.
In doing so, I will identify how the same group-based reasons we considered in
Chapter 2 – reparative justice, racial solidarity, cultural preservation – lend
compelling support for members of oppressed racial groups to adopt children
rather than procreate. This is significant because it limits the force of the groupbased challenges against a duty to adopt we considered in Chapter 2 and, on the
contrary, seems to further reinforce the scope and strength of the duty. As was
the case in Chapter 2, my interpretations of group-based reasons to adopt
children are rooted in an ethic of resistance to historical or ongoing racial
injustices.

4.1. Reparative Justice
Recall that, in Chapter 2, I raised historical and contemporary examples of
reproductive and sexual injustices, and state-sanctioned restrictions that have
affected (and continue to affect) some individuals’ procreative liberties. I argued
that various measures – ranging from genocide and anti-natalism, to colonization
and forced impregnation – deny procreative liberties to certain individuals, qua
members of targeted social groups. From a reparative justice perspective, I
reflected, procreation seems to serve as a symbolic act of resistance to
oppression, allowing members of oppressed groups to reclaim previously
thwarted reproductive liberties. Arguably, procreation provides the mechanism
for actualization and, since adoption cannot offer this value, procreation is
uniquely valuable, making biological children, by extension, distinct from
adoptive children. Crucially, the implication for a duty to adopt is that adopting a
child constitutes a special burden for some prospective parents, namely, that of
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foregoing the opportunity to seek reparative justice in the realm of family life
(i.e., by having biological children).
However, at the heart of this procreative reason is an attempt on behalf of
members of oppressed racial groups to achieve racial justice within a society,
which I will argue can be achieved through adopting a child either within or
outside one’s racial group. In this way, reparative justice does not definitively
support procreation over adoption; rather, as I will argue, it seems to ground firm
reasons in favour of members of oppressed racial groups adopting children in
need of parental care. I begin with the case for same-race adoptions; afterwards, I
turn to transracial adoptions.
Adopting Children Within One’s Racial Group
In many countries, colonialism and state-sanctioned assimilationist
policies have negatively impacted family formation and familial bonds within
racialized and indigenous communities. Consider this group-based reason in
support of same-race adoptions: in response to historical and ongoing
assimilationist policies and familial injustices against certain racial groups,
children in need of adoption who are members of these racial groups should,
when possible, receive care from parents who share the child’s race. Where the
familial bonds between members of these groups (specifically, between parents
and children) have been compromised (through assimilationist policies, e.g.,
residential schooling) or prevented (through transracial adoptive placements),
children who are members of these oppressed racial groups would benefit from
receiving care from parents who share their race. To meet this need, prospective
parents who are members of oppressed racial groups should extend parental care
to children of the same race (by way of adopting children in need of adoption) as
a way of reclaiming familial and community bonds; and these efforts should be
supported by adoption policies.
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Reparative justice provides clear and compelling reasons for members of
oppressed racial groups to adopt children within their racial group,346 but beyond
this, I argue, reparative justice may also support adopting children outside one’s
racial group.
Adopting Children Outside One’s Racial Group
Consider this proposal in favour of adoptions involving differently raced
parents and children: as a way of redressing past wrongs and striving toward a
racially just society, members of racially oppressed groups should adopt children
of different races. To combat entrenched racial hierarchies and assumptions
about fit parenthood in child welfare contexts, transracial adoptions involving
adoptive parents who are members of racially oppressed groups have the
potential to challenge our assumptions about racial hierarchies, both within
families and in society, generally.
As some philosophers argue, one way to seek reparative justice and strive
toward a racially just society is through widespread racial integration.
Integrationism, in its general form, is the intermixing of people across lines of
race, ethnicity, dis/ability, class, nationality, gender, and so on. Elizabeth
Anderson advocates for widespread racial integration, wherein people of different
races share in all aspects of life together, from neighborhoods and workplaces, to
politics and family life. What makes Anderson’s vision particularly significant to
our discussion of a duty to adopt is that racial integration can function as a proactive, anticipatory “set of [antidiscrimination] principles and policies for
preventing injustices from occurring” or as a reparative “set of principles and

For example, Simon Nuttgens makes a case that it is important for social and
political reasons for Aboriginal children to be raised in Aboriginal families and
communities in order to “rectify past injustice while promoting the restoration of
Aboriginal culture and health” (2004, emphasis added, 285; cited in Carriere, Aski
Awasis, 40).
346

135

policies for rectifying disadvantages and harms caused by past injustices.”347
Integrationism provides a framework for understanding the causes of racial
injustices, and for redressing past wrongs and preventing anticipated injustices.
Philosophical proposals in favour of racial integration are, in part,
substantiated by empirical research in social psychology, in which it has been
found that developing relationships with people whose social identities differ
from our own positively impacts our perception of members of that group.
Researchers suggest that, on an interpersonal level, contact with people whose
social identities differ from ours reduces prejudice and biases against members of
the other group. We can account for how this cross-group contact creates positive
effects in the following terms. When one interacts with people who are different
than oneself, one gains exposure and knowledge, develops empathic connections,
experiences reduced anxiety;348 acquires familiarity and liking for the other; 349
and is able to engage in perspective taking. 350 Whereas cognitive mediators, such
as increased knowledge, have been shown to play a minor role in reducing
prejudice through intergroup contact, emotive mediators, such as perspective
taking and empathy, seem to have a significant impact. 351 According to Pettigrew,
cross-group friendship, empathy, and perspective taking are some of the
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strongest mediators of prejudice-reduction for members of the outgroup.352 The
stronger the interpersonal relationship, the greater the potential for these
cognitive and emotive mechanisms to have a positive effect on the individuals
involved.
Anderson comments on some of the positive effects that interracial
relationships can have on children, in particular, emphasizing that exposure to a
diverse community can benefit children’s personal, educational, and professional
growth by providing a larger circle of social contacts from whom to learn and
form supportive networks. Crucially, Anderson’s vision of racial justice through
practical learning extends to family life, including the realm of family-making
and adoption. She explains that informal social integration is realized “when
members of different races form friendships, date, marry, have children or adopt
different race children. At school and work, it happens when members of
different races share conversations at the lunch table, hobnob over the coffee
break, and play together at recess”.353 Implicated in Anderson’s call for
integration is that adoptive parents adopt children of different races, not just
children who are of the same race.
Another important finding in social psychology is that, in addition to a
reduction of biases in those who are directly involved in the interaction, the
effects of intergroup contact extend beyond the individuals directly involved in
the relationship.354 As Pettigrew et al., explain, effects of intergroup contact and
prejudice reduction extend beyond the immediate contact group, impacting
perceptions of other out-groups as well:355
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Not only do attitudes toward the immediate participants
usually become more favorable, but so do attitudes toward
the entire outgroup, outgroup members in other situations,
and even outgroups not involved in the contact. This result
enhances the potential of intergroup contact to be a
practical, applied means of improving intergroup
relations.356
This finding is significant because it posits that the effects of interracial
contact do not only positively impact interpersonal relations between those in
direct contact with one another; rather, the positive effects of reduced prejudice
generalize beyond those directly involved to other groups, as well. Thus, as
researchers contend, interpersonal contact with people who are different from us
can reduce our prejudice against them, bolster our positive perceptions of them,
and also make us perceive and treat others who are different than us more
favourably than we otherwise would.
Tina Rulli’s discussion of the unique value of adoption speaks to the
transformative power of intimate connection with close family members. As Rulli
explains, when one adopts a child, that child becomes an extension of oneself.
This is true in the sense that the adopted child is an additional member of one’s
family, whose needs and experiences are integral concerns of the family unit;
what one regards as central to their own and their family’s wellbeing now also
includes the adopted child. Moreover, in a second sense, adopting a child allows
one to gain knowledge through the “intimate and extended, vicarious experience”
of living through their adopted child. As Rulli eloquently explains, adoption
inspires “transpersonal transformation. … it allows us to transcend the
constraints of our own accepted identities and integrate into them what was once
outside or foreign to ourselves. In a way, adoption makes us bigger than our
original selves; it expands us beyond our original kin and community”.357 In the
case of transracial adoptions, parents and children gain deeper understandings of
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themselves in relation to one another, their race, and other racial groups, and this
has the potential to foster, in Rulli’s words, “transpersonal transformation”.358
Moreover, drawing from our understanding of empirical data on
intergroup contact, which finds generalized effects of positive relations beyond
the immediate contact group, we can imagine the transformative value of
adoption that Rulli envisions extending beyond the parent-child relationship to
larger family circles, communities, and society at large. In this way, I contend
that Rulli’s point can be extended further: not only does transracial adoption
have transformative power for parents and children, but it also provides
opportunities for personal transformations in those beyond the adoptive family:
other family members, neighbors, school educators, the child’s friends, and
members of one’s community at large. Let me explain.
Approaching reparative justice from an integrationist perspective provides
a compelling case for adopting children outside one’s racial group because
adopting a child who is of a different race than oneself has important
interpersonal and political effects on individuals and larger communities. While
Anderson does not comment much further on transracial adoption, other
philosophers writing in the area of family ethics have written about transracial
adoptions in favourably integrationist terms. For example, Heath Fogg-Davis
argues that if our goal is to deeply challenge racial hierarchies and negative
perceptions of minority racial groups to care for children, we ought to encourage
transracial adoption. In his words,
Those who craft and implement adoption policy should also
be concerned with decreasing aversive racism by
encouraging TRA that flows in all directions. Blacks should
be encouraged to adopt white children, not only because
TRA benefits the members of their own adoptive family, but
also to show others that blacks can successfully parent
white children. ... What's more, the racial fissure between a
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white child and his or her black adopted parents may
stimulate critical thinking about the social and cultural
meaning of whiteness.359
In principle, this argument applies to other groups, as well: the
widespread encouragement of transracial adoptions is a way to challenge racial
hierarchies. Sally Haslanger360 makes a similar point that it should to be our goal
to live in a society in which differences between racial groups do not mark sites of
privilege and subordination. Rather, she envisions a society in which cultural or
ethnic difference replaces racial difference. In such a society, we would share in
each other’s traditions, ways of life, meanings and symbols, and we would
celebrate and value our cultural differences, absent racial hierarchies.
The idea that forming and maintaining deep connections with others
fosters positive interactions is captured by a number of philosophers in their
discussions of adopting children. Take, for example, Sally Haslanger’s account of
being “transracialized” in virtue of having adopted two black children.361 As she
explains, having family members who experience a different racial reality in the
world influences and shapes her perception and experience of the world in
important ways. Her own racial identity becomes more nuanced and complex,
informed by her understanding and appreciation of the lived experiences of her
adopted children. Haslanger’s experience embodies the affective mediators of
empathy and perspective-taking that social psychologists have identified as
important for fostering and enhancing positive intergroup relations. As
Haslanger reports, her experience of adopting her two children involved forming
intimate connections with them that provided her with meaningful opportunities

Heath Fogg Davis, “Racial Randomization: Imagining Nondiscrimination in
Adoption,” in Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays, eds. Sally
Haslanger and Charlotte Witt (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005): 253.
360 Sally Haslanger, “You Mixed? Racial Identity Without Racial Biology,” in
Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays, eds. Sally Haslanger and
Charlotte Witt, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): 265-289.
361 Haslanger, “You Mixed?”
359

140

to develop deeper understandings of race. In all of these ways, reparative justice
as informed by an integrationist perspective lends support for adopting children
whose race is different than one’s own.
Integrationism is not without its critics, however. Some philosophers
emphasize the value of racial separation in order for members of oppressed
groups to develop together as critical masses of empowered individuals, who can
then use their collective power to influence the polity.362 Segregation has two
classic forms: state-imposed and self-imposed (i.e., self-segregation). Stateimposed segregation consists in measures enacted and enforced by the state that
are designed to regulate inter-group relations by keeping different groups apart
and restricting access to goods, services, spaces, and political representation.
Self-segregation, however, occurs when particular groups – rather than the state
– segregate themselves within communities. Expressing skepticism about the
positive effects of interracial contact, Tommie Shelby comments that “blacks
would have little assurance that sacrificing their bonding capital would lead to
more valuable bridging capital”.363 Likewise, Denise James voices suspicion that
proximity breeds empathy and genuine concern for differently-raced others.364
For these scholars, the risks of benefiting in some way from racial integration is
not worth sacrificing close bonds with members of one’s own racial group. They
both maintain anti-integrationist positions, affirming the value of selfsegregation for members of racially oppressed groups.
While I agree with these scholars that efforts to self-segregate and resist
integration are effective in certain contexts, I think that integration within the
realm of family life takes on a character of its own. What makes racial integration

See Shelby, “Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice”; Du Bois, 1996;
Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction; Jeffers, “The Cultural Theory of Race.”
363 Shelby, “Integration,” 275.
364 Denise James, “The Burdens of Integration,” Symposia on Gender, Race, and
Philosophy, 9, no. 2 (2013): 1-5.
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in the realm of family life particularly powerful is that relationships between
members of one’s family are some of the most personal bonds one can have. In
loving parent-child relationships, children can have powerful transformative
effects on their parents, and vice versa. As Fogg-Davis puts the point, “Because
emotional identification affects racial navigation, and our strongest emotional
ties are usually to family members of our immediate families, we should expect
the most intense exchange of ideas about racial self-awareness to occur within
immediate families”.365 In my view, familial relations have a strong potential to
challenge existing racial structures in society at large by first challenging
immediate family members’ conceptions of race and political hierarchies that
attach to society’s treatment of racial difference. These new ways of conceiving of
oneself and the value of racial difference absent racial hierarchies will have
effects beyond familial relationships, influencing society at large.
In any case, anti-integrationist challenges to transracial adoptions do not
undermine a duty to adopt; rather, they seem to provide even stronger reasons
for members of racially oppressed groups to adopt children within their racial
group. Statistically, there are far more children of colour than there are white
children, and the pool of adoptable children is much higher amongst those who
are racialized within particular communities. If anything, anti-integrationism
brings out the value of caring for children within one’s racial group as a way to
resist the widespread adoption of children of colour by (typically) white adoptive
parents. I will expand on this point in the next section. In summary, reparations
for familial racial injustices would take the form of prospective parents of racially
oppressed groups providing parental care to children in need of it, that is,
through adoptions

Fogg Davis, H. G. The Ethics of Transracial Adoption. (London: Cornell
University Press, 2002): 20.
365
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4.2. Racial Solidarity
Recall that, in Chapter 2, I developed a group-based reason from racial solidarity
in favour of procreation premised on the idea that members of oppressed racial
groups have a moral right to procreate as a way of expressing social or political
solidarity with one’s racial group. The primary motivation for one to procreate
would be to strive for social change by way of honouring one’s group through
bonds of solidarity. Prospective parents who are members of these groups and
who are motivated to have biological children for reasons of racial solidarity
would be expressing a sense of solidarity toward the group in which they identify
as belonging. Through nurturing bonds of solidarity, they seek social change and
liberation from historical and ongoing injustice. Procreation is valuable and nonsubstitutable by adoption, on this view, because having biological children allows
for the expression of solidarity bonds between members of racialized groups
whose value as persons is challenged within an oppressive racial order. The
implication for a duty to adopt is that adopting a child constitutes a special
burden for some prospective parents, namely, that of foregoing the opportunity
to foster bonds of solidarity with members of one’s racial group (i.e., by having
biological children).
However, members of oppressed racial groups may also seek social change
and liberation from racial injustice by adopting children who share one’s race.
Consider this second group-based reason in favour of adoption: members of
oppressed racial groups can express solidarity with their group and its
constituent members by adopting children within their own racial group. Given
that children in racially disadvantaged groups are overrepresented in child
welfare and adoption systems, one way for members of oppressed racial groups to
express solidarity is to care for these children who are in need of adoption. This
argument, like the one from reparative justice, is founded on an ethic of
resistance to historical and contemporary familial injustices that undermine the
value of racialized and indigenous communities, parents, and children. However,
whereas reparative justice was about members of certain racial groups seeking
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reparations for past and ongoing racial injustices against families, the idea would
be that members of certain racial groups could honour their group through bonds
of solidarity by adopting children of the same race.
Critics of transracial adoptions claim that children’s identity formation,
sense of self, and sense of belonging is negatively affected when children are
raised in families whose members do not share the child’s race. Assuming this is
true, one way to ensure that children are given the opportunities to develop
healthy personal, racial, and community identities is to provide them with
parental care within same-race families. This position is supported by selfsegregationism, as articulated by Tommie Shelby, who argues that living in
racially self-segregated settings – even if they are located within larger integrated
spaces – can provide members of oppressed groups with comfort of living and a
sense of community. Living in close proximity and close contact with people who
have “similar life experiences,” he says, can be both comforting and empowering
in itself.366 Having access to regular contact with people who share one’s styles of
communication, values of caring, political consciousness and values, sense of
humour, and so on, can provide a sense of security and reassurance, especially if
those experiences are unique from dominant culture. Such networks of support
and community bonds may not be as easy to foster in more integrated settings,
where dominant culture can overpower efforts for members of oppressed groups
to establish a sense of community belonging.
Moreover, proponents of self-segregation (or, more generally, antiintegration) argue that the merits of striving for racial equality and justice lie in
protecting members of oppressed groups, cultivating and raising consciousness
about the value of one’s culture, and facilitating groups’ political solidarity.
Shelby argues that self-segregation can serve as protection for blacks against the
likely harms of integration within a society “where they are deeply disadvantaged
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and vulnerable to mistreatment and political marginalization”.367 In these sorts
of cases, having a “critical mass” of similarly-situated individuals can provide
group protection for its members.368 Relatedly, members of oppressed racial
groups may self-segregate as a way of expressing political solidarity by interacting
with “politically like-minded individuals”.369 The consciousness-raising and
awareness that often accompanies meaningful interactions amongst racially
oppressed groups, Shelby argues, is “an important source of political
empowerment” and, crucially, a “component of an ethic of resistance to
injustice”.370 Crucially, for members of racially oppressed groups, liberation from
injustice may require (as some contend) the very sort of political and social
solidarity that Shelby and others have in mind. In the context of child welfare,
caring for children within the same racial group can help them form healthy
racial identities, and cultivate a source of political empowerment that can be
instrumental in achieving social change for the betterment of racially oppressed
groups and its constituent members.
Let us now turn to the third group-based reason to favour adoption over
procreation.

4.3. Cultural Preservation
Recall that, in Chapter 2, I presented three ways in which one could appeal to
cultural preservation as a reason to procreate. The first way involved procreating
as a form of cultural expression; the second involved creating biological progeny
through whom to pass along one’s cultural traditions; and the third involved
procreating to continue on a lineage threatened with foreseeable extinction.
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However, as I will argue here, cultural preservation also seems to provide a
strong group-based reason to adopt children within and outside one’s racial
group.

Adopting Children Within One’s Racial Group
Consider this proposal: as a way of resisting assimilationist pressures from
dominant cultures, members of oppressed racial groups can pass on one’s culture
to members of the same racial group who would – through transracial adoptive
placement – not have direct access to cultural goods as one would if one were
raised in a same-race family. This would avoid the observed downfalls of
transracial adoption that we discussed earlier. This proposal depends on a
cultural theory of race, whereby members of the same race share a culture.
Efforts to adopt children of the same race would conform to Chike Jeffers
conception of cultural preservation as “efforts by individuals or groups to
maintain the distinctness and distinctiveness of a cultural group to which they
belong.”371 To the extent that cultural goods are worth preserving, one may go so
far as to argue that members of racially oppressed groups have an obligation (i.e.,
a moral duty) to adopt children within one’s racial group, as a way of resisting
pressures to assimilate into dominant culture. This third group-based reason
provides a compelling case for same-race adoptions. The disproportionately large
pool of children of colour in child welfare and adoption systems who are available
for adoption could be met with concerted efforts by prospective parents who are
members of these same racial group to adopt them.
Adopting Children Outside One’s Racial Group

Jeffers, “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation,” 206. For Jeffers,
cultural preservation is valuable for members of all races, for the value in one’s culture
persists beyond a world with racial hierarchies, but in the context of a group-based claim
to procreation, I would argue that, on the basis of race, members of minority racial
groups have a far more plausible claim to procreative rights than do members of
dominant racial groups.
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Consider this proposal in favour of adopting children outside one’s racial
group for reasons of cultural preservation: as a way of resisting assimilationist
pressures from dominant cultures, members of oppressed racial groups can pass
on their culture to those who are outside one’s racial group, thereby expanding
one’s cultural community by passing on the goods of one’s culture to adopted
members of the community (i.e., adopted children). Adopting outside one’s racial
group as a way of preserving one’s culture may be especially compelling in cases
where one’s cultural community faces foreseeable extinction or would otherwise
benefit from an expansion in population. Traditions, languages, and other
cultural goods can be shared with those who become members of one’s
community not through birth but rather through adoption. Thus, this third
group-based reason provides a compelling case for transracial adoptions.

5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented three group-based reasons in support of adopting
children within or outside one’s racial group. I first provided a demographic
overview

of

child

welfare

and

adoption

systems,

highlighting

the

disproportionate overrepresentation of children of colour in need of adoption,
globally; and racial disparities in localized child welfare systems. I traced some of
the causes of these racial disparities historically and identified both structural
and attitudinal racism in child welfare and adoption systems. I then elucidated a
few key concerns about domestic and intercountry transracial adoptions. Next, I
argued that each of the three group-based reasons in favour of procreate that we
considered in Chapter 2 do not definitely support procreation over adoption but,
rather, seems to support adoption in many cases. I showed how reparative justice
supports the adoption of children within and outside one’s racial group; and how
racial solidarity and cultural preservation supports adopting children within
one’s racial group. Thus, I conclude that, as challenges to a duty to adopt, they are
unsuccessful in most cases – namely, in cases where there are available children
to adopt within one’s racial group. However, further philosophical arguments are
needed to dislodge remaining challenges from racial solidarity and cultural
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preservation with respect to adopting children outside one’s racial group.
Moreover, for those who remain unconvinced about any of the reasons I have
provided in this chapter in favour of members of racially oppressed groups
having a moral duty to adopt, I will offer a final defense of the duty in the
upcoming chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Politics of Children’s Belonging
1. Introduction
Thus far in this dissertation, I hope to have demonstrated the persuasiveness of a
duty to adopt, despite strong objections. In Chapter 1, I introduced the duty and
showed its resilience against proposed defeating conditions and foundational
challenges. In chapter 2, I developed three group-based reasons – reparative
justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation – in favour of procreation that
challenged a duty to adopt. In Chapter 3, I argued that these reasons do not
definitively support procreation and, instead, provide persuasive reasons for
prospective parents who are members of racially oppressed groups to adopt
children, either within or outside their racial group. I showed how striving for
reparative justice and cultural preservation provides strong reasons for members
of oppressed racial groups to adopt children within and outside their racial
group; and how racial solidarity can be achieved through adopting children
within one’s racial group. Still, as I noted, a few group-based challenges to the
duty remain, and so in this chapter, I present a closing defense of my position
that all prospective parents, including those who are members of racially
oppressed groups, have a duty to adopt children instead of procreating.
In this final chapter, I evaluate whether group-based interests in favour of
procreation or in determining children’s familial placements (to the exclusion of
adopting children outside one’s racial group) can override the needs of individual
children for parental care, simpliciter. I will argue that the needs of individual
children to receive parental care take priority over groups’ interests in both
procreation and decisions about particular adoptive placements in cases where
same-race or intra-communal placements prove difficult. I will make the case
that steadfastness about children’s belonging that manifests in moral
prohibitions on transracial adoptions of racialized or indigenous children has
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detrimental compound effects on these children, who are already socially
disadvantaged.372 Moreover, debates that centrally engage this topic tend to be
inert and counterproductive in addressing the plight of children who need
parental care.
In my view, it is a mistake to conceive of parents and communities as
proprietary owners of children, and of children as deterministically bound to
their communities of origin; it is also mistaken to view children as wholly
disconnected from their communities of origin. Rather, we should think of
adoptions as existing within larger networks of relationships, in which
meaningful collaborations between communities with which the adopted child is
connected (through birth or adoption) play a role in helping children develop
healthy identities and take pride in their identities. Racialized and indigenous
communities that lack the resources to provide adequate and timely parental care
for children should offer support to adoptive families who do adopt children from
within their communities, so that adopted children can have access to
interpersonal supports as they grow up and can, on their own terms, maintain
connections with their birth community. In turn, adoptive families should
reciprocate respect for their children’s birth communities, helping the child
maintain connections, if the child wishes to do so. Needless to say, structural
inequalities that are responsible for the disproportionate rates of children in need
of adoption within racialized and indigenous communities need to be addressed
in parallel but not at the expense of children’s well-being and opportunities to
receive parental care from willing and loving adoptive parents.

Raven Sinclair emphasizes the importance of being attentive to the unique
circumstances of indigenous children when collating data on transracial adoptions.
Literature on transracial adoptions usually concludes that adoptees and adoptive
families experience positive outcomes. However, indigenous transracial adoptions are an
exception to this trend, resulting in consistently negative outcomes for adoptees and
families. See Raven Sinclair, “Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties Scoop,”
First Peoples Child and Family Review, 3, no. 1 (2007): 65-82.
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In §2, I will motivate the importance of thinking carefully about issues of
children’s belonging, pointing out the high stakes of such debates. I will reference
international human rights and adoption legislation, where appropriate, to
illustrate how ideas about children’s rights to certain identities are protected or
eschewed. In §3, I will articulate and critique two views about children’s
belonging, one that views children as deterministically bound to their
communities of origin and another that views children as wholly unbounded by
them. In §4, I will offer my view about how to think about children’s relationships
to their communities of origin. My positive view conceives of adoptions as childcentered, and as involving mutual respect and collaboration between birth and
adoptive families, in children’s best interests, as guided by children’s own voices.
In §5, I will discuss the implications of this discussion for a duty to adopt,
ultimately reinforcing that the duty applies to all prospective parents but also
specifying that the duty supports subsidiary duties to extend support for
racialized children who are adopted outside their communities of origin.

2. Children, Law, and the Politics of Belonging
Throughout history, one of the key tools of oppression has been the
disintegration of families. Dominant groups in societies have sought to fragment
and diminish power within families, the fundamental units of political life, as
means of achieving larger political projects, such as colonization. As Alice Hearst
explains, “As dominant groups inevitably universalized their cultures, they
configured their own members as ‘normal’ while marking others as different,
rendering the latter therefore invisible and effectively excluded from full
participation in political life. … that erasure was often accomplished by design or
circumstance via the removal of children from families”.373 Because children
connect previous familial generations to current and future ones, communities
are vulnerable to grand political manipulation via removals of children from their
birth families by dominant groups.
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Debates about children’s belonging are deeply contentious, rich with
meaning and political ramifications. In particular, adoptions are saturated
microcosmic contexts for political debates about racial justice, indigenous
sovereignty, international relations, and more. Child welfare and adoption
systems are complex, and they present ethical and political challenges regarding
how best to provide care to children in need. Adoptive parents, birth parents,
children, racialized and indigenous communities, nations, and governments all
have interests in the policies and practices that shape and regulate the formation
of families. As Hearst comments, “The fact that adoption entails gains and losses
for individuals, families, and communities means that adoption is a volatile
political issue, particularly when adoption and foster care placements cross
racial, cultural, and national boundaries”.374 Because children who are members
of racially disadvantaged communities are typically adopted into racially
privileged families, there is a serious risk of “intrusion of the privileged into the
intimate spaces of poor and marginalized communities”.375 Consequently, we
need to pay careful attention to power relations when thinking about children’s
placements within families in the context of adoptions.
Within different forms of adoption, a number of key issues regarding
children’s belonging are at stake. In the case of domestic transracial adoptions of
both indigenous and non-indigenous children, children’s belonging is set against
a background of historical and ongoing racial inequalities. Recall from Chapter 2
how racialized and indigenous groups were (and still are) subject to anti-natalist
and reproductive injustices that thwarted their abilities to have biological
children. And recall from Chapter 3 the countless ways in which some
communities were subject to familial injustices at the hands of the state and
dominant social groups, to the detriment of racialized children, families, parents,
and communities, making it difficult for birth families to maintain relationships
with their children. Being able to keep children within these communities is of
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serious importance for these groups. Whereas these groups have been deprived of
autonomy in maintaining familial ties or deciding on the placement of their
children, attempts to keep children in same-race or intracommunal families has
significant value for group sovereignty and political power.
Several few pieces of adoption legislation support groups’ interests in
keeping children within their communities of origin or in same-race familial
placements. One is the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in the United States,
which grants tribal indigenous groups (i.e., “American Indian tribal courts”)
jurisdictional authority over the care of children who are eligible members of the
tribe.376 ICWA is praised by critics and opponents of transracial adoptions for
protecting the rights of marginalized groups to exercise sovereign power over its
members – in this case, children in need of parental care – but it is heavily
criticized by those who regard the policy as hindering the prospects of indigenous
children to gain timely placements in stable, permanent homes. In Canada, some
provinces have policies that affirm the autonomy of indigenous groups in
deciding on their children’s placement. For example, Alberta’s Policy Directive in
the Adoption of First Nations Children – and a similar policy in Saskatchewan –
requires the consent of an indigenous child’s First Nation for adoption
placements.377 Once again, critics of these policies argue that it delays the process
of finding parental placements of children.
Other pieces of adoption legislation directly oppose group interests in
placing children within communities of origin. In the United States, for example,
as stipulated in the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994 (‘MEPA I), amended by
the Interethnic Placement Provisions of 1996 (‘MEPA II’), race-matching is
prohibited in cases involving non-indigenous children, unless there are

Hearst, Children and the Politics of Cultural Belonging, 7.
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compelling circumstances in favour of race-matching.378

379

MEPA II is

applauded by supporters of transracial adoption for encouraging timely
placements for children and for lessening delays that may result from waiting for
available parents who share the child’s race. But critics of this policy argue that it
is a form of continued erasure of racialized people and an attack on racialized
communities.
A few pieces of international policy lend support for preferring same-race
or intracommunal placements380 in the context of intercountry adoptions. For
instance, Article 20.3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that,
in cases where children need alternative childcare placements (e.g., adoption,
foster care), “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child 's
upbringing and to the child 's ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
background.”381 Similarly, Article 16.1.b of the Hague Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption stipulates that
the sending country of the adoptable child “give due consideration to the child's
upbringing and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural background.”382
Furthermore, several clauses in the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples lend support for the recognition of indigenous groups’
sovereignty over matters of child welfare, including their determination of samerace placements of indigenous children. One notable section in the document

Hearst, Children and the Politics of Cultural Belonging, 7.
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the placement decision” (Solangel Maldonado, “Discouraging Racial Preferences in
Adoptions,” U.C. Davis Law Review 39, no. 4 (2006): 1457).
380 By this, I mean placements of children within their birth communities.
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acknowledges the importance of “Recognizing in particular the right of
indigenous families and communities to retain shared responsibility for the
upbringing, training, education and well-being of their children, consistent with
the rights of the child”.383 In terms of rights to culture, though not directly tied to
adoption or child welfare, Article 31.1 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right
to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions”.384 Whereas this article does not
address whether this clause pertains to children’s rights, Article 30 of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Child clearly states:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child
belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not
be denied the right, in community with other members of
his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess
and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her
own language.
The strong preference for keeping children within their communities of
origin has resulted in many countries closing their doors to adoption over the last
few years.385 Unfortunately, these decisions affect children who need parental
care by shrinking the pool of adoptive families who can care for them. When the
stakes are high for children to receive parental care and for communities to have
a voice in matters involving members of their community, it is clear why
adoptions – both domestic and international – are contentious.
In sum, concerns about children’s belonging are that adoptions across
racial, cultural, and national boundaries “stigmatize whole communities as unfit
to care for children and thwart efforts to create community-based care systems

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
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that would ultimately redound to the benefit of both children and the
communities themselves”.386 Importantly, my assessment of a duty to adopt goes
beyond the existing literature on this topic by attending to these intricate political
features of adoption and the implications they have for racially oppressed
populations, whose children are – as a result of historical and ongoing racial
injustices – disproportionately represented in child welfare and adoption
systems. Grasping this complex debate about children’s belonging is critical to
our examination of a duty to adopt because it helps us adjudicate whether groupbased reasons to favour procreation over adoption, or to forgo adoption of
children outside one’s racial group in favour of procreation, can successfully
defeat one’s pro tanto duty to adopt.
Now that we have an understanding of the stakes involved in issues that
concern children’s belonging, let us examine two opposing views within these
debates.

3. Two Views on Children’s Belonging
As I have presented them in previous chapters, at the heart of group-based
challenges to a duty to adopt is a tension between the interests of racialized and
indigenous communities, and the needs of individual children for parental care.
Embedded in philosophical discussions of adoptions, especially those that cross
racial and national boundaries, are competing views about children’s belonging.
On the one hand, some racialized and indigenous communities claim authority
and jurisdiction over children who are born within them. These communities
regard decisions about their children’s placement as falling within their domain
of sovereign decision-making and political governance. On this view, children are
bound to their birth communities as integral members; they safeguard the
groups’ interests; and they fare best when cared for within their birth
communities or with parents who share their race. On the other hand, a
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competing view is that children are not deterministically bound to their
communities of origin and should be placed in adoptive care with willing
adoptive parents, regardless of racial, cultural, or community-based affiliations.
On this view, children do not have inherent birthright attachments to their
communities of origin, or to any particular racial or cultural groups; they should
be granted freedom to shape their own identities; and they fare best in loving,
stable, permanent homes, regardless of whether their familial placements are
extra-communal or transracial.
In this section, I detail and critique these two opposing views on children’s
belonging that embody the tension between the interests of oppressed racial
groups and the needs of individual children to have parental care. Let us begin
with the view that children are intimately connected to their communities of birth
and critically represent these groups’ interests. Call this the ‘community
representative’ view of children’s belonging.

3.1. Children as Community Representatives
Given a long-standing history in Western countries of racialized and indigenous
children being systematically removed from their birth families and placed in
foster or adoptive care, children born within these endangered communities are
often viewed as political markers for them.387 Children are seen as holding
promises of a better future for groups who have experienced oppression and
whose interests continue to be subject to the interests of more powerful groups.
Disadvantaged communities seek to have their voices heard amidst “forces that
threaten the very existence of groups who seek recognition to integrate on their
own terms”.388
Those who hold a view of children as community representatives make
three main claims. First, they argue, children are integral and interdependent
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members of their communities of origin. For instance, Kenn Richard (2004)
explains that a “tribal world view”, as espoused by many First Nations389
communities in Canada and elsewhere, conceives of the relationship between
child and community as “symbiotic”.390 Individuals, including children, are
“contextualized with families, communities and cultures. Here[,] the best
interests of a child are inexorably linked to the best interests of the community
and vice versa. As the child is seen as the embodiment of her culture she is as a
result required to be nurtured within it”.391 In turn, well-adjusted adults who are
raised within their tribal communities “strengthen the collective through the
generations”.392 The communitarian view of individual flourishing that underlies
tribal world views favours culturally-sensitive (i.e., same-race) familial
placements of indigenous children.
Likewise, for other racialized groups, some believe that children have
inherent birthrights to their racial and cultural groups, such that children depend
on these groups in order to form their identities. In this vein, two members of the
US-based adoption organization Pact, express strong consternation about
transracial adoptions, framing the issue as one of cultural deprivation for
children. They write:
Who is hurt by the myth that race is not an issue for Latino
or Asian children placed in White families? Children who
lose the history, traditions, and comforts of connection to
others who share their racial background are the victims of
this myth. Parents who take away their child’s opportunity
to feel a true member of their own racial or ethnic groups

‘First Nations’ is the terminology used by author Kenn Richard.
Kenn Richard, “A Commentary Against Aboriginal to non-Aboriginal
Adoption,” First Nations Child and Family Review 1, no. 1. (2004): 102.
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are depriving their child of a birthright and diminishing
the rich contributions of the child’s intrinsic culture”.393
References to children’s “own” identities and cultures reveal the strong
belief that children are entitled not just to community connection but, more
specifically, to being raised by parents who share their social identities and who,
presumably, are immersed in the same culture into which the child was born.
Second, on this view, children are representatives of their groups’ interests
and well-being. Critics and opponents of transracial adoption draw attention to
the harms to marginalized communities, parents (especially mothers), and
children when children are removed from their birth communities and placed in
the care of ‘outsiders’. For instance, according to what Anita Allen calls the
“cultural genocide” argument, racialized groups will lose their cultures if children
are placed in the care of families outside the group. The worry is that children
who are raised in families who do not share their race will not be able to learn
about their culture and pass it on to future generations. For example, a
representative of the national tribal association in the United States offered the
following testimony during congressional hearings on the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA):
the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if
our children, the only real means for the transmission of
the travel heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes
and denied exposure to the way of their People… probably
in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be
respected than in an area as socially and culturally
determinative as family relationships”.394
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As this sentiment brings to light, “community self-determination” is a
cornerstone in arguments against indigenous transracial adoptions;395 tribal
sovereignty is tested in the politics of children’s belonging. Sovereignty over one’s
community and members within it depend on having the power to make
decisions that affect one’s group and having others respect that decision. As
Hearst puts it, “Determining which children are subject to the provisions of
ICWA then raises questions … of sovereignty: how is an Indian child defined by it
and will that definition find outsiders to respect that determination?”.396
Third, those who espouse this view of children argue that they fare best
within their communities of origin or within same-race adoptive placements.
According to what Allen terms the “transmission of survival skills” argument,
critics of transracial adoption believe that children need to be raised in families in
which parents share their race in order for the children to develop skills
necessary to forming a healthy, appropriate racial identity. According to this
argument, children need parents who can model the same racial identity and
teach them to understand and live appropriately in a society which is embedded
in historic and contemporary systems of racism. A same-race family upbringing
would allow children to have appropriate and factual self-awareness of
themselves – the “internal or private aspect” of their racial identity – as well as
exhibit appropriate behaviour to others – the “internal or public aspect” of their
racial identity.397 These two aspects of children’s identities are seen as operating
together, for a lack of outwardly expressed pride in one’s racial identity is a telling
sign of internal rejection of one’s identity. On the flipside, lacking an
understanding of one’s socially constructed (i.e., group-based) identity places one
at risk for experiencing “social dislocation and psychological malaise”.398
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Many opponents of transracial adoption believe that children can gain necessary
survival skills as members of racialized group only if raised by parents who share
their race; thus, in their view, transracial adoption placements are problematic
for children.
From the perspective of many indigenous communities, part of what ought
to constitute determinations about the ‘best interests’ of the child is an
attentiveness to the cultural context in which the child is an integral member. As
Richard points out, however, this tribal world view is in contention with AngloEuropean conceptions of children’s best interests in child welfare. Canadian
courts often cite “bonding” and “continuity of care” as principal considerations in
adoption proceedings, often assigning little weight to the cultural context into
which the child is born.400 Thus, whereas many indigenous communities hold a
firm position on adopting indigenous children within their communities of birth
and resisting transracial adoptions, the tendency for courts is to place a heavy
emphasis on non-cultural or individualistic assessments of children’s best
interests.401 These are some of the main aspects of the view that children are
representatives of their communities of origin. Now, on to my critique.
The view of children as community representatives is problematic because,
in my view, it misattributes to children a right to a particular culture; and it
essentializes, determines, and instrumentalizes them. Moreover, firm moral
prohibitions on transracial adoptions of racialized or indigenous children has
detrimental effects on them, compounding the negative effects that follow from
their positions of social disadvantage.
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Treating children as having inherent ‘rights’ to a racial or cultural identity
from birth mistakenly attributes meaning to children’s identities that they,
themselves, likely do not understand or possess. 402 First of all, children lack fully
formed identities when they are young; rather, they acquire their sense of identity
over time, as they mature. Children acquire culture through experiential learning.
They observe traditions, participate in events, and become accultured to certain
ways of life as members of a community. The presumption that children, upon
birth, are deserving of cultural entitlements is misguided. Anita Allen argues that
race-matching commitments that affirm children’s belonging in same-race
adoption placements reflect adults’ interests in having their own identities
protected rather than children’s interests in receiving parental care. As she puts
it, ideas about children’s rights to a certain identity are “a surrogate for another
idea, … that adults have a right to respect for their identities.403 Enshrined in
international human rights documents, she notes, is the idea that children have a
moral or political right to a certain identity. For example, the UN Declaration on
the Rights of the Child references children’s rights to “his or her own culture”
(UN Dec); “their parents, their nationalities, their religions”.404 The presumption
is that children possess entitlements to certain identities that compel recognition
and respect amongst nations and as a matter of international relations.405
However, she reasons, arguments in favour of race-matching in adoption stand in
proxy for “concerns about adult identity, and how law and social practice can be

This is not to say that having a right to something requires that I understand the
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better molded to accommodate it”.406 In this way, attributing meaning to
children’s identities when, in reality, they do not possess the requisite
understanding of these identities is a mistake. Rather, these claims about
children’s rights say more about adult’s interests. This leads into my next three
criticisms.
A second problem with regarding children as representatives of their
communities with birth-inherited rights to racial and cultural identities, is that it
essentializes children’s identities as members of racialized groups. By casting all
children in the same light – namely, as in need of same-race parents or
intracommunal familial placements – one falsely assumes that all children have
the same needs. By imposing an identity politics on young children, many of
whom will not have an adequate understanding of racial identity politics at their
young age, one assigns children’s identities from birth based on arbitrary
attributes, namely, those associated with the luck of birth.
A third problem is that, by assigning certain identities to children at birth,
it fixes their identities and restricts opportunities for authentic identity
formation. Placing expectations on children to be a member of a certain social
group or, as they grow, to adhere to cultural markers of social identity set by that
group restricts children in profound ways. As Hearst explains, there are
“distinctive reasons to be concerned about the expectations placed on adopted
children to carry forward a set of cultural or communal values with which they
are not familiar. Even if children are imagined as carriers of culture, they become
such carriers only through enculturation: they do not carry culture in their
bones”.407
Likewise, Heath Fogg Davis argues against the racial rigidity with which
some communities lock children. A “static notion of racial understanding”
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assumes that children are not able to navigate their identities.408 Rather, he
argues, children become adept at crossing cultural boundaries and often become
acculturated in more than one group, plotting their own belonging along several
axes.409 In sum, committing children to a certain identity-based group from birth
locks them into identity categories from which they cannot easily escape at their
will. This racial fixity has dangerous consequences in the context of child welfare,
for children who are embraced too tightly by their communities of origin may
miss out on opportunities to be placed in adoptive homes that would,
counterfactually, be better suited to their individual needs.
Lastly, treating children as community representatives instrumentalizes
them by subjecting their needs (i.e., to parental care) to that of the social groups
that claim them. Feminists have been very critical of the treatment of certain
individuals (e.g., women, children) within cultural groups. Some groups tend to
subject its more vulnerable members to the group’s will, creating cultural
boundaries that place some individuals at risk. Some argue that, in empowering
groups, states should safeguard individuals’ human rights that “allow those
individuals to exercise the power to craft their membership on their own
terms”.410 The dire risk of subsuming children into a group and subjecting them
to the groups’ interests is that, in the midst of debates about their belonging, their
need for parental care becomes overshadowed.
In addition, policies against transracial and intercountry adoptions
negatively impact children who need parental care, not (or perhaps, to a much
lesser extent) the communities who claim them. For instance, some of the most
vocal critics of transracial adoption are based in the United States, and the
impact of their views have had noticeable effects on adoption rates of black
children. In Chapter 3, we looked at the National Association of Black Social
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Workers’ 1972 firm stance against transracial adoption. 411 As Maldonado reports,
following NABSW’s statement, the rates of domestic transracial adoptions of
African American children – which were relatively high in the 1960s and 1970s –
drastically decreased.412 In the case of intercountry adoptions, rates of adoptions
of children in developing countries drastically decreased over the past few years,
as a result of countries closing their borders to international adoptive parents. 413
For all these reasons, I am critical of firm positions in favour of upholding groups’
interests in determining children’s welfare.

3.2. Children as Liberated Beings
In contrast to the view of children as community representatives is the view that
children are liberated beings, with no birth-inherited rights or obligations to their
communities of origin. Call this the ‘liberationist view’ of children’s belonging.
Those who hold this view make three main claims. First, children do not have
birth-inherited obligations to their communities of origin or to any racial or
cultural group into which they are born.414 On this view, children’s luck of birth
(i.e., being born into one family rather than any other) is arbitrary. The fact that a
child is born into a certain cultural community or within one country rather than
another has no binding effects for the child, in the sense that they do not bear
birth-inherited rights or obligations to their communities of origin.
Second, children should be free to shape their identities at their own will.
Children should be encouraged to embrace identities with which they identify
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and to take pride in creating an authentic self. For example, Josiah Wilson is
someone who embodies this ideal in his own life. As an infant, Josiah was
adopted from Haiti by his Heiltsuk Nation father and white Francophone mother.
He says confidently, “I identify myself as Haitian, Canadian, First Nations,
francophone and black. … I am proud to embrace these multiple identities at the
same time.”415 Exposure to a multiplicity of identities and the opportunity to
embrace them would likely not have been possible had Josiah not been raised in
such a multicultural family.
Third, on this view of children’s belonging, children fare best when they
have good parents, regardless of whether or not those parents share the child’s
race or culture. Elizabeth Bartholet, a vocal advocate of adoptions, maintains this
stance on international adoption, comparing it to the “horrors of institutional and
street life, and the limited options for any kind of adequate home care in their
countries of birth” and arguing that opposition “cannot be justified based on any
best interest of the child principle”.416 Elsewhere, she states that “children’s needs
for permanent family placement should trump all other concerns”417. On this
view of children’s belonging, children primarily need parental care from loving
parents. Children’s needs for stable, permanent families come first and foremost,
before any other concerns about their or their adoptive parents’ racial identities.
The serious risks to children’s physical, cognitive, emotional, and psychological
well-being of growing up without parents – whether on the streets or in foster
care – necessitate expedious adoptive placements. In sum, children belong in
families that can provide them with the parental care they need.
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This view of children as entirely disconnected from their communities of
origin is also problematic. In addition to being removed from the realities of
oppression and dismissive of historical and ongoing oppression to certain groups
of people, this view also fails to match the lived experiences of some adoptees.
For instance, some indigenous children who were adopted into white families
during the 60s Scoop report feeling torn and in-between worlds, longing for a
sense of belonging but suspended between incommensurate communities.418
Recall that supporters and defenders of transracial adoption argue that children’s
needs for stable, permanent parental care trump group-based interests in family
preservation or adoptive placements designed to keep children in their
communities of origin. In doing so, they tend to downplay the injury to groups
when children are removed from birth communities and view group-based
petitions to retain children within them as instrumentalizing – “using children as
pawns”.419 This dismissal of the severity and systematicity of oppression is
harmful to groups and to children within them. Just as one example of the
pervasiveness of racism in child welfare systems is that, historically, indigenous
groups have rarely been granted any authority over decisions involving
indigenous children. Based on assumptions formed during previous decades,
even today, indigenous people experience discrimination in child welfare cases
from courts.420
Hearst captures the importance of respecting histories of colonialism that
make it such that certain groups in society strive for sovereignty over their
children. She writes,
claims for protecting the links between children and tribes
are compelling precisely because those connections are
fragile– and they’re fragile because they were deliberately
attenuated by a series of federal and state policies that
openly undermined Indian families and communities. As a
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result, distrust of the motives of state child welfare workers
in dealing with Indian children is a constant theme when
considering the placement of Indian children, and
overcoming that distrust is critical to promoting
cooperation and understanding between tribes and white
society.421
Likewise, long histories of racial oppression that carry on today provide good
reason for groups to be skeptical, vigilant, and protective over their children. In
turn, children who are ascribed certain social identities need to live in a society in
which those groups are afforded respect and equitable participation, including
that of having a say in children’s welfare.
In my view, neither of the two respective views about children’s belonging
accurately capture the individual needs of children or the importance of groupbased claims to children’s belonging. Thus, in the next section, I construct a
middle way for thinking about relationships between children and their
communities of origin, one that complements children’s needs for parental care
with group-based interests in maintaining children’s community connections

4. Adoptions as Child-Centered and Collaborative
In §3, I presented and critiqued two views about children’s belonging. I argued
that the first view wrongly ascribes a particular identity to children upon birth;
and essentializes, determines, and instrumentalizes children; and the second
view was insufficiently attentive to and dismissive of the positions of indigenous
and racialized groups, and the value of children’s social identities. In this section,
I articulate a view of children’s belonging that strikes a middle way between these
two extremes. Rather than being a compromise position, I understand this view
of children’s belonging as harmonizing conflicting views about children’s
relationships to their communities of birth.
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In what follows, I develop a view of adoptions as child-centered and
collaborative. On this view, children’s interests in shaping their identities are
respected and nurtured, and they are given opportunities to form and maintain
meaningful connections with their communities of origin, on their own terms.
Moreover, communities of origin and adoptive families collaborate with one
another where appropriate to help the child to develop healthy, secure
attachments and to have pride in their identities.

4.1. Children’s Voices
Debates about children’s belonging often neglect to include children’s voices.
Decisions are often made for or about children, seldom in consultation with
them. In my view, safeguarding children’s interests in decisions about their
welfare requires listening to them and incorporating their perspectives into the
process of determining the best familial placements for their particular situation,
assuming they are old, capable, and mature enough to participate in at least some
of the process.
As Claire Fenton-Glynn argues, children’s “right to be heard” in adoption
proceedings should be consistently upheld across jurisdictions. She contends that
this right, codified in the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, has
substantive, procedural, and symbolic value.422 By listening to children, the
decision-maker is able to incorporate the child’s experiences and preferences into
rulings about their “best interests”. The child’s input allows the decision-maker to
make a more fully informed determination about a suitable adoptive placement.
Moreover, involving the child in the process affords the child due respect in the
process. If given the opportunity to participate in decision-making about their
adoptive placement, children are more likely to understand the process and be
amenable to the placement. Children who are left out of the process altogether
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may respond less favourably to the decision and may have difficulty adapting to
their assigned familial environment. As Fenton-Glynn suggests, including
children in the decision-making process is a way of respecting them as
participants, even if it turns out that their wishes are ultimately deemed to be not
in their best interests. Finally, children’s participation grants them respect for
their bourgeoning autonomy, a value recognized in the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Including children in the process of familial placement
affords them appropriate treatment as rights-bearers, as opposed to passive
recipients of rights. Rather than treating them as objects of protection, giving
children a voice in adoption proceedings allows them to express themselves as
individuals whose views are worthy of consideration. 423
Giving children a voice also means allowing them the freedom to influence
the frequency, kind, and conditions of the connections they have with their birth
communities. Maintaining connections with one’s birth community will be more
or less desirable for different children. For some children, the expectation to be a
member of a community in which they have not grown up is burdensome, while
other children welcome connections with their cultural roots as a means of
gaining a better sense of identity that conquers feelings of loss.424 Facilitating
connections on the child’s own terms will give them a say in the extent to which
they would like to stay connected with their birth communities, and how so.
Because children may not have fully informed preferences about whether
or not to maintain community connections, it is imperative that their autonomy
be supported by family members who can assess and, if needed, supersede their
expressed wishes. For instance, parents of a young child who wishes to not
participate in cultural traditions of their birth community may nonetheless
involve the family (and the child) in those traditions, until such time that the
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child can better understand the significance of choosing to participate or not. It is
perhaps especially important for parents to be able to assert their own authority
over children’s preferences if predictive assessments of the child’s future wellbeing as a result of not having maintained community connections appear
unfavourable. For instance, a child may not have the insight to gauge the longterm importance of maintaining connections with their birth communities, so
parents may need to find ways to keep their children connected despite their
wishes to the contrary. Parents will need to moderate their decisions according to
their child’s age, capabilities, and maturity. Crucially, listening to children’s
voices in child welfare contexts means accepting that different children will have
varying levels of allegiance to their birth culture: some will embrace it, while
others will dissent from it. Allowing them to have a say (though perhaps not a
decisive say) is what is means to give children a voice in shaping their belonging
and identity.
Given the magnitude and severity of the global orphan crisis, it is critical
that children in need of parental care receive timely interventions. Research
shows that children who spent prolonged periods of time in temporary care
arrangements (e.g., institutions, foster care) or who are on the streets without
adequate care face serious potential harms, including increased risks of
disordered

attachment,

psychological

and

emotional

disturbances,

and

vulnerability to abuse.425 Because the stakes for children’s safety and well-being
are high, child welfare (in particular, the placement of children in stable,
permanent, loving homes) is a critically time-sensitive matter. While groups do
have legitimate claims about their children due to having experienced histories of
oppression, it is also imperative that children do not become sentimentalized
and, as a result, denied timely care as needed. Hearst’s views align with my own.
She says, “Children should not be unduly burdened with carrying forward any
particular group’s identities or claims. The interests of children, rather, should be
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framed in ways that understand their interests in exploring their origins as they
mature”.426 In trying to balance group-based interests in children’s belonging, we
should not forget that children have fundamental needs for parental care.
Approaching adoptions from a child-centered perspective by including
children’s voices alleviates the problems associated with the ‘community
representative’ view of children’s belonging. By awarding children a voice in their
familial placements, children are given the freedom to understand and shape
their relationship with their communities of origin as they grow. A child-centered
view avoids ascribing a particular cultural right to children and placing
expectations on them to adhere to certain ways of life. Rather, it allows children
to identify with aspects of their culture and community on their own terms. In
this way, a child-centered approach to adoptions treats each child as a unique
individual with varying needs for connections to their birth communities. Instead
of fixing children’s identities and assigning them a “primordial identity”, the
emphasis on children’s voices acknowledges that different children require
different degrees of access and attachment to their communities of origin.
Recognizing the individuality of children thus also circumvents the problem of
instrumentalization that arises from the ‘community representatives’ view of
children.

4.2. Collaborations Between Communities
Second, in my view, adoptions should involve mutual respect and collaboration
between birth and adoptive communities, assuming that information about the
child’s origins are known.
The symbiotic relationship between children and tribal communities that
Richard describes427 need not be antithetical to transracial adoption placements.
In fact, children who receive parental care from non-indigenous parents need not
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be isolated from their communities of birth upon placement. Rather, the
relationship can persist post-placement, allowing the child to gain the goods of
both a stable, permanent, loving home, and sustained connection with members
of their birth community. Take, for example, the Walsh family in Canada, who
exemplifies this continued relationality with their indigenous adopted child
Rick’s birth family. Although Rick’s parents do not share his race, they made
concerted efforts to keep him connected to his birth family and community “by
encouraging telephone calls and correspondence, and by inviting the families to
visit”.428 Once Rick’s birth family reciprocated the Walsh’s communication and
visited the Walsh’s over a weekend, Rick and his adopted siblings made periodic
visits up north to visit his birth family. Rick’s father, Roy, describes his now-late
son as “the epitome of being connected”, for he maintained relationships on his
own terms with members of his birth community, as well as friends, colleagues,
and others with whom he connected in his daily life.429 This is a case of how one
family effectively navigated the cultural landscape in their transracial indigenous
adoption.
Hearst draws attention to the importance of approaching issues of
children’s belonging from a collaborative perspective. She explains:
Communities that seek to revitalize themselves by
reclaiming children whose connections are highly
attenuated must be willing to seek an accommodation with
competing communities. Moreover, disadvantaged
communities must be realistic about their own abilities to
cope with large numbers of vulnerable children. Although
the precarious position of many children in such
communities can typically be traced to a series of historic
injustices, not every injustice is easily or immediately
remediable, and providing immediate care for vulnerable
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children is a problem of such magnitude in many
communities that it may be difficult, if not impossible, for
marginalized communities to respond adequately in the
moment. At the same time, privileged communities must
not jump to the conclusion that the best solution is always
to remove children through adoption or foster care, and
make more than illusory efforts to alleviate the problems
that lead to large numbers of abandoned and needy
children in the first place. …
This kind of compromise and accommodation is largely
absent from the political contest over adoption currently
being waged on both the domestic and international
fronts.430
Importantly, the relationship between birth and adoptive families needs to
be one of mutual respect and collaboration. Adoptive parents must be willing to
facilitate connections with their child’s birth communities, and birth
communities should remain supportive of the child and their adoptive parents
post-adoption.
My view of adoptions as involving collaborations between a child’s birth
and adoptive families (where possible) solves the problems associated with the
‘liberationist view’ of children’s belonging that is dismissive of groups’ claims to
children in light of historical and ongoing oppression, and which is also
inattentive to the needs of some adoptees for close community connections.
Viewing adoptions as collaborations between communities – both birth and
adoptive – highlights the importance of forming networks of care to meet
children’s needs, primarily for parental care but also for developing secure and
healthy social (e.g., racial) identities. Instead of relying on birth parents or
adoptive parents to fulfill all of a child’s needs, my view of adoptions as
collaborative recognizes the importance of working with others to provide
children with appropriate supports throughout their lives. Roy Walsh, an
adoptive father of eleven children, imparts the following wisdom: “If we are to
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succeed in this dialogue, it will be with the understanding that parents are not
proprietary owners of children. Whether they come to us by birth, by legal
sanction, by blended families, or unanticipated circumstances, we are only
entrusted with their care for a short time. We are accountable to them for this
privilege”.431 Helping children develop healthy, secure identities can be done
outside the care of birth communities or same-race parents, as long as we
conceive of adoptions as existing within larger networks of relationships.

4.3. Implications for a Duty to Adopt
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of a child-centered, collaborative
approach to adoptions. My view has two main implications for a duty to adopt.
Recall that, in Chapter 2, I developed three potential objections to the duty,
founded on appeals to a limited right to procreate for reasons of reparative
justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation. In Chapter 3, I made a
compelling case that these group-based goals can be pursued through adopting
children within or outside one’s racial group. In this chapter, I went beyond that
rebuttal and addressed a more fundamental idea: that the needs of individual
children to have parental care outweigh group-based interests in not adopting or
in resisting adoptions by those outside one’s racial group. Children who need
parental care should not be denied care as a result of group interests that
compromise their chances of adoptive placement.
The two implications of a duty to adopt are as follows. First, communities
who are unable to provide parental care for their children must be open to
allowing their children to be adopted by people outside the community who are
willing and able to provide this care. Second, prospective parents who are
members of racially oppressed groups must honour a moral duty to provide
parental care (i.e., a duty to adopt) for children outside their racial group.
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My argument in this chapter was that children’s needs for parental care
cannot be overridden by group-based interests that privilege procreation over
adoption or attempt to justify not adopting children outside one’s racial group. I
have articulated a view of adoptions as involving collaborations between birth
and adoptive families, where possible, for the purpose of helping children
develop healthy identities and for guiding – to an appropriate degree – the extent
to which children would like to maintain or withdraw connections with their
communities of origin.

5. Conclusion
In this final chapter, I argued against a view of children as being tightly and
interdependently bound to their birth communities, and also against a view that
children are liberated individuals who are entirely disconnected from their
communities of origin. Crucially, where the needs of individual child for parental
care come in tension with the interests of oppressed groups who claim authority
and sovereignty over children, I defended a view of adoptions as being childcentered and involving collaboration between the child’s birth community and
adoptive family, so as to meet the child’s best interests. As it pertains to a duty to
adopt, I made the case that the needs of individual children take priority over
group-based interests in seeking (through procreation, or against transracial
adoption) reparative justice, racial solidarity, cultural preservation, sovereignty,
etc. Structural inequalities that render children parentless or otherwise in need of
parental care need to be addressed, but because these are massive problems that
require long-term solutions, I maintained that children who need parental care
should not be denied that care in the meantime. Instead of viewing children as
proprietary entities of parents and birth communities, my view allows us to view
adoptions as existing within larger networks of relationships, in which we all play
a role in helping children develop healthy and secure identities as they grow. This
chapter concludes my final defense of a duty to adopt.
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Conclusion
In my dissertation, I have argued that all prospective parents have a moral duty
to adopt children rather than procreating. I defended the duty from a series of
objections, with a special focus on group-based claims to reparative justice, racial
solidarity, and cultural preservation in favour of procreation and against
transracial adoptions. I began by introducing the framework of the duty,
reviewing its foundational structure of obligatory rescue and defining its scope
and force. Then, I engaged with proposed defeating conditions to the duty,
ranging from parental desires for a child who shares physical resemblance, to
desires to experience pregnancy, to concerns about the appropriateness of
obligating aid in the form of adoption. I responded to each objection in turn,
demonstrating the persuasiveness of a duty to adopt.
Having established the strength of the duty and its resilience against many
objections, I then evaluated a set of challenges that are overlooked in existing
philosophical literature, namely, those that are group-based (i.e., deriving
primarily from one’s membership in a social group). I distinguished group-based
reasons from self-regarding, child-centered, and other-regarding reasons. After
describing two relevant theories of race, I developed three group-based reasons
in favour of procreation: for reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural
preservation. I argued that members of racially oppressed groups seem to have
strong reasons for justifiably forgoing adoption in favour of procreation, thereby
overriding a duty to adopt. On the reparative justice argument, the claim is that
members of racial groups that have experienced historical or ongoing oppression
in the form of anti-natalism or reproductive injustices are entitled to procreate as
a way of reclaiming and asserting their procreative liberties. On the racial
solidarity argument, members of racially oppressed groups are entitled to
procreate as an act of political resistance and as an expression of self-worth and
affirmation of one’s group. On the cultural preservation argument, members of
racially oppressed groups have a right to procreate as a means of honouring one’s
cultural traditions, resisting cultural assimilation, or passing on one’s culture
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through ancestral lineage. I argued that these three reasons pose very strong
objections to the duty to adopt and, for this reason, are worth taking seriously.
With these three looming challenges to the duty to adopt, I then argued
that each of them does not provide definitive support for procreation over
adoption but, rather, provides compelling reasons for members of racially
oppressed groups to adopt children within or outside their racial groups instead
of procreating. To set the stage for these arguments, I provided demographic
information about child welfare systems on a global scale and within localized
contexts, drawing attention to disproportionate overrepresentation of children of
colour and racialized children. On the reparative justice argument, prospective
parents who are members of racially oppressed groups should adopt children of
the same race as a way of reclaiming familial and community bonds that have
been compromised through familial injustices enacted by the state. Moreover,
reparative justice can be achieved through widespread racial integration,
including adoptions that involve differently raced children and parents. On the
racial solidarity argument, providing parental care for children who share one’s
race is a way of expressing bonds of social and political solidarity. On the cultural
preservation argument, prospective parents who are members of racially
oppressed groups would benefit from adopting children who share one’s race by
passing on culture through these familial lineages. Moreover, adopting children
outside one’s racial group is a way of expanding a group’s cultural influence and
growing one’s cultural community through enculturation of one’s children and
future lineage. All in all, I made the case that group-based reasons to favour
procreation do not successfully override one’s duty to adopt but, rather, support
adoption of children within or outside one’s racial group. However, I noted a few
outstanding group-based challenges to the duty.
Finally, I argued that group-based interests – to seek reparative justice,
racial solidarity, cultural preservation, and also political goods such as
sovereignty – cannot override the needs of individual children for parental care. I
contrasted two views of children’s belonging, one that views children as
representatives of their communities of origin and another than views children as
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disconnected individuals who are liberated from any attachments to their
communities of origin. I critiqued each of these views and showed how neither of
them adequately characterizes children’s relationships to their communities of
origin. I offered my own view of adoptions as child-centered and collaborative,
bridging a gap in the two views in a way that harmonizes the dissonance in how
children are viewed. I emphasized the importance of listening to children’s voices
in helping to shape their relationships with birth communities, and the
importance of birth and adoptive families to collaborate so as to provide children
with parental care and also supports so that they have access to community
connections as they grow. Ultimately, I refuted attempts for communities to hold
onto children to the detriment of children’s expedient placement in adoptive
families as needed, and for prospective parents who are members of racially
oppressed groups to appeal to procreation or attempts to justify their stance
against not adopting children outside their racial groups. Crucially, the
implication for a duty to adopt is that group-based interests cannot override the
needs of individual children for parental care.
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